Illicit Nuclear Trade and Security Risks in the Middle East

This report assessed the risk of illicit radiological and nuclear material trafficking originating from Iran, particularly under scenarios of regime instability or collapse. Iran was the central focus because it combines three critical risk factors: it is a focal point of an ongoing major conflict, it maintains extensive smuggling networks, and it possesses a significant stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other radiological materials. Together, these factors create a credible risk that materials could be diverted to proxy groups or other non-state actors.

The analysis addressed three core questions: What might happen to Iran's nuclear and radiological materials if regime control weakens? Which states are most likely to serve as transit corridors and why? What early-warning indicators and policy tools the United States can deploy to detect and disrupt smuggling efforts? The report also examined the challenge of detecting HEU. Current radiation detection systems provide important capabilities, but HEU's weak radiation signature and susceptibility to shielding complicate interdiction — especially in high-volume transit environments or when materials are deliberately concealed.

To identify where smuggling risks are most acute, the report employed a principal component analysis to a dataframe of governance, security, and connectivity indicators, then incorporated findings into a weighted composite index built on three pillars: Iranian operational presence, physical and economic access, and state fragility. Based on this analysis, the report developed targeted recommendations for the Department of Energy's nuclear smuggling detection and deterrence program, focusing on prioritizing high-risk corridors, strengthening detection capabilities, and enhancing partner-state coordination.