

TRANSITIONING TO PEACE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE UN PRESENCE IN SUDAN



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This report is the capstone project for SIPA, Columbia University for the International Peace Institution. We are grateful for the support from organizations around the world for speaking with us including numerous departments in the UN.

The views expressed in the report reflect the authors and not necessarily those of IPI or our interviewees.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFP United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programs

AU African Union

CAN Community Alert Network

CEDAW The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

CLA Community Liaison Assistant

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CRSV Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

DPO United Nations Department of Peace Operations

DPPA United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

FFC Forces for Freedom and Change

GoS Government of Sudan

HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

HRDDP Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

ICC International Criminal Court

IDP Internally Displaced Person

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

IPI International Peace Institute

IPO Individual Police Officers

JMACs Joint Mission Analysis Center

MINUJUSTH UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NP Nonviolent Peaceforce

NSAG Non-State Armed Group

ABBREVIATIONS

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PBC Peacebuilding Commission

POC Protection of Civilians

QUIP Quick Impact Project

RSF Rapid Support Forces

SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SLFs State Liaison Functions

SLM/A Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army

SNHRC Sudanese National Human Rights Commission

SPM Special Political Mission

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UCP Unarmed Civilian Protection

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq

UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNPOL United Nations Police

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is closing in 2020, despite significant human rights and civilian protection risks in Darfur and in Sudan more broadly.¹ In the past three decades, Sudan experienced a decades-long civil war, confronted consistent and severe instability, and witnessed the overthrow of its thirty-year long regime in a peaceful protest. While the final form of the follow-on United Nations presence has yet to be determined, we assess that the UN is most likely to establish a Chapter VI Special Political Mission (SPM) as its follow-on presence.² Our recommendations are centered around three themes: human rights monitoring, protection of civilians, and peacebuilding and capacity building. The issues that fall under these themes are important for promoting peace in Sudan and preventing conflict. Our following recommendations mitigate protection of civilians and human rights risks:³

Human Rights Monitoring

1. The UN should ensure that there is a Human Rights component in the SPM that works closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on reporting, monitoring, and capacity building. **(Pg. 23)**
2. The UN should continue to work closely with the Government of Sudan (GoS) to strengthen the capacity of Sudan's police. **(Pg. 24)**
3. The SPM should continue to support the Sudanese National Human Rights Commission (SNHRC). **(Pg. 29)**

4. The UN should work with the GoS to address continued gender inequities. **(Pg. 29)**
5. The UN should encourage the GoS to include transitional justice proposals in any subsequent peace agreements. **(Pg. 26)**

Protection of Civilians

6. The SPM should include a Protection of Civilians (POC) component. **(Pg. 22)**
7. The GoS should, with UN support, expand the weapons collection program in a more inclusive manner. **(Pg. 24)**
8. The UN should encourage the GoS to strengthen and expand reforms of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). **(Pg. 25)**
9. The UN Security Council (UNSC) should encourage unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in Darfur. **(Pg. 26)**
10. The SPM should establish Integrated Analysis and Integrated Information Hubs. **(Pg. 31)**

Peacebuilding and Capacity Building

11. The SPM should carry over UNAMID's Civil Affairs Division. **(Pg. 27)**
12. The State Liaison Functions (SLFs) should be carried over. **(Pg. 28)**
13. The SPM should utilize "Mobile Teams" and work with the Peacebuilding Commission as learned from the

¹ See Section IV: Context of UNAMID's Transition.

² See Section IV. D: The Future of UNAMID.

³ See Section VI.

transition cases in Haiti and Liberia.
(Pg. 32)

14. The United Nations (UN) should facilitate the development of a compact between the GoS and the international community.
(Pg. 21)

Sudan is at a moment of remarkable instability and transition, but also opportunity. The transitional government and the constitutional process could generate a much more stable future for Sudan, which the SPM could help facilitate. Furthermore, if successful, mechanisms from this transition could serve as best practices for other UN missions that will be closing in the near future.

Image 1. UNHCR Refugees in Darfur⁴



⁴Aristophane Ngargoune, UNHCR Refugees in Darfur (January 2020). <https://www.unhcr.org/nl/2020/01/geweld-darfur-soedan-duizenden-gevlucht/>.

II. INTRODUCTION

The streets of Khartoum wear an empty and desolate look in the light of the state of emergency declared in March 2020 by the Sudanese government to control the spread of coronavirus.⁵ While this is not unlike the situation in many places all across the world, the current social environment in Sudan stands in stark contrast to the one the world witnessed there a year ago when popular uprisings in the country's capital were allowed to gain momentum and resulted in the ouster of Omar al-Bashir from 30 years of power. This subsequently led to the establishment of a transitional civilian-military "Sovereign Council" with a mandate of 39 months beginning in August 2019. These developments considered alongside the ongoing peace talks between the Sovereign Council and various Darfuri armed groups continue to generate hope for a more peaceful and stable Sudan.

However, the conflict in Darfur and other regions of Sudan still awaits a sustainable and feasible resolution. The special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was released on 12 March 2020, confirms the continuation of intercommunal clashes and displacement of refugees and vulnerable populations in Jebel Marra and West Darfur due to in-fighting among armed groups, and also implicates Sudan's RSF in these attacks.⁶ The protection of civilians and human rights therefore remain critical issues that we cannot afford to ignore especially in

light of UNAMID's drawdown, currently scheduled for October 2020. After facing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the UNSC is now expected to convene in June to decide on the contours and objectives of an international follow-on presence.

This report, commissioned by the International Peace Institute (IPI) and written by capstone consultants at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, focuses on the two key aspects of civilian protection and protection of human rights in Darfur, analyzing their current status, identifying unresolved challenges, and recommending options for key decision makers in the international community and in Sudan, with a view to mitigating risks to human lives and maximizing the conditions for peace in Darfur, and in the country.

⁵Cameron Hudson, "Op-Ed: Sudan's Revolution One Year after Fall of Al Bashir Dictatorship," Radio Dabanga, 13 April 2020, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-sudan-s-revolution-one-year-after-fall-of-al-bashir-dictatorship>.

⁶"Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on

the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and a Follow-on Presence" (United Nations Security Council, March 12, 2020), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/s_2020_202.pdf.

III. METHODOLOGY

Our research used the IPI's recent report titled "Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur" as its starting point. This was followed by a comprehensive literature review on UNAMID's role, studied against the broader context of UN peacekeeping missions, UNSC resolutions and Sudanese politics. We also reviewed lessons learnt from other peacekeeping transitions in Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia, UN doctrines on the POC and mission transition planning, and commentary by independent human rights organizations. Official reports from the UN and African Union (AU) were complemented by scholarly works on Sudan and Darfur. Events, reports and news articles up to 15 April 2020 were considered during this phase.

We also distilled the initial findings of this secondary research process to develop questions for our primary research phase. We interviewed 25 experts and other persons of interest including UN staff members at Headquarters and in the field working across different departments, diplomats from country missions that have a stake in Sudan and Darfur, Darfuri civil society activists, a representative of a Darfuri armed group, staff from NGOs and INGO tracking human rights and humanitarian issues in the region, as well as academics and researchers at Columbia University and think tanks. While the report includes insights from the field, it was not possible for our research team to travel to the region to speak to locals, given the security situation even before the COVID-19 crisis.

We collated findings from these interviews and used them in conjunction with our secondary research findings to inform and support our analysis and draw up our recommendations.

A. Historical Context

In the past thirty years alone, Sudan has undergone a decades-long civil war, confronted consistent and severe instability, become a hot spot for emerging terrorist networks, and most recently, witnessed the overthrow of its thirty-year long regime by hundreds of thousands of Sudanese in peaceful protest. Sudan is a multi-layered country that escapes easy analysis, an amalgam of challenging dynamics.⁷

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), formally ending the Sudanese Civil War that had marred the previous 22 years and killed more than two million people. Months later, the UNSC mobilized to support the CPA by founding a new mission, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Omar al-Bashir, the then-longtime President of Sudan, vigorously opposed the mission. Though he argued that it was a violation of Sudan's sovereignty and that the UN was hostile to Sudan, al-Bashir begrudgingly accepted the mission.⁸ Again over his objections, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1706, which gave UNMIS a mandate to operate in Darfur, which developed into a new mission and partnership with the AU to protect civilians in the midst of the conflict and between the Sudanese government and armed movements.⁹

This new mission, UNAMID, was established in 2007 and officially deployed in

2008. President al-Bashir actively resisted the effective implementation of the mission and obstructed their access to many of the most vulnerable civilians in Darfur by preventing the free movement of UN Peacekeepers in violation of the Status of Forces Agreement.¹⁰

One of the central components of the CPA was a referendum in 2011 that would give citizens in South Sudan the choice of declaring independence or remaining in Sudan. About 99% voted for independence, leading to the final conclusion of the Civil War, and the creation of a new nation – but not the end of tensions between the South and the North, as disagreements remained over the rights to territorial oil.¹¹ While the result of the referendum was widely lauded as a success for the United Nations, South Sudan remained unstable. By 2013, South Sudan fell into a brutal civil war that drove hundreds of thousands of refugees to cross the border back into Sudan.¹²

⁷ Jean-Marie Guehenno, "Sudan: Dangers of a Fragmented Strategy for a Fragmented Country" and "Darfur: Deploying Peacekeepers against All Odds" in *The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2015).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Sudan: Down-Sized UN Mission for an Over-Sized Human Rights Crisis," Amnesty International, 28 June 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR5486802018ENGLISH.pdf>.

¹⁰ Richard Gowan, "Darfur Highlights the Challenge of Shuttering U.N. Peacekeeping Missions," *World Politics Review*, 23 July 2018, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25181/darfur-highlights-the-challenge-of-shuttering-u-n-peacekeeping-missions>.

¹¹ "South Sudan referendum: 99% vote for independence," *BBC News*, 30 January 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927>

¹² Guehenno, "Sudan: Dangers of a Fragmented Strategy" and "Darfur: Deploying Peacekeepers."

Extremists and terrorists remain at large in Sudan. The United States first designated Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993, for its support of the Abu Nidal Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad.¹³ The *USS Cole* bombing and the East Africa Embassy bombings were planned at least in part on Sudanese territory, and Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan for several years.¹⁴ Up until 2013, Hamas continued to be a declared ally of Sudan, when the Sudanese government finally shuttered the Hamas and Hezbollah offices in an effort to distance the country from its ties to terrorism.¹⁵ However, the permeability of Sudan's borders and the Libyan conflict have ensured that Sudan continues to be a center of arms trafficking and a permissive operating environment for extremists. Sudan remains on the United States' State Sponsors of Terrorism list and continues to face the associated sanctions.

Sudan has struggled to grow and maintain its economy, which was exacerbated by economic sanctions, along with rampant and widespread government corruption. In 2018 and 2019, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens protested the growing economic crisis, the end of the bread subsidies, corruption, and elitism. Despite brutal repression from the Bashir government, the protests gained momentum

and Bashir was overthrown and arrested in April 2019. A transitional military council took over power – while Sudanese protesters remained in the streets for weeks, demanding a larger presence for civilians in the government and a commitment to a democratic transition. Activist groups and the military forged a compromise – elections would be held in 2022, and until then Sudan would be led by a Sovereign Council, composed of both military and civilian leaders.¹⁶

The UNSC renewed UNAMID's mandate through 31 October 2020, hoping to support the fledgling government and to provide stability at the beginnings of the Constitutional process.¹⁷ The current focus of UNAMID is on supporting the peace process, to include peacebuilding activities, and monitoring human rights and protecting civilians.

B. Security Context in Darfur

Many of the underlying grievances in Darfur remain unaddressed. The “diminution of armed conflicts does not mean diminution of protection concerns in Darfur.”¹⁸ Despite the reported marginal decrease in the number of clashes and fatalities, tensions between herders and farmers over land endure, fueled by climate change. In Darfur generally, security has been hampered by the limited

¹³ “Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 - United States Department of State: Sudan,” U.S. Department of State, 1 November 2019, <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/#Sudan>.

¹⁴ John Prendergast, “Don't Remove Sudan From the Terrorism List,” U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News & World Report, February 23, 2018), <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-report/articles/2018-02-23/dont-remove-sudan-from-the-terrorism-list>.

¹⁵ Cleo Haynal, “Tension between the Sudans: Not Just Oil, but a Lack of Foresight,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 5, no. 7 (2013): 8, accessed February 23, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26351164; Laura Kelly, “Sudan Closing Hamas and Hezbollah Offices in Bid for U.S. Sanctions Relief,”

The Hill (December 16, 2019), <https://thehill.com/policy/international/474806-sudan-closing-hamas-and-hezbollah-offices-in-bid-for-us-sanctions-relief>.

¹⁶ Alexandra Novosselof, Marc Jacquand, and Paige Arthur, “Peace Operations 2019,” Global Peace Operations Review, Center for International Cooperation (December 2019), https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/peace-operations-review-2019-web-final_0.pdf.

¹⁷ “UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): Mandate Renewal,” What's In Blue (30 October 2019), <https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/10/un-au-hybrid-operation-in-darfur-unamid-mandate-renewal-3.php>.

¹⁸ UNAMID Official, Interview with the authors, 12 February 2020.

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presence and capacity of law enforcement personnel and rule of law outside of the main population centers. This limited presence and capacity of law enforcement leaves IDPs and refugees especially at risk of harm, including from sexual violence.¹⁹ While the revolution inspired much hope across Sudan, not all of that hope has resulted in meaningful change, particularly in the lives of those living in Darfur. As UNAMID is closing without a sustainable peace agreement, the structural drivers of conflict in the region have not been resolved.²⁰

The security situation in Darfur remains volatile, and the UN is proceeding with the drawdown of UNAMID forces despite persistent POC and human rights challenges.²¹ While the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was signed in 2011 in an attempt to bring stability to the conflict-ravaged area, it remains largely unimplemented, and many of the key opposition groups were not included in the negotiations. Furthermore, some opposition groups that were not included have sent their forces to serve as mercenaries in countries all over the region. This may provide the groups with experienced fighters and funds, which could contribute to future instability.²²

While the revolution and the overthrow of Bashir in 2019 changed the

government structure and the lives of those in Khartoum, it has not yet delivered substantial changes in the lives of civilians living in Darfur, who continued to be terrorized by militias.²³ Distrust between Darfuris and the government continues to fester as a result of human rights abuses and protection challenges which limits the ability of the new government to govern the territory. This distrust then exacerbates the protection of civilians and human rights challenges.²⁴ There have been sporadic protests against the Sovereign Council around Sudan, but government forces have treated Darfuris far harsher than protestors in other areas of the country.²⁵ Furthermore, grave violations of human rights by government forces continue, particularly in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur.²⁶ While there is less violence than during the civil war, violence nevertheless remains omnipresent.

Additionally, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees continued to face obstacles to voluntarily returning to their homes, not the least of which is that many no longer have land or homes to return to.²⁷ Militia groups continue to block IDPs from returning to their homes as they compete over land and natural resources.²⁸ As of June 2018, there remain more than 1.8 million displaced persons in Darfur, and refugee and

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 1 June 2018."

²⁰ Daniel Forti, "Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur," International Peace Institute (December 2019), <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/12/navigating-crisis-and-opportunity-the-peacekeeping-transition-in-darfur>.

²¹ "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID," United Nations Security Council (15 October 2019), 4, <https://undocs.org/S/2019/816>.

²² Verjee, "Downsizing the UN-AU Mission."

²³ Tom Gardner, "Sudan's Revolution Runs aground in Darfur," The New Humanitarian (January 2020), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/1/8/Darfur-Sudan-Janjaweed-militia-revolution-conflict-IDPs-displacement>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Jehanne Henry, "Sudan's Transition Hasn't Ended Abuses in Darfur: Leaders Should Hold Abusive Officials, Forces to Account," Human Rights Watch (May 8, 2019), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/08/sudans-transition-hasnt-ended-abuses-darfur#>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Guehenno, "Sudan: Dangers of a Fragmented Strategy" and "Darfur: Deploying Peacekeepers."

²⁸ "Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of UNAMID," United Nations Security Council (1 June 2018); <https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1816017.pdf>.

IDP camps from both the Sudanese civil war and the South Sudanese civil war persist.²⁹ The continued presence of IDPs and refugees in Darfur presents both human rights and POC challenges that the Sovereign Council, even with the aid of UNAMID, has yet to meet.

C. Current Political Situation

The current political situation—both within Sudan and internationally—contributes to the instability and the challenges of the UNAMID transition. The Sovereign Council is composed of five military personnel and six civilians, and will govern for a 39-month period, at which point Sudan is expected to elect a new government in accordance with the conclusions of the constitutional process.³⁰

The constitutional process has included a fairly broad coalition of armed groups in Sudan.³¹ Perhaps more importantly, the constitutional process has been led by the Sudanese people.³² Furthermore, the peace negotiations between the government and rebel groups, The Juba Peace Talks, have continued, and the government and most rebel groups continue to reaffirm their commitment to the peace process, though progress has been faltering and deadlines have been regularly pushed back.³³ The progress in the constitutional process has been encouraging, but this will be a challenging transition. Failure to transition

successfully could have detrimental impacts on the security of Darfur.

Political challenges within the UNSC are also shaping the UNAMID transition.³⁴ The withdrawal of UNAMID is a decision driven in part not by timing, but by finances, as the United States is interested in lowering the cost of peacekeeping. While the intention was originally to close UNAMID in June 2020, the removal of President Omar al-Bashir generated enough instability to warrant four more months of the mission in the UNSC's deliberations, and the drawdown was unanimously extended to its completion in October of 2020.

D. The Future of UNAMID

As UNAMID draws down, the UNSC has yet to formally decide what type of mission will follow. However, it is clear that the reconfiguration of the UN presence in Darfur presents one of the most challenging transitions in peacekeeping.³⁵ The drawdown takes place within a volatile moment in Sudan; some regions continue to have enduring protection and human rights challenges.³⁶ The Council expressed its intent to decide a course of action regarding the responsible drawdown and exit of UNAMID by the end of May 2020 and to adopt a new resolution to establish a follow-on presence.³⁷ UNAMID's transition must be understood as a reconfiguration of the UN presence in Sudan rather than as the simple

²⁹ Amnesty International, "Down-Sized UN Mission for an Oversized Human Rights Crisis."

³⁰ United Nations Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 15 October 2019," 2.

³¹ "Resolution 2479 (2019)," United Nations Security Council (27 June 2019), <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2479>.

³² United Nations Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 15 October 2019," 3.

³³ "Global Overview," Crisis Watch (January 2020), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch>.

³⁴ Richard Gowan, "Navigating the Storms at the UNSC," International Crisis Group (5 February 2020), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/navigating-storms-un-security-council>.

³⁵ Adam Day, "UN Transitions: Improving Security Council Practice in Mission Settings," United Nations University (2020), 12.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ "Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2517 (2020), Security Council Maintains Force Levels of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," United Nations Security Council (31 March 2020), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14152>.

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end of what once constituted the largest peacekeeping mission ever deployed.³⁸

The end of the al-Bashir regime has opened up opportunities for a new relationship between the UN and Sudan, where the UN presence is no longer forced upon the government but requested in a cooperative way.³⁹ While this is a significant and promising change, protection challenges remain in Darfur.⁴⁰ The closure of UNAMID and the reconfiguration of the UN presence must therefore strike a subtle balance between the ultimate goals of any peacekeeping transition, which are to both prevent a relapse into violent conflict and to give international support to national actors expected to fulfill their responsibility over security and protection of their civilians.⁴¹

As laid out in the joint AU-UN Special Report of October 2019, the coexistence of positive political developments at the national scale and of persistent security, human rights and protection challenges at the regional level requires a two-pronged approach: on the one hand, sustaining the gains made in the areas of protection, rule of law, human rights and durable solutions for IDPs and local communities in Darfur; on the other hand, defining the broader parameters for the follow-on presence with the national authorities to guide the UNSC's engagement with Sudan once UNAMID closes down.⁴²

After consultations with the Sudanese government, the AU and the UN agreed on several parameters that should guide the design of the future engagement of the UN in Sudan. As laid out in the Special Report, the

follow-on presence should rely on “national ownership and support for its presence [as] a *prerequisite* to its success.” The mandate must be clear, focused, and achievable; it should address issues that do not require military force, and it must have a deployment timeline not exceeding the transition period.⁴³

After the establishment of a joint task force in Khartoum to finalize options for a possible UN presence, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok sent a letter to the President of the UNSC requesting an SPM. Less than two months later, a second similar letter was sent, but with subtle yet telling differences that are likely the result of the delicate political balance between civilians and the military on the Sovereign Council.

In the first letter issued on 28 January 2020, the Sudanese authorities requested “a *Chapter VI* peace support operation in the form of a *special political mission* with a *strong peacebuilding component*,” whose mandate should be country-wide and whose approach should be innovative, agile, coordinated and light. The letter identified six key building blocks that should be included in the SPM's mandate, with particular attention being given to Darfur regarding the Juba process and its implementation and with specific efforts being required “to consolidate the gains in Darfur through peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, development initiatives, and the restoration of state authority.”⁴⁴

Additionally, Prime Minister Hamdok requested UN support for the

³⁸ Forti, “Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur,” 17.

³⁹ UN Security Council Official, Interview with the authors, 9 March 2020.

⁴⁰ UNAMID Official, Interview with the authors, 12 February 2020.

⁴¹ Forti, “Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur,” 22.

⁴² United Nations Security Council, “Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 15 October 2019.”

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ “Letter dated 28 January 2020 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council (January 28, 2020), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_77.pdf.

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repatriation and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, and for reconciliation among communities. Significantly, he called for “the protection of civilians and capacity-building of the national police force,” and for assistance to monitor human rights and help Sudan build its capacity for national institutions.⁴⁵

In contrast, the second letter excludes any mention of what type of follow-on presence the UN would have following the conclusion of the mission, nor does it reassert the need of UN support concerning protection of civilians, and human rights monitoring and capacity-building. Equally important, while the first letter made eight references to Darfur and stressed that the important peace dividends made by UNAMID should “be safeguarded, deepened and *expanded*,” with priority to the worst affected regions like Darfur, the second letter contained only one reference to Darfur. It requested that the UN would provide “assistance to consolidate the gains made in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States through peace-building efforts.”⁴⁶

Our interviews with UN officials revealed that these differences are significant. They convey shifts in position by the Sudanese government, which are likely a result of internal negotiations between the military and civilian components of the Sovereign Council. The first letter embraced a more comprehensive agenda for an SPM, while the second letter emphasized that “intensive consultations” would be needed to formulate a vision for a UN follow-on

presence in Sudan. The first letter – and the Prime Minister – were apparently criticized for requiring a countrywide mission with a protection component that may have included a presence of peacekeepers.⁴⁷ While it is quite evident that Sudan is far more open to working with the United Nations than under President al-Bashir, concerns remain within the government that a comprehensive mandate, and especially the deployment of uniformed personnel, would undermine the national sovereignty of Sudan.

In contrast with the first wave of UN transitions that took place in relatively stable environments, like Côte d’Ivoire or Liberia, the transition in Darfur faces a fundamental limitation: peacekeeping operations are not going to be able to solve all of the underlying challenges of a nation in conflict. The UN presence after the peacekeeping mission must grapple with remaining structural problems.

The Council has two options in tailoring the follow-on presence to shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The first option is to directly transition to a UN Country Team (UNCT). This is often the easier political choice, but it gives the UNSC less tools and operational oversight. The second option is an SPM, which may include peacebuilding, conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery efforts.⁴⁸ This second option is politically more challenging as it requires more direct attention from the UNSC over the country.⁴⁹

Before the requests made by the Prime Minister, transitioning from UNAMID to a country-wide SPM already appeared as the

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶ UNSC, “Letter dated 20 March 2020 from GoS to UNSC.”

⁴⁷ UN Security Council official, Interview with the authors, 9 March 2020.

⁴⁸ Daniel Forti and Lesley Connolly, “Pivoting from Crisis to Development: Preparing for the Next Wave of UN Peace Operations Transitions,” *International Peace Institute*, July 2019.

⁴⁹ “Growing diversity of Security Council briefers in 2019 masked sharp divisions among Members, effects of treaty-shredding unilateral actions,” United Nations Security Council (January 10, 2020), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14073.doc.htm>.

most appropriate option for a future UN engagement in Sudan. Yet, the hybrid nature of UNAMID, the continued threats to civilians in Darfur and the reluctance of the Sudanese authorities to see armed UN peacekeepers or police make the design of the SPM particularly challenging. Therefore, discussions are ongoing regarding the modalities of the SPM.

The UNSC's dynamics and the geopolitical developments in Sudan firstly render any Chapter VII-mandated SPM very unlikely. Yet, as discussed with UN officials, "the residual peacekeeping and protection challenges in some of the 'hot spots' of Darfur [imply that] it would be sort of irresponsible for the Council to take away any international protection" from the follow-on presence. Several field visits have also supported that view, with some IDPs expressing the concern that if UNAMID was to leave, they would also leave, triggering internal displacement in an environment where peace is still very insecure.

There is obviously no clear-cut answer to address all the challenges existing in Darfur and in broader Sudan, however the recent political developments have encouraged a shift in mindset on how the UN now perceives its role in Sudan. It can now work in support of the Sudanese authorities, rather than having no mission presence at all.⁵⁰

The Chairperson of the African Union and the Secretary-General Report of March 2020 is to date a good proxy of what a follow-on presence could look like in Sudan, although a UN official said it was purposely

drafted "not [...] to be very specific," due to the absence of a peace agreement in Darfur potentially requiring the UN to undertake additional responsibilities.⁵¹ According to the report, the ideal option would be a "political and peacebuilding integrated support presence, headquartered in Khartoum, with responsibility for all of Sudan that would be focused on the core political objective of supporting the country's transition."⁵² The post-UNAMID presence is expected to support Sudan-led efforts on peacebuilding and the strengthening of human rights, but the report also warns that: "if a follow-on mission includes a mandate indicating the physical protection of civilians, such a mandate, which has not been requested to date by the transitional GoS, would require a very significant deployment, commensurate with the size of the area of operations. Short of this, a post-UNAMID mechanism would not be in a position to provide such protection and should therefore not be expected to do so."⁵³ While "the responsibilities and capacities for POC work in SPM have so far received less attention," the post-UNAMID presence will certainly help to meet the "urgent need to examine how SPMs, and their unique features, can and should support POC imperatives."⁵⁴

E. Meaning of Protection of Civilians and Human Rights

In UN peacekeeping missions, the POC refers to the responsibility which includes all parts of a peacekeeping mission, up to the use of deadly force, in order to prevent violence

⁵⁰ UN Official, Interview with the authors, 13 February 2020.

⁵¹ UN Official, Interview with the authors, 13 February 2020.

⁵² United Nations Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 15 October 2019."

⁵³ "Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and

a follow-on presence development to build resilience and mitigate protection risks", United Nations Security Council (March 12, 2020), para 64-81.

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_202.pdf.

⁵⁴ Marc Jacquand, "Protection of civilians: challenges and new frontiers for peace operations at the twentieth anniversary," Center on International Cooperation, 2019, 21-26.

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against civilians, regardless of whether the violence comes from state or non-state actors.

POC is guided by the pillars of the UN Charter: human rights, peace and security, and development. Included in this idea is that for peace, there must be a protective environment. If people feel threatened, peace will be harder to achieve. While UNAMID carried a POC mandate, this report discusses at length how a UN presence could seek to maintain a role in protecting civilians in Darfur, and Sudan in general, without a Chapter VII POC mandate.

One of the mechanisms for POC is human rights monitoring, as it often deters would-be perpetrators from committing violations and allows for a greater understanding of threats. In UN peacekeeping missions, including UNAMID, human rights and POC components work together. However, in UNAMID, it has been challenging to monitor human rights violations. The former government impeded monitoring, and the security situation made it hard to accurately gather data. As human rights monitoring is a component of POC, it is important that human rights monitoring continue as an active part of any follow-on UN presence. If civilian protection is not adequately established by the time the mission draws down, it is essential for the follow-on presence to be able to help fill in any significant voids.

The official Department of Peace Operations (DPO) policy on the POC holds that there are three tiers of protection that should be established in environments where there are substantial risks of violence being committed against civilians.

- Tier I, “Protection through dialogue and engagement”
- Tier II, “Provision of physical protection”
- Tier III, “Establishment of a protective environment”

All nations hold the primary responsibility to protect their populations. While the three-tiered approach to POC is a DPO construction, many states use civilian protection methods that could be said to encompass all three of these tiers. There is no hierarchy of importance or necessary sequencing of these tiers.⁵⁵ Each of the recommendations we make regarding POC in this report contribute to one or more of the three tiers. In using the term POC with regards to the anticipated Chapter VI SPM likely to replace UNAMID, we use DPO's tier classification for POC. However, in UN peacekeeping operations, tier II, “provision of physical protection” initiatives “by uniformed components [involve] the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to threats to civilians,” whereas “civilian mission components can also [engage in tier II activities by providing] protective presence through their regular, visible, direct engagement with civilian populations at risk.”⁵⁶ Yet, in the absence of a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission having a POC mandate, an SPM, on its own, is only able to engage in *unarmed* activities falling in tiers I, II, and III. As will be seen in this report, UCP organizations also conduct unarmed activities which involve all three tiers, *including* the “provision of physical protection.” The additional and strategic use of UCP organizations in an environment

⁵⁵ “Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping,” UN Department of Peace Operations, 1 Nov. 2019, 9.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 12.

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where an SPM operates and where threats to civilians are prevalent would complement and multiply civilian protection efforts by the SPM.

Further, in UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates, *all* mission personnel (military, police, and civilians) are expected to engage in activities to protect civilians. Though DPPA has not created a POC policy for SPMs to date, there is no reason why SPMs in countries experiencing POC threats could not also stipulate that all staff members be required to engage in tasks aiming to protect civilians. Though it is to be expected that POC outcomes from SPM

activities may not be as effective as a POC mandated peacekeeping mission due to SPMs' lighter footprint and lack of armed personnel, it is our firm belief that the POC activities recommended in this report, when complimented with the added value of activities of UCP organizations, will provide a level of protection far greater than if no special efforts to protect civilians were made at all. Requiring all staff members in UNAMID's follow-on presence to engage in POC activities will further enhance civilian protection throughout the territory it is mandated to serve.

A. Key Current Challenges to Protecting Civilians in the Absence of UNAMID

From the outset, UNAMID has been unable to adequately fulfill its POC mandate. It faced several challenging obstacles, including limited forces, an inability to obtain sufficient equipment and supplies, intentional obstruction of the mission by President Omar al-Bashir, intentional efforts to target UNAMID personnel, and a lack of any genuine peace to keep.⁵⁷ However, it successfully provided more security in and around IDP camps and the roads connecting the more populated towns in Darfur through its 2010 Darfur Protection Strategy's focus on "protection by presence" patrols.⁵⁸

It is quite clear that protecting civilians remains both a critical challenge and need, and this is likely to continue into the future. The government's willingness and capacity to protect civilians without the help of peacekeepers is doubted by many of the experts we interviewed for our report. Despite UNAMID's presence for nearly 13 years, and the signing of multiple peace agreements, the drivers of the conflict endure. There remain armed militias, disputes over land ownership, and a lack of accountability for atrocities. These protection related issues must be addressed effectively for the conflict to ultimately be resolved.

In 2014, government military attacks against major rebel groups drove most of them out of Sudan, and there have been no major armed confrontations with rebel groups in Darfur since July 2017.⁵⁹ Additionally, there have been no *large-scale* intercommunal clashes since mid-2015.⁶⁰ However, civilians in Darfur still face significant security threats, including occasional attacks against communities by government security forces (particularly the RSF) and various militia groups, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and intercommunal conflicts arising from disputes over land ownership and access to natural resources. Many of these disputes arose as a result of the mass displacement of mainly Fur and Masalit tribes that occurred during earlier years of the war, after which mostly Arab nomadic tribes occupied their properties.⁶¹ Furthermore, there continue to be clashes between security forces of the government and the SLA-Abdul Wahid, especially in areas of Jebel Marra. A high-level diplomat to the UNSC remarked that they have consistently heard that historic hot spots in Jebel Marra, particularly those with parties that have not joined the peace talks, remain insecure.⁶²

Though efforts have been made in previous years by the government to establish legal frameworks whereby IDP communities could regain possession of their lands, 1.8

⁵⁷ Richard Gowan, "Darfur Highlights the Challenge of Shuttering U.N. Peacekeeping Missions," *World Politics Review*, 23 July 2018, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25181/darfur-highlights-the-challenge-of-shuttering-u-n-peacekeeping-missions>; Heiko Nitzshke, "Sudan," in Sebastien Von Einsiedel, David Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte (eds.), *The Security Council in the 21st Century*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015), 625; Lanz, "UNAMID," 5-9.

⁵⁸ David Lanz, "African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)" in Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, October 2015), 6.

⁵⁹ "Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," United Nations Security Council, 30 May 2019, 4; United Nations Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 1 June 2018," 2.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 5.

⁶² UN Security Council Official, Interview with the authors, 2 March 2020.

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million Darfuris – about one-third of the entire population of Darfur – remain displaced today, presenting an ever-present obstacle to reducing tensions and intercommunal violence.⁶³ Militias tied to ethnic groups still proliferate across the region, and use the wide availability of weapons to threaten those claiming prior rights to occupied land from returning.

Additionally, many refugees have migrated to Darfur from neighboring nations also experiencing political instability, including 17,000 refugees from the Central African Republic and 3,000 refugees from Chad.⁶⁴ UNAMID recorded an increase in the overall number of attacks by pastoralists against farmers from 2018 to 2019. In December 2019, the most serious case occurred in West Darfur in El Geneina. A dispute between an IDP and an Arab tribesman led to a sweeping revenge attack by the tribe with support from members of the RSF against IDPs living at the Krinding camp and 18 nearby villages. The attack resulted in at least 65 fatalities and 54 injured individuals, and the displacement of 57,000 people.⁶⁵ Further, there is a concerning upward trend of violence against children and of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and CRSV.⁶⁶

It is true that expanding state authority into much of Darfur has reduced cases of and fatalities from intercommunal

violence in recent years, as the Sudanese Government has sought to drive the main rebel groups out of Darfur.⁶⁷ However, a severe trust deficit remains between the civilian population and the Sudanese security forces, especially the RSF, which contains elements of the Janjaweed militias that the Government used to perpetuate violence during the genocide in 2003.

Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka “Hemeti”) is the leader of the RSF and Vice-Chair of Sudan’s new Sovereign Council. He led the Janjaweed, the forces which developed into the RSF, and according to a Darfuri activist interviewed by Al Jazeera, are perceived as “more powerful than the Sudanese forces itself... it is very provocative to see Hemeti and Burhan both lead the transitional government, and so there is no trust here.”⁶⁸ Indeed, International Crisis Group concludes that “earlier in his career [Hemeti] led militias accused of perpetrating some of the worst killings in Darfur...”⁶⁹ Musa Bakri, a senior leader and spokesman for the SLM/A-Abdul Wahid (the last major non-state armed group still in Darfur) told us, “90% of the RSF are from one tribe” and are racist towards the non-Arab population.⁷⁰ According to the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, the RSF has been implicated in abuses ranging from murder, torture, rape, sexual assault, excessive use of

⁶³ United Nations Security Council, “Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 1 June 2018,” 16.

⁶⁴ “UNHCR seeks international solidarity for refugees and hosts in Sudan,” UNHCR, 14 January 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/1/5e1d81254/unhcr-seeks-international-solidarity-refugees-hosts-sudan.html>; “Sudan: As of 13 January 2020,” UNHCR, January 2020, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Sudan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%202013JAN20.pdf>.

⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council, “Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID 12 March 2020,” 3.

⁶⁶ UNAMID Official, Interview with authors, 12 February 2020.

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council, “Special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the SG on UNAMID,” 30 May 2019, 5.

⁶⁸ “Sudan: What Would Justice for Darfur Look Like?” The Stream, Al Jazeera English, Comments by Rudwan Dawod, 19 Feb. 2020.

⁶⁹ “Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution,” Report No. 281/Africa, International Crisis Group, 21 October 2019.

⁷⁰ Musa Bakri, US Spokesperson for the SLA-Abdul Wahid, Interview with the authors, 11 April 2020.

force, as well as inhumane treatment of civilians.⁷¹

Many Darfuris are fearful of what will happen to them after UNAMID leaves. While they often have mixed feelings about how effective UNAMID has been at protecting them over the years, they are much more fearful of the RSF in the absence of an armed protection force capable of deterring its aggression and human rights abuses, particularly since the RSF has further expanded its presence in Darfur since the revolution.

There is also – to a lesser extent – distrust between Darfuris and the Sudanese police forces.⁷² Part of this stems from their role as part of the government security apparatus, but also because the police forces are often ill-trained, ill-equipped to protect civilians under threat, often lack basic facilities like jails and prisons to hold and process perpetrators, and lack a sufficient presence, particularly in the rural parts of Darfur where civilians are especially vulnerable.⁷³ Many Sudanese police officers are not from the same ethnic groups as the communities in which they serve, compounding the trust deficit. A high-level UNSC diplomat said, “we want to see the capacity of the Sudanese police to build up [to be able to effectively protect civilians] and we do understand since the revolution there’s been much more willingness on the part of the Sudanese police, particularly in Darfur, to engage with UNAMID and to receive UN training and advisory support.”

Further, “the new mission needs to contribute to police capacity-building; there should be something that bridges the gap because ultimately nobody wants to see a relapse in Darfur.”⁷⁴

B. Challenges to Human Rights in Sudan: A Non-Protective Environment

The continued violence in Sudan, and the way in which violence exacerbates humanitarian challenges, threatens human rights and the protection of civilians in Sudan, particularly with the closure of UNAMID. The Juba Peace Negotiations and current transitional government offer encouraging signs of change, but human rights abuses continue. E.g., in Darfur, some IDPs are still threatened and harmed by armed groups when leaving IDP camps.⁷⁵ However, for the first time in almost a decade, humanitarian aid has been allowed into the Blue Nile region, demonstrating the Sovereign Council’s commitment to change.⁷⁶ The Report of The Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan “commends the Government for having taken positive steps towards improving the security situation in Darfur, including efforts by State authorities to address community-level conflicts and foster social cohesion by drawing diverse communities together through processes of dialogue and consultations.”⁷⁷

Human rights violations perpetrated by the RSF also continue. On 9 April 2020, the RSF arrested a leader of the Forces for

⁷¹ “Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, 10 January 2019, 18-19.

⁷² UNSC Official, Interview with the Authors, 10 March 2020.

⁷³ UN Official, Interview with the authors, 19 February 2020.

⁷⁴ UNSC Official, Interview with the authors, 10 March 2020.

⁷⁵ “Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan,” United Nations Security Council, 13 August 2018, 8-9.

⁷⁶ “WFP Executive Director in breakthrough visit to Yabus in the Blue Nile State following decade of inaccessibility - Sudan,” World Food Program, 18 December 2019,

<https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/wfp-executive-director-breakthrough-visit-yabus-blue-nile-state-following-decade>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

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Freedom and Change (FCC), Idris El Bur for a post on social media that criticized the RSF.⁷⁸ This demonstrates one of the clear challenges presented: the lack of freedom of speech. Creating a system where IDPs, refugees, and citizens, regardless of gender, can report human rights abuses and feel secure is critical.

While Sudan has a justice system that brings together British law, Islamic law, and African law in its court system, it does not bring justice. Justice reforms are critical to protect civilians and monitor human rights violations. A UN human rights official stated that for Sudan to succeed there must be “strong monitoring capacities (deterrence), capacity-building, reform, [and] legal and socio-economic efforts.”⁷⁹ Currently, the justice system has corruption at all levels, from policing to the prison system.⁸⁰

Furthermore, in 2020, 9.3 million people in Sudan need humanitarian support, including access to food, water, health and education.⁸¹ Currently, less than half of the

people in need are being reached, which only exacerbates conflict. One of the key issues is the high level of unemployment in Sudan - 130,000 young people enter the labor market each year, but there are only 30,000 jobs available.⁸²

Fortunately, the Sovereign Council is open to working with the UN to address humanitarian needs.⁸³ Prime Minister Hamdok has written that after the end of the peacekeeping mission, the UN could play a role in “assisting in the transition from humanitarian assistance to attaining sustainable development projects in Sudan.”⁸⁴ The openness to humanitarian work is extremely positive, but the amount of work that needs to be done is daunting. Humanitarian work by the follow-on presence to UNAMID can help provide short term solutions to food insecurity and access to water and sanitation, yet these roles need to be filled by the government in the long term.

⁷⁸ “Man detained in Sudan’s Blue Nile for Facebook Post,” *Dabanga*, 16 April 2020, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/man-detained-in-sudan-s-blue-nile-for-facebook-post>.

⁷⁹ UNAMID Official, Interview with the authors, 12 February 2020.

⁸⁰ UNDP Official, Interview with the authors, 13 February 2020.

⁸¹ “Humanitarian Response Plan: Sudan,” UN OCHA, January 2020, 8-9, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/sudan_2020_hrp.pdf.

⁸² *Ibid*, 10.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 21.


⁸⁴ UNSC, “Letter dated 27 February 2020 from GoS to UNSC.”

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Figure 1: Human Rights Scores for Sudan⁸⁵



Figure 2. Humanitarian Response Needed for Sudan⁸⁶



⁸⁵ "Human Rights Scores," Our World in Data" (2017), <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-scores?tab=chart&country=SDN>.


⁸⁶ "Humanitarian Response Plan: Sudan," UN OCHA, January 2020, 8, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/sudan_2020_hrp.pdf.

Figure 3. Human Capital Index for Sudan Relative to Global Domestic Product Per Capita Purchasing Power Parity⁸⁷

HCI and GDP Per Capita PPP (log scale, horizontal axis)

Productivity relative to benchmark of complete education and full health

● Sudan



⁸⁷ "Sudan," The World Bank Group (2018); <https://data.worldbank.org/country/sudan>. This data shows the Human Capital Index, which is the level of human capital a child born today can reach by the age of eighteen. Sudan's Human Capital Index is 0.38.

The UNSC has yet to decide what type of mission will follow UNAMID when it ends. However, given the politics of the UNSC and the desires of the Sudanese government, every indication is that this mission will be an SPM. For this reason, we tailored our recommendations for an SPM.

A. Human Rights Monitoring

1. Ensure there is a Human Rights Component in the SPM Working Closely with OHCHR on Reporting, Monitoring, and Capacity Building

The establishment of OHCHR in Sudan was a positive step forward. Yet as we learned in our interviews, it does not have the capacity to do human rights monitoring and reporting as well as UNAMID, especially with only ten people in its Khartoum offices, and without yet having established Darfur offices.

By including a human rights component in the new mission, there will be additional resources and employees provided – compared to OHCHR, which relies on voluntary contributions. A UNAMID official interviewed was adamant that OHCHR would not be able to adequately monitor human rights violations without UNAMID’s Human Rights section being carried over in the follow-on mission to help.⁸⁸

A UN University official said that the Sudanese government may be open to missions with a smaller footprint that would still maintain the ability to provide civilian protection and human rights monitoring capabilities. He envisioned a large number of UN staff, made up of mostly *Sudanese*

nationals, whose responsibility was “to report on the human rights situation [with] some oversight by international staff.”⁸⁹

This official cautioned that the more Chapter VII sounding that proposals for a follow-on presence are, the more Sudanese officials are likely to believe that such a follow-on presence will send a negative message to potential donor countries. Yet, we would argue that the most effective approach to attracting aid from donor countries would be for the GoS to fully and openly recognize the problems which do exist, be transparent about the nature of these problems and what steps the GoS is ready to take to correct them, and ask the international community for the types of help that will most quickly and effectively enable Sudan to create a secure environment where human rights are respected for all segments of its population, and where civilians’ trust in their leaders and security forces is enhanced. The human rights component of the new mission should also work constructively with the GoS to bolster its reporting, monitoring, and justice capacity.

2. Enhance the Capacity of Sudan’s Police Force

In order to best enhance the capacity of the Sudanese police to play an integral role in protecting civilians from violence in Darfur, they should be better equipped, including with vehicles and weaponry – things they often lack, and should receive frequent training on civilian protection strategies. With a Chapter VI SPM, without any armed uniformed component, we recommend that a fairly large number of unarmed individual

⁸⁸ UNAMID Official, Interview with the authors, 12 February 2020.

⁸⁹ UN University Official, Interview with the authors, 6 March 2020.

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police officers (IPOs) be a part of the mission in a POC training capacity.

Moreover, we recommend that as a principle far more police officers be recruited from among the *IDP communities* they are tasked with serving, in order to increase the incentives of Sudanese police to protect civilians and to build more trust with IDP communities. We believe doing so would build on the community policing successes UNAMID has previously achieved.⁹⁰ A UNSC diplomat said in agreement that “community-policing and having IDPs contributing to their own security is a good way forward [and] needs to be explored.”⁹¹

Furthermore, IDPs should be randomly and *anonymously* surveyed each month by staff members in the follow-on presence (from Civil Affairs or UNPOL) to rate their level of trust in the Sudanese police in their camps, and to make suggestions about how the police can improve security conditions and improve in their performance of tasks. We recommend that one of the principles that should also be included in the compact between the GoS and the UN is a *measurable* increase in the level of trust between the Sudanese police and IDP communities.

In addition, because of the limited capacity and equipment of the Sudanese police in Darfur, the UN should consider providing some of their equipment to the Sudanese police as part of UNAMID’s liquidation process. However, a review should be conducted to verify whether doing so would be in harmony with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and the risks that such equipment could fall into

the hands of sectors of the Sudanese security services having a track record of human rights abuses.

3. Continue to Support the Sudan National Human Rights Commission (SNHRC)

The SNHRC was established in January 2012 and opened in 2015 with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Japan.⁹² Since then, the SNHRC continues to open offices throughout Sudan and hear complaints. The commission provides an existing structure for monitoring and making decisions on human rights violations.⁹³ However, to move forward there must be real efforts to foster a system where human rights are respected, and violators are aggressively prosecuted.

In conclusion, the SNHRC provides an avenue for monitoring human rights and providing decisions that demonstrate Sudan’s commitment to human rights. It must remain committed to providing independent decisions that respect local and international standards on human rights. Sudan must follow through on defining human rights within the national context and work to create justice for victims of human rights violations, including sexual violence. We thus recommend that the UN support the process of the SNHRC in having independent and fair reporting and monitoring. Furthermore, there must be fair legal practice. In addition, we recommend the UN support justice for victims of human rights abuses, SGBV, and CRSV in Sudan.

⁹⁰ Lanz, “UNAMID,” 6.

⁹¹ UNSC Official, Interview with the authors, 10 March 2020.

⁹² Republic of Sudan, National Human Rights Commission Strategic Plan (2014-2018); Strengthening the Capacity of the Sudan National Human Rights Commission

⁹³ A/HRC/39/71 (2018), 12.

4. Address Gender Inequities

According to the report “Assessing the Value of Human Rights-Based Interventions in Situations of Conflict: Community Outreach to Combat Violence against Women and Girls in Darfur, Sudan,” there are many problems that arise for women in the Sudanese court system. Many Darfuri women are uncomfortable with coming before the local courts “because the local judges use custom instead of laws and this custom itself grounds the concept of supremacy of the males [over] females when the parties are not the same gender.” As a result, women often favor having cases heard in the civil court system. Moreover, it is concerning that “women’s rights under international human rights law are viewed by some in Sudan to oppose cultural values, religious doctrines and constitutional principles.”⁹⁴ We recommend that the follow-on presence make a concerted effort to help the GoS produce gender equality in its court system.

When Darfuri women have been in positions of leadership, more equality has been seen in the courts.⁹⁵ We therefore also recommend that the UNSC encourage the GoS to include more women in high level leadership positions, and this recommendation follows through from the court system to every aspect of society in Sudan.

There furthermore must be greater local, national, and international efforts to

prevent SGBV and ensure that victims see justice. There must also be support for access to resources including medical care and places for women to report abuse. While UNAMID’s Women’s Protection Network provides access to such resources, there should be an expansion of this programming in the follow-on presence.

In the initial stages of the peace talks in Juba, no women were present.⁹⁶ It is encouraging to see that some women have been included in the transitional government, but it is still insufficient.⁹⁷ Currently, only two of the eleven people on the Sovereign Council are women, and only four of the seventeen ministers.⁹⁸

While it is important that there are plans for a Gender Equality Commission to be created in the fall, we recommend that this commission be created with women’s involvement and that the commission be permitted to make decisions that have a genuine impact. Women must also be included in the creation of every commission in the development of the government. We recommend these steps as principles in the aforementioned compact. Further, while UN Women has not been affected by the upcoming closure of UNAMID, it is critical that UN support for women in Sudan increases.⁹⁹

It will be critical to ensure women continue to play an active role in capacity building and working to identify leaders that could fill the constitutional requirement of having 40% of the legislature be women.¹⁰⁰ Women’s groups are active, and groups like

⁹⁴ “Assessing the Value of Human Rights-Based Interventions in Situations of Conflict: Community Outreach to Combat Violence against Women and Girls in Darfur, Sudan,” *The Journal of Human Rights Practice* (01 February 2018). <https://academic-oup-com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/jhrp/article/9/3/534/4833982>.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ UN Women official, Interview with the authors, 04 March 2020.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ AFP, “Sudan women decry slow progress on rights since Bashir’s fall” *The Bangkok Times* (08 March 2020). Sudan women decry slow progress on rights since Bashir’s fall.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

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MANSAM have come together to create their goals for the new government.¹⁰¹ We recommend that the follow-on presence encourage the GoS to take steps to enable such women's groups to play a key role in the new government.

In addition, Sudan has not ratified CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. It is one of the only countries in the world to have not signed nor ratified CEDAW. Sudan's opposition to its ratification has drawn protest from women's rights groups in Sudan.¹⁰² Women have protested, "ashamed" of their government, and demonstrated their commitment to activism when their rights have not been honored.¹⁰³ In order to show the Sovereign Council's commitment to women's rights, we recommend that Sudan sign and ratify CEDAW as one of the principles of the said compact, and incorporate a commitment to women's rights in national legislation. We also encourage the UN to support Sudan in this process.

5. Strengthen Transitional Justice

Transitional justice proposals must be included in any subsequent peace agreement. Emphasizing the importance justice plays in resolving the conflict, on 16 March 2020, four prominent leaders of IDP camps in North, South, West, and Central Darfur were interviewed by a Darfuri radio station, Radio

Dabanga: all stated that the matter of greatest importance to them was for the transitional justice process to begin, including the transfer of all individuals indicted by the ICC to the court immediately. Further, each demanded that reparations be included as part of the transitional justice process.¹⁰⁴ A Darfuri civil society activist agreed: "This is the one thing that *cannot* even be negotiated. *This is the one thing that everybody is talking about.* This is one of the reasons why the previous agreements failed...*None of them talked about [compensation].* This will be the fate of [the agreement now being negotiated] if it does not address the issues of compensation..."¹⁰⁵

This activist also stressed that many Darfuris are calling for a truth and reconciliation commission to establish facts regarding the genocide in addition to prosecutions of alleged perpetrators. Because of the lack of trust in Sudan's judicial system at the present time, we recommend that other options being explored to try indictees other than those wanted by the ICC. A model that the UN could push for in the Darfur context and Sudan context more broadly is the envisioned "hybrid court" agreed upon by the government and opposition in South Sudan, to be organized by the AU¹⁰⁶, whereby local judges would partner with well-regarded judges from other countries to help ensure that judgements are not impacted by bias or political agendas. A hybrid court could have the benefits of potentially being based in Sudan, and the building of a sense of local buy-in of the

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "Sudanese women demand govt to sign CEDAW" *Dabanga News* (03 January 2020) <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-women-demand-govt-to-sign-cedaw>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ "Darfur displaced community leaders: Justice is top priority," *Dabanga*, 17 March 2020, [https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-](https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-displaced-community-leaders-justice-is-top-priority)

[news/article/darfur-displaced-community-leaders-justice-is-top-priority](https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-displaced-community-leaders-justice-is-top-priority).

¹⁰⁵ Darfuri civil society activist, interview with the authors, 6 April 2020.

¹⁰⁶ "UN Investigators Propose Hybrid Court for South Sudan," *Voice of America*, Lisa Schlein, 12 March 2019

<https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-investigators-propose-hybrid-court-south-sudan>

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judicial process.¹⁰⁷ Either the UN or AU could help Sudan establish such a court should the GoS agree to this proposal.

Because prosecutions and compensation remain top priorities in the minds of a significant number of IDPs in Darfur who have suffered for many years as a result of the genocide, we recommend they be included as key principles in our proposed compact between the GoS and the UN.

B. Protection of Civilians

6. Include a Protection of Civilians Component within the SPM

It is critical that the UN includes components to protect civilians within the follow-on presence.¹⁰⁸ A high-level UNAMID Human Rights division official expressed great concern regarding what would happen without any protection component: “there are a *growing* number of protection hot spots in the country, especially in the Jebel Marra area. What happened...in El Geneina clearly demonstrates the extreme vulnerability in terms of protection in many of the areas [designated as peacebuilding areas], which normally should not necessitate any form of physical protection.”

¹⁰⁷ “The proposed hybrid court for South Sudan: Moving South Sudan and the African Union to action against impunity”, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, AJCR 2018/2, Owiso Owiso.

<https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-proposed-hybrid-court-for-south-sudan/>

¹⁰⁸ A UNU report in May 2015 clarified that while no SPM currently has a POC mandate, “the protection of civilians is invoked in a number of their mandates and many of them carry out tasks that in Peace Ops are characterized as PoC. For instance, UNSC Resolution 2145 (2014) includes a reference in UNAMA’s mandate “to monitor the situation of civilians, [and] to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection...” Additionally, UNAMA has openly stated it conducts “activities aimed at minimizing the impact of the armed conflict on civilians including: independent and impartial monitoring of incidents involving loss of life or injury to civilians [and] advocacy to strengthen protection of civilians affected by the armed conflict...” See: Sebastian von

The case of El Geneina presents a cautionary tale. In mid-2017, as UNAMID began handing over many of its sites and eventually its sector headquarters to Sudanese authorities, violence did not originally increase. The El Geneina sector headquarters was handed over in May 2019. Yet, less than a year later, in late December 2019, at least 65 people were killed in the El Geneina IDP camp, hospital staff were held up at gunpoint, a blood bank was destroyed, and a police officer was killed. This case suggests that the impact of violence resulting from UNAMID withdrawing from its bases may not be seen immediately.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, a Sudanese government official that we interviewed claimed that there are no major human rights violations occurring, and that the RSF is a very disciplined and professional military force that poses no threat to civilians.¹¹⁰ Moreover, he claimed that there is no need for a human rights component in the follow-on presence and that the limited presence which OHCHR has recently been granted in the country, including in Darfur, will be sufficient alone to monitor human rights conditions alongside the SNHRC. However, a UNAMID official said that while the situation has improved in recent years, there

Einsiedel, “Non-Military Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Experiences and Lessons,” United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper 3, May 2015, 10, endnote 4.

¹⁰⁹ Using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data set, we evaluated episodes of violence within 60 miles of each of the 21 UNAMID team sites and each of the 3 sector headquarters handed over to date in the 3 months before each handover occurred compared with the 3 months after each handover (see Annex). We found that violent incidents and especially overall fatalities more often decreased rather than increasing or remaining the same. In fact, at the El Geneina sector headquarters, overall fatalities dropped significantly; 14 fatalities from violence were reported in the 3 months before its closure compared to only one fatality in the three months after its closure.

¹¹⁰ Sudanese Government Official, Interview with the authors, 04 March 2020.

are still substantial protection challenges that require physical protection. He also said that it will be hard for the GoS to gain the trust of its citizens, especially IDPs, in Darfur: “You just wonder how Sudan will be able to assume the protection responsibility if there is no neutral entity there.”¹¹¹

7. Expand the Weapons Collection Program and Make it More Inclusive

We also recommend as a compact principle that the GoS give a larger share of weapons and vehicles obtained through their weapons and unregistered vehicle collection campaign to local Darfur police units than current levels to help strengthen their capacity to protect civilians.¹¹² Also as a part of the compact, the weapons collection campaign, which began in August 2017 and is set to expire this year should be extended as it has been credited with improving security in Darfur, especially in towns and commonly used roads.¹¹³ However, the weapons collection program has not made much progress in rural areas, and therefore efforts in such areas should be expanded. We highly recommend that the weapons collection program cover all communities equally, ensuring that disarming of communities will not leave them vulnerable to attack from others not disarmed. UNPOL, through UNAMID as well as its follow-on presence, should offer the GoS its assistance with expanding the program.

8. Strengthen and Expand Reforms of the Rapid Support Forces

Furthermore, based on the evidence of human rights violations committed by the RSF, and the high level of distrust it has in IDP communities, we believe far more should be done to reform the RSF, both in terms of its compliance with Sudan’s obligations under international human rights law and in terms of its ethnic composition. We believe the following RSF reform measures should be included as compact principles: The GoS has already begun efforts to make the RSF more professionalized, create more discipline within its ranks, and diversify its ethnic character, beginning in January 2017 when Sudan’s parliament passed a law making the RSF officially part of the Sudanese Armed Forces.¹¹⁴ Such efforts need to be greatly expanded if the RSF is to become an entity Darfuris can trust to protect them from violence. Further, laws which grant state security actors (including the RSF) immunity from prosecution, such as the 2007 Armed Forces Act, the 2008 Police Act and the 2010 National Security Act should be reformed as another important step toward building trust between civilians and the security sector.¹¹⁵

Additionally, it is critical that a mechanism be established which provides civilian oversight of the activities of the RSF, particularly an *independent* civilian-led investigation panel which investigates all accusations of atrocities or gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This panel should include at least some

¹¹¹ UNAMID Official, Interview with the authors, 12 February 2020.

¹¹² “Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, 10 January 2019, 37-38.

¹¹³ Ibid. 38.

¹¹⁴ United Nations Security Council. “Letter dated 10 January 2019 from Panel of Experts to UNSC,” 38-9.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 19.

members who are from Darfur as well as other areas of Sudan where the RSF have been accused of serious abuses. At a time when the RSF's influence is becoming stronger than ever, military leadership must aggressively train RSF members how to act in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law standards and civilian leaders must be allowed the oversight they need to ensure that such training is properly occurring.

The International Crisis Group noted that the once-dominant army has lost its primacy to the RSF – and that its leader, “Hemedti”, may be the most powerful man in Sudan. The think tank has stated that the country's primary military and paramilitary organizations should be unified under one command.¹¹⁶ Though the RSF is nominally part of the Sudanese Armed Forces, “the army, RSF, and internal security forces all have competing loyalties, interests, and cultures, opening up the possibility of different parts of the security sector going into battle against each other. Notwithstanding the revolution, the entire security sector remains shrouded in secrecy, with off-the-books financial flows that make accountable governance impossible.”¹¹⁷ Since the RSF still poses a significant protection threat to IDP communities in Darfur and potentially to the transition to democracy in Sudan, we recommend that the UNSC begin to approach Sudan to emphasize the importance of truly unifying all of their military forces under a single command structure with mandatory international humanitarian and human rights law training

and with civilian accounting oversight of their finances.

9. Encourage Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP)

We call upon the UNSC to highly encourage the GoS to allow the presence of “unarmed civilian protection” (UCP) workers who protect civilians as well as train local civilian populations on techniques to improve self-protection strategies. We recommend that at least 2,000 UCP protection officers be allowed to work in Darfur, with the bulk being deployed in hot spots.¹¹⁸ Both personnel from the follow-on presence who are trained in UCP methods and international UCP organizations well established in the field could both contribute personnel to meet a sufficiently high threshold of UCP workers to effectively reduce protection threats. However, it should be kept in mind that international UCP organizations can hold a comparative advantage over UN employees in cases where either the host government or NSAGs feel threatened or are suspicious of the motives of UN personnel.

The High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) report in June 2015 emphasized that “unarmed strategies must be at the *forefront* of UN efforts to protect civilians,” and recommended that “in view of the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection actors, missions should work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective

¹¹⁶ “Safeguarding Sudan's Revolution,” Report No. 281/Africa, International Crisis Group, 21 Oct. 2019.

¹¹⁷ Rebecca Hamilton, “The Enemies of Sudan's Democracy Are Lurking Everywhere,” Foreign Policy, 6 Dec. 2019

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/sudan-democracy-enemies-everywhere-bashir/>

¹¹⁸ “UNAMID Fact Sheet,” African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, updated January 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid>

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environment.”¹¹⁹ While peacekeepers often play a critical role in protecting civilians at risk, UCP organizations like Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) can work in conflict environments regardless of whether there is a peacekeeping mission present, and if so, regardless of whether its mandate contains a POC component.

Even a cursory examination of their methodologies shows how UCP organizations have the ability to perform many of the same functions as armed peacekeeping missions aimed at protecting civilians and minimizing violence.¹²⁰ e.g., establishing a “protective presence” in hot spots through patrols, providing “protective accompaniment” for civilians at-risk (e.g. women and children), ceasefire monitoring, and “interpositioning” UCP officers between would-be combatants. In using such methods, UCP actors hold some important comparative advantages to armed peacekeepers: the fact that UCP protection officers are unarmed, side with no party to conflicts yet engage in dialogue with all parties, and make it known that their goal is to protect all civilians in conflict areas irrespective of their ethnic identity, makes them less of a threat to armed actors.

At the same time, UCP protection officers live among civilian populations at

risk of being harmed by violence and by so doing are better able to engage with and gain the trust of the civilian population, learn to recognize context specific threats to civilians in each community’s unique environment, and help communities learn to create their own early warning and early action procedures tailored to their community context to avoid and escape from impending violence. Further, UCP officers are less expensive to fund than peacekeepers.¹²¹

10. Establish Integrated Analysis and Integrated Information Hubs

We believe that having an Integrated Analysis Hub and Integrated Information Hub in the follow-on presence with a sufficient staff to monitor all of Darfur, and especially the hot spot regions, will be essential until all serious protection threats no longer exist. Many of the UN’s larger SPMs maintain situational awareness collection methods similar to their DPO counterparts. Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) establish early warning networks based on verified situational information they collect from contacts in the field and reports created from all mission sections, including from Civil Affairs officers and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) – national staff

¹¹⁹ “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,” Presented to UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 16 June 2015, paragraph 84, 23, 27.

¹²⁰ NP uses 10 methods to protect civilians. These include: (1) establishing a “protective presence” of UCP officers in hot spots, (2) provide public “protective accompaniment” for specific persons at risk of being harmed, (3) “interpositioning”, i.e. standing in between conflict parties to reduce the risk of fighting, (4) ceasefire monitoring, (5) monitoring and debunking inflammatory rumors that could otherwise lead to violence, (6) early warning/early response, (7) “confidence building” of community members to have the courage to protect themselves, or when appropriate, seek protection from state actors, (8) engaging in diplomacy between actors at all levels of society, (9) training civilians and local leaders on UCP strategies, and (10) fortifying or building new local protection infrastructure.

¹²¹ The revised budget for UNAMID between 1 July 2018 and 30 June 2019 stood at \$727,522,700 for a total of 6,550 military observers, military contingent personnel, UN police, and FPU. A per personnel cost breakdown would thus amount to \$111,072 for that year. In comparison, Mel Duncan stated that other than the costs of initial training for UCP protection officers, the costs needed to sustain each UCP individual UCP officer, and all programming costs in the field for one year is about \$50,000, which would be less than half as expensive as maintaining a uniformed peacekeeper in UNAMID. If 2,000 UCP protection officers were dispatched to Darfur, these costs would amount to \$100,000,000. The number of UNAMID uniformed personnel has since 2018 dropped slightly from 6,550 to 6,316. If all 6,316 uniformed personnel were to be replaced with UCP officers, the cost would be just \$315,800,000.

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who leverage their ethnic and language backgrounds to engage with civilians to learn about potential threats. JMACs then use knowledge gained from these information streams to create weekly early warning or threat assessments.¹²² The SPM version of JOCs are called “Integrated Information Hubs” and the JMAC equivalent is called by different names, including “Integrated Analysis Hubs,” or other names such as the Joint Analysis and Planning Unit in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Joint Analysis Unit in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).¹²³

While true that without peacekeepers and/or Formed Police Units to work in these components, the capacity to collect vital early warning information concerning protection threats will be restricted, there are a number of ways to help ameliorate this dilemma. To bolster protection capacities while respecting the Government of Sudan’s likely preference for a limited international staff footprint, we recommend hiring a large number of Sudanese national or expatriate staff members for mission sections like Civil Affairs and Human Rights, which traditionally feed information into the mission’s early warning system.

We also believe that an important step to take in the absence of peacekeeping troops would be to compensate for their absence by boosting remote technology capable of monitoring conditions on the ground for POC and human rights threats. We recommend

that the follow-on presence use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including at night when civilian protection threats often increase, to scan for potential threats and help verify violence that has been reported. We also recommend the follow-on presence regularly analyze satellite imagery for similar purposes. UAVs have also been used for humanitarian aid delivery in hard to reach areas in Africa by the company, Zipline.¹²⁴ With the lack of peacekeepers to protect humanitarian aid workers in dangerous areas of Darfur, UAVs should be used for this purpose as well.

Further, in the absence of a UN rapid response force to protect civilians, it is important that local Darfuri communities enhance local self-protection strategies. A case study of one such community based protection strategy occurred between Dec. 2012 and Jul. 2013, when an early warning system was created linking communities that trusted each other in northern Nigeria using the FrontlineSMS messaging app on cell phones distributed among 109 focal points in 8 different Local Government Areas in Plateau State.¹²⁵ Either the follow-on presence or an NGO specializing in this area should distribute cell phones with FrontlineSMS to high risk communities in Darfur.

UNAMID’s Community Alert Network (CAN) – a tool used in several POC mandated peacekeeping missions – allows local level authorities and civil society leaders to contact UNAMID immediately

¹²² “Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, November 2018, 32.

¹²³ Haidi Willmot, “Improving U.N. Situational Awareness: Enhancing the U.N.’s Ability to Prevent and Respond to Mass Human Suffering and to Ensure the Safety and Security of Its Personnel,” Stimson Center, August 2017, 48; Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations,” International Peace Institute, July 2016, 15.

¹²⁴ “A coronavirus first: Zipline drones deliver test samples in Africa,” Axios, 20 April 2020 <https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-zipline-drone-delivery-africa-1d4d2680-ce4f-4efe-b3b4-b91714c4a254.html>

¹²⁵ “Participatory Early Warning for More Effective Response to Religious Conflict in Plateau State, Nigeria: A Pilot Project funded by USIP,” Internal Evaluation, Search for Common Ground, November 2013, 4.

when signs of threats to civilians first emerge.¹²⁶ The CAN should be carried over in the follow-on presence, but without a peacekeeping force to be able to respond with protection, doing so could raise false hopes and lead civilians not to resort to self-protection strategies they might otherwise use to save their own lives. Any continued use of the CAN must accompany a communication strategy to emphasize that the UN will no longer directly respond to alerts, but will instead seek to indirectly intervene through diplomatic channels with the GoS and/or non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and will also use data from the system for documentation and reporting purposes.

As illustrated with our recommendations for continued use of the CAN, although under Chapter VI there is no rapid UN armed response capability, a mission-wide early warning system should still be used both to deter violence and to provide leadership with the evidence they need to engage in high-level diplomacy with the GoS or non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to de-escalate any protection crises. Furthermore, evidence gained from a mission-wide early warning system would alert the UNSC to the actual level of threats to civilians, which could be useful as the Council decides whether to upgrade or downgrade mission civilian protection measures during future mandate renewal discussions.

C. Peacebuilding and Capacity Building

11. Carry over UNAMID's Civil Affairs Division into the Special Political Mission

The SPM should carry over UNAMID's Civil Affairs division to help resolve intercommunal conflicts and to carry over the expertise that UNAMID has developed in this area. Currently, the Civil Affairs section is in charge of three main areas: 1) monitoring the Darfur peace process 2) promoting dialogue between key stakeholders, and 3) strengthening governance institutions.¹²⁷ Civil Affairs has played a vital role in creating a platform where leaders of different communities can interact and work for a peaceful future. Since the Civil Affairs section of UNAMID has been staffed by civilians, it will be viable for the follow-on presence to resume the same agenda even without an armed component. We highly recommend that a carried over Civil Affairs unit from UNAMID place an emphasis on helping resolve local-level disputes while focusing on the needs of IDPs, farmers, herders, women and children.

12. Carry over the State Liaison Functions

Furthermore, unlike other peacekeeping missions, UNAMID and the UNCT headquartered in Khartoum have historically operated independently. To mitigate this lack of integration, the AU and UN developed SLFs. Standing as an innovation among UN peacekeeping transitions, the UN Joint Project on UN Mission Transitions envisioned the SLFs to have two components: the collocation of UNAMID's

¹²⁶ "The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Addressing Local Conflicts," United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, 2017, 28.

¹²⁷ UNAMID, Civil Affairs, <https://unamid.unmissions.org/civil-affairs>

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personnel with UN Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFP) in the four states of Darfur to undertake joint programming and analysis; the use of programmatic funds to enhance collaboration between the mission and UN agencies around four peacebuilding priorities.¹²⁸ As pointed out by Paige Arthur, the four priorities of the SLFs should be recognized as being “interlinked; for example, displaced persons will not return to insecure areas; service delivery will not be effective without strengthened state functions; etc.”¹²⁹ While the second phase of the SLFs is ongoing until June 2020, it is worth wondering to what extent they should or should not be continued beyond UNAMID’s closure.¹³⁰

From our discussions with UN officials, the prevailing view of the SLFs is mostly positive, although their operationalization proved to be process-heavy and resource-intensive, coming relatively late in the transition.¹³¹ After one year of experience, several UN agencies collocating with UNAMID acknowledge how the SLFs allowed them to “have a better analysis of the ground,” to “have seconded staff in areas where they did not have a presence before,” and to “scale up their activities thanks to their access to UNAMID’s assessed budget while Sudan is still a difficult donors environment.”

Moreover, the SLFs have also managed to initiate a “mindset change” of both the UNCT and the Sudanese security forces, particularly through their rule of law and human rights pillars.¹³² While the efforts

of the UNCT in Darfur were mostly humanitarian-driven, the establishment of joint programmatic priorities with UNAMID helped the UNCT to change its approach to protection, particularly in areas shifting from “physical protection” (patrolling) to developing a “protective environment” through capacity-building and local engagement.¹³³ Likewise, while the trust deficit between some Darfuri civilians and the Sudanese security forces is still worrisome, the SLFs were also used to conduct capacity-building of the Sudanese police, with a special focus on international human rights and humanitarian law and SGBV.¹³⁴

Hence, through combined engagement with local communities and security forces, the SLFs have also succeeded in “gradually shifting ownership away from the UN and [in] increasing the inclusion of national actors.”¹³⁵

We recommend the continuation of the SLFs within the follow-on presence, as requested by the Prime Minister of Sudan and as mentioned in the Secretary-General report stressing that “the new presence could capitalize on several assets, including the State liaison functions model.”¹³⁶

13. Create “Mobile Teams” and work with the Peacebuilding Commission

We explored applicable practices from two other transition cases: Haiti and Liberia.

¹²⁸ UN Official, Interview with the authors, 21 February 2020.

¹²⁹ Paige Arthur, “Innovation in transitions: reconfiguring the UN presence in Darfur amid wider political change in Sudan,” Center on International Cooperation, 2019, 16.

¹³⁰ “United Nations State Liaison Functions (SLFs) in Darfur,” United Nations Peacekeeping, <https://unamid.unmissions.org/un-state-liaison-functions-slfs-darfur>.

¹³¹ UN Official, Interview with the authors, 21 February 2020.

¹³² UN Official, Interview with the authors, 17 February 2020.

¹³³ Forti, “Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur,” 13.

¹³⁴ “UN State Liaison Functions conduct training on human rights for GoS police in South Darfur,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 22 May 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-state-liaison-functions-conduct-training-human-rights-gos-police-south-darfur>

¹³⁵ Forti, “Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur,” 13.

¹³⁶ UNSC, “Letter dated 20 March 2020.”

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1) *Haiti*

Haiti's case is special because it had an interim mission called MINUJUSTH (2017-2019), or the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, which was created to prepare for a smooth withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation. While the first mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operated under a Chapter VII mandate with a heavy military component from 2004 to 2017 with gradual reduction in military staff, MINUJUSTH focused on police capacity building and rule of law. Currently, an SPM named BINUH, or the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, oversees political stability and rule of law with 19 other UN entities in the UNCT in Haiti.¹³⁷

Similar to UNAMID's current stage of transition, there were less than 1,300 UN police left when MINUJUSTH took over. With most of the troops and police gone, MINUJUSTH decided to train the Haitian National Police in terms of senior management and administration instead of providing patrols and escorts. The mission provided mentorship advisory programs on "investigation, community-oriented policing, accountability mechanisms, and prevention of SGBV."¹³⁸ As a result, the yearly intentional homicide rate has been almost cut in half between 2004 and 2019. All of Haiti's 145 communes now have a full time Haitian National Police presence.¹³⁹

National police training is essential to UNAMID's withdrawal as people in Darfur, especially the IDPs lack confidence and trust

in Sudanese national police. There was some progress in this area on UNAMID's part. Training Sudanese police on topics such as gender-based violence, and crime scene management and investigation principles in Darfur was conducted by relevant stakeholders, including UNDP and UN Women. There were negotiations with IDP leadership and the Sudanese police regarding patrols, and humanitarian NGOs worked with UNAMID Police to support the establishment of Security Committees in IDP camps.¹⁴⁰ However, the remaining concern is that tribal militias and armed groups still exceed the Sudanese police's capacity and resources. Therefore, better police management and building strong justice institutions are key to a sustainable withdrawal of UNAMID (please refer back to recommendation 4).

Another key mechanism used by MINUJUSTH is a new tool called "mobile teams." The mobile team is a compact-sized team with 10-15 staff members who travel to different regions in Haiti to implement quick impact projects (QUIPs) to support peacebuilding efforts and strengthen the link between the government and civil society organizations.¹⁴¹ Danish Refugee Council, an international NGO, has also recently introduced a similar human-right monitoring mechanism called "Mobile Protection Teams." Each Mobile Protection Team comprises three to five staff members who are specialists in fields such as gender-based violence, child protection and legal reform. They travel to a given area of concern,

¹³⁷ United Nations, Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, BINUH, <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/binuh>

¹³⁸ Namie Di Razza, "Mission in Transition: Planning for the End of UN Peacekeeping in Haiti," International Peace Institute, December 2018, p.34.

¹³⁹ United Nations Security Council, "8641st meeting: The question concerning Haiti Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (S/2019/805)"

October 15th 2019, retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8641.pdf

¹⁴⁰ Michael Fryer, "Working it out on the ground: coordination between UNAMID Police and humanitarian actors in Darfur," January 2013.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

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undertake a rapid assessment of the situation, analyze the problems, and report directly to the main mission.¹⁴² While it is uncertain whether these mobile teams have been implemented effectively, the concept of a smaller-scale team with experts carrying out QUIPs seems like an adequate innovation that SPM could consider after UNAMID's withdrawal. Mobile teams are essential because first, they only require a limited number of civilian staff members and second, they work as a bridge between the government and civil society organizations by organizing discussions and town-hall meetings. If implemented, mobile teams will not only compensate for lack of field offices, but also provide opportunities for civil society organizations to grow in Darfur.

2) *Liberia*

The UN Mission in Liberia, or UNMIL (2003-2018), is a relatively successful transition case.¹⁴³ The mission worked with UNCT, its follow-on presence, as early as 2012 to carry out a capacity mapping exercise to identify comparative advantages of UNMIL and the eighteen UN agencies, funds, and programs.

According to a UN human rights official, the case of Liberia highlights that the participation of the government is crucial to a successful transition.¹⁴⁴ Since its presidential election in 2006, the Liberian government found relative political stability and was open to cooperate and communicate with the international community. Liberia's

Independent National Commission on Human Rights was fully functional, and the Liberian government also participated in the annual Universal Periodic Review. Unfortunately, the Sudanese government currently appears somewhat unstable and the military council currently has more resources and power than the civilian council.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, it is important that the Security Council ensure that all sectors of the Sudanese government will continue to engage with the UN community after UNAMID's complete drawdown through aforementioned mechanisms such as a compact.

Another mechanism that played a major role in planning the transition is the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Headquartered in New York, PBC became very active in carrying out dialogues between key stakeholders¹⁴⁶ and acted as an efficient bridge between the UN and the Liberian government. PBC provided forums which allowed multiple UN officials to share their expertise, in contrast with UNSC meetings where only one official representative could speak with government leaders. Currently, there is no PBC agenda for UNAMID's transition in Sudan. Rather than have the UNSC plan the entire transition, it would be ideal for the PBC to head the Peacebuilding Plan as well as hold separate meetings and visits that could involve speaking with more experts and leaders in Sudan.

14. Develop a Compact

¹⁴² Danish Refugee Council Officer, Interview with the authors, February 29, 2020.

¹⁴³ Daniel Forti and Lesley Connoll, "The Mission is Gone, but the UN Is Staying: Liberia's Peacekeeping Transition", International Peace Institute, December 2018, p.1.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations Human Rights Official, Interview with the authors, March 11, 2020.

¹⁴⁵ International NGO official, interview with the authors, April 20, 2020.

¹⁴⁶ Daniel Forti and Lesley Connoll, "The Mission is Gone, but the UN Is Staying: Liberia's Peacekeeping Transition", International Peace Institute, December 2018, p.12.

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We recommend that the GoS establish a compact with the international community as a mechanism to facilitate the Sudanese government's sustainable and successful nation-building and improve its capacity to protect civilians and effectively monitor and report on human rights violations. A notable example of a compact model similar to (yet different from) what we recommend for Sudan is the New Deal Initiative, launched in 2011 to promote international dialogue between donor states and fragile states, which was endorsed by more than 40 countries as well as major international organizations such as the European Union, OECD, and World Bank. Among the participating countries were G7+ countries like Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and South Sudan which shared lessons learned and best practices with each other for peacebuilding and state-building. These countries proposed the New Deal Compact to South Sudan in April 2013 to extend this same opportunity for cooperative nation-building, which encouraged the South Sudanese government to develop a set of benchmarks to improve its economy and governance. While this might have been an invaluable opportunity for South Sudan, civil war broke out in December that same year, and South Sudan ended up not signing the compact.¹⁴⁷

During its initial stage of implementation, South Sudan conducted a nation-wide Fragility Assessment and Fragility Workshop in which 80 stakeholders from the central government, civil society organizations, and foreign development

partners participated.¹⁴⁸ Although not much progress has been made since the Workshop, some key lessons learned from the assessment highlighted the importance of promoting an environment safe for civil society organizations to operate and flourish, the need to develop a less oil-dependent economy, and the value of local ownership of the process.

Similarly, Sudan could benefit from joining a compact with the international community that would encourage donor countries to reward Sudan for progress made on exercising good governance, abiding by international human rights and humanitarian law obligations, and effectively protecting civilians regardless of their identity. Ideally, this new compact would be between the Sudanese government, the UN, financial institutions like the World Bank and African Development Bank, and the 'Friends of Sudan' which include the United States, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt.¹⁴⁹

The Peacebuilding Support Office developed recommendations for good practices in establishing and implementing compacts. Some of the key factors for success it identified included (1) garnering local ownership of the compact through "a highly consultative process" in order to establish sufficient political and financial support for meeting established benchmarks, (2) high-level national led monitoring of indicators of progress in partnership with the UN and the establishment of "working groups involving civil society, to propose timely responses to shortcomings in

¹⁴⁷ "New Deal Compact: Background information on a New Deal compact for South Sudan," Ministry of Finance and Planning, Republic of South Sudan, http://www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS_Compact-Overview.pdf

¹⁴⁸ "The New Deal Implementation in South Sudan, A South Sudanese Civil Society perspective paper," CSO Working Group

¹⁴⁹ "Friends of Sudan meet in Khartoum", Dabanga, December 12, 2019, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/friends-of-sudan-meet-in-khartoum>

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implementation” to hold the government and international community mutually accountable and (3) the development of “concrete, measurable, [and] timebound indicators,” that are both quantitative and qualitative to sequence priorities and measure both the risk of relapse into violent conflict and the progress towards sustainable peace.¹⁵⁰

To help countries and international organizations that are parties to the compact gauge the extent to which all parties are making progress on each of their promised actions, it is advised that an impartial monitoring mechanism be jointly established between the GoS and the UN that will shift to sole GoS management over time.¹⁵¹ The PBC would be well suited to take on this initial joint monitoring role. Sudan will also benefit from PBC involvement by leveraging its expertise in bringing peacebuilding and development stakeholders together.¹⁵² While actors from the international community can

recommend benchmarks and indicators comprising the compact deemed important for fostering post-conflict stability, to maximize national ownership and local buy-in no benchmarks should be forced upon the GoS.

By signing the compact, the GoS will have incentives to reach political and socio-economic milestones it sets for itself, such as signing and keeping peace treaties with the armed groups, carrying out a successful national election in 2022 with a full installment of a democratic leadership, resettling refugees and IDPs in a voluntary and safe manner, among others. With a support system of partner donor countries and institutions that are committed to rewarding Sudan for success, Sudan will have a framework for human rights monitoring and protection of civilians’ benchmarks in the absence of UNAMID.

¹⁵⁰ “Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks since the late 1990s,” PBSO Briefing Paper, Working Group Lessons Learned, Peacebuilding Support Office, 19 September 2007, 4-7
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/wgll_pbsf_briefing_paper_14sep07.pdf

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 8

¹⁵² “Special Research Report No. 5: Peacebuilding Commission,” Research Report, Security Council Report
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-gKWLeMTIsG-b-4673567.php?print=true>

Image 2. UN Peacekeepers Protecting Civilians¹⁵³



¹⁵³ “News in Brief 1 June 2017,” UN News, 01 June 2017.
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YXVJovbEo6U0TWAmdwFflN5kVwJZqTa/edit#>.

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It has been just over a year since hundreds of thousands of Sudanese flooded the streets of Khartoum – risking their lives and their freedom to demand a better future for themselves and their fellow citizens. Given their sacrifice and triumph, it is pivotal to get this current moment right.

This is a defining moment for Sudan, which stands at a crossroads. The political developments of the last year offer genuine hope for a democratic transition. Just as importantly, it offers hope for a government that does not target minorities and displaced people, but instead strives to protect them from violence; to build the rule of law, and to foster the restorative justice they so richly deserve. These hopes will not be easily realized; they cannot be fulfilled overnight, but they can become reality.

Ultimately, the future is in the hands of the Sudanese people and their government – but it is clear that the United Nations has a vital role to play. In stark contrast to the conditions in which UNAMID was created, where President Omar Al-Bashir repeatedly frustrated efforts to protect Sudanese civilians, the United Nations now has a partner.

In order to best position itself to help the Sudanese government while ensuring the most vulnerable in Darfur are protected, the United Nations should include a *Protection of Civilians* and a *Human Rights Component* within their mandate for the SPM. The UN can also help Sudan build and *train its police force* to establish rule of law and *expand its weapons collection program*.

The United Nations' SPM should encourage Sudan to continue expanding its *reforms of the Rapid Support Forces*, which will be vital for the Sudanese government's effort to earn the trust of citizens of Darfur that the crimes committed by the Janjaweed during the genocide will never again be permitted. Similarly, Sudan should be encouraged by the UN to embrace *transitional justice* in their ongoing peace negotiations, as this remains one of the top concerns for many IDPS.

Furthermore, we recommend the UN embrace *Unarmed Civilian Protection* as an essential tool to both help communities create their own early warning systems and develop actions procedures to prevent impending or future violence. We encourage the UN to develop a *Compact* with the Government of Sudan, in which Sudan would receive Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds.

The UN should carry over its *Civil Affairs* division into their SPM for Sudan, so that it can continue its important role as a platform for leaders across different communities to work together toward resolving local disputes, addressing the needs of key stakeholders from IDPs to herders, and to build a more peaceful future. The UN should continue supporting the work of the *National Human Rights Commission*, while supporting more aggressive reforms that will grant justice for victims of human rights violations. Because Sudanese women were the core of the peaceful protest against Omar al-Bashir, we suggest the UN continue expanding its efforts to support and train women leaders, and we encourage the Sudanese Government to ensure that women

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play a pivotal role in determining and structuring the country's future.

Lastly, we strongly recommend that the UN install an *Integrated Analysis Hub* and an *Integrated Information Hub* in the SPM, in order to establish robust early warning networks designed to deter violence and provide both UN and Sudanese leadership with evidence and tools needed to identify, respond, and de-escalate the crisis. These additions will significantly improve the SPM's ability to protect civilians by monitoring potential human rights violations in a manner that we believe wouldn't infringe on Sudanese sovereignty.

The current global Coronavirus pandemic has already spread to Sudan; its outcome risks jeopardizing Sudan's transition to civilian rule. To its credit, the Sovereign Council has been thorough in its pandemic preparation and prevention efforts. They began setting up checkpoints to screen travelers as early as January 28th, closed all airports by March 16th, and banned travel between cities in early April. Over half of Sudan's population lives under the poverty line; many Sudanese do not have the financial luxury of choosing to "stay home" or socially distance. Given the limited number of tests available, and even more limited access to testing, it is likely that the number of infected is far higher than reported.

Sudan is at risk of running out of medical supplies needed to fight the pandemic in less than a few weeks. It is important to recognize the danger the novel Coronavirus presents to Sudan's successful transition to peace if it infects or causes widespread deaths. There remain close to two million Sudanese who are internally displaced, many living in crowded camps, where many of those are unable to meet even their most basic needs. If the virus ravages

these camps, Sudan will struggle to provide them with even the most basic medical care, let alone what they will need to survive.

It is critically important for the international community to physically and financially support Sudan during the pandemic. Sudan should not have to shoulder this burden alone. It is understandable that international donors are overwhelmed with the challenges they face in their own countries, but their help is essential now, as this may be the single most impactful moment to provide aid to Sudan.

There is an alternative option to a pending catastrophic outcome in Sudan. In fact, this is a critical opportunity for the Sudanese transitional government to demonstrate to the Sudanese people that when confronted with the greatest challenge of its tenure, it was able to lead effectively. Similarly, this can be a defining moment for the United Nations and for the international community to demonstrate its commitment to peaceful and successful governmental transitions. The Sudanese people and government will remember those that provided support when they needed it most; but they will also remember if they were abandoned to confront this crisis alone.

UNAMID Base Closures/Handovers to the GoS

All violent episodes and fatality cases are from the ACLED data set and were calculated within 60 miles of each town's geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude), compared 3 months before and 3 months after each base's handover.

24 Total Cases of Base Handovers

Cases where violence increased	7
Cases where fatalities increased	7
Cases where violence remained unchanged	8
Cases where fatalities remained unchanged	5
Cases where violence decreased	9
Cases where fatalities decreased	12

The towns (in which UNAMID bases were transferred) that were assessed using the above listed methodology include:

Darfur Town	Site Transfer Date	Violent Episodes	Episodes of fatalities
Muhajiriya	8 Aug. 2017	Unchanged	Decreased Sharply
Malha	16 Aug. 2017	Unchanged	Unchanged
Mellit	17 Aug. 2017	Increased	Increased
Um Kaddada	29 Aug. 2017	Relatively Unchanged	Relatively Unchanged
Abu Shawk	12 Oct. 2017	Increased	Unchanged

Tina	12 Oct. 2017	Increased Slightly	Increased Slightly
Habila	12 Oct. 2017	Relatively Unchanged	Decreased
Edd Al Fursan	12 Oct. 2017	Decreased	Decreased
Tullus	15 Oct. 2017	Increased	Decreased
Foro Burunga	17 Oct. 2017	Decreased Slightly	Decreased
Zamzam	21 Oct. 2017	Increased	Relatively Unchanged
El Sireaf*	8 Oct. 2018	Relatively Unchanged	Increased
Shearia	30 Oct. 2018	Decreased Slightly	Decreased
Labado*	1 Nov. 2018	Decreased Slightly	Decreased
Mukjar	4 Nov. 2018	Increased Slightly	Increased Slightly
Misterei	7 Nov. 2018	Unchanged	Unchanged
Umm Baru	8 Nov. 2018	Decreased Slightly	Decreased Slightly
Korma	17 Nov. 2018	Decreased Slightly	Decreased Slightly
Murnei	18 Nov. 2018	Unchanged	Increased Slightly
Buram	9 Dec. 2018	Decreased	Decreased
Gereida	20 Dec. 2018	Decreased	Decreased
Ed Daein	30 Apr. 2019	Increased	Increased
El Geneina	15 May 2019	Decreased Slightly	Decreased Sharply
Nyala	19 Nov. 2019	Relatively Unchanged	Increased

*Geographic coordinates of town were not listed in the ACLED data set and had to be approximated

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