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Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Paix En Haïti (MONUPEH)

A UN-led Peacekeeping Operation for Haiti

Haiti's multidimensional crisis requires an integrated political economy solution that breaks the nexus between the gangs and the elites.

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Haiti's transition from the Multinational Security Support mission (MSS) to the more robust Gang Suppression Force (GSF) seeks to address immediate security needs but leaves a critical gap in long-term stabilization planning. This paper proposes MONUPEH, a five-year United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, as the necessary bridge from gang suppression to sustainable, Haitian-led recovery by integrating security, governance, and economic development into a single, phased framework.

Notes:

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- Authors are arranged in alphabetical order.

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Executive Summary

Gangs, criminal enterprises, and poverty have overtaken much of Haiti and its capital, Port-au-Prince, since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. In response to the government of the Republic of Haiti's request for international support, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized in 2023 the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, working in coordination with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and deploying in 2024. In late 2025, the UNSC authorized a transition from the MSS to the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), with a mandate to conduct offensive gang suppression operations in an effort to reestablish security throughout the country, and established the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide logistical and operational support. With UNSOH, the GSF offers greater funding, resourcing, manpower, and capability to forcibly address gang control and assert Haitian state-control in Haiti.

However, Haiti's crisis is rooted in, and sustained by, a political-economic equilibrium in which predatory elites, criminal groups, and a captured state reinforce one another. Fourteen successive international missions since 1993, from the UN and Organization of American States (OAS) International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) to the Gang Suppression Force and UNSOH architecture, generated episodic security gains but left those underlying incentives intact. The framework described in this report is a Chapter VII UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission to succeed the GSF, called the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Paix En Haïti (MONUPEH). Unlike prior missions, MONUPEH is designed to break this pattern by integrating security recovery with the political, economic, and institutional reforms that make security durable. The mission succeeds or fails on whether Haitian institutions, not blue helmets, are the visible authority by the end of the mandate.

While different policy options have been developed and discussed to help Haiti reestablish state control, none have put forward a comprehensive planning and execution framework for a UN peacekeeping mission. The following framework addresses that gap.

This project outlines in-depth analysis, describing MONUPEH's organizational architecture and GSF transition. It then discusses the five Lines of Effort, 16 Operational Themes, and 31 distinct tasks by which MONUPEH should operate, to be conducted over three phases: *Phase 1. Prepare/Secure*, *Phase 2. Stabilize*, and *Phase 3. Develop*. The phases and tasks are listed chronologically with estimated timelines, triggers, descriptions, lead actors, and assessed funding sources in both a Gantt Chart and comprehensive Task Register. Additionally, the project outlines a contingency plan should GSF operations fail to establish security. Finally, the project discusses UNSC dynamics, budgeting, and end-state criteria.

The framework is organized around five mutually reinforcing lines of effort (LOE). LOE 1 establishes security and rule of law through a bounded military-to-police handover, standing surge capacity for contingencies, and police-courts-prisons security-sector reform. LOE 2 delivers early economic stabilization, such as cash-for-work, targeted economic pilots along the Route Nationale 1 (RN-1) corridor and in Saint-Marc, and a renegotiated relationship with the global economy, so that security gains translate into enduring livelihoods. LOE 3 rebuilds democratic credibility by reconstituting an independent Conseil Électoral Permanent, expanding Internationally Displaced Persons (IDP) and diaspora voting access, and embedding civic education for the 45 percent of Haitians who are under 18. LOE 4 restores institutional capacity through anti-corruption infrastructure, financial-crimes enforcement, and judicial reform. LOE 5 addresses the backlog of accountability through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), community violence reduction (CVR), and transitional justice, differentiated by role so that gang leadership, coerced participants, children, and host communities are treated distinctly.

Three primary risks present themselves. First, the Security Council consensus authorizing MONUPEH would likely be fragile and would be tested by the first casualty event, corruption scandal, or funding shortfall. Second, the gang coalition Viv Ansanm and its constituent structures retain the capacity to disperse into insurgency, potentially stretching HNP and any residual international force beyond planned levels. Third, the Haitian political transition may slow-walk or refuse the reforms on which drawdown depends. The mission's principal hedge is condition-based, not calendar-based, phasing: benchmarks govern force reduction, and a residual UN political presence remains to accompany Haitian institutions after the uniformed footprint departs. The end state is modest by design: an HNP that can hold the line without external backstop, an elected government seated through credible elections, and a functioning judicial backbone in major jurisdictions. These are preconditions for the deeper reforms Haitian society can take forward. Anything more ambitious, on a five-year horizon, is a forecast this mission cannot responsibly make.

Overall, this framework aims to answer how a UNSC-authorized multidimensional Chapter VII peacekeeping mission would organize, operate, and resource itself in Haiti, in coordination with and by the invitation of the Haitian government. It outlines five years of operations, with an estimated 12,000 personnel, and \$2.6B in total costs to support long-term Haitian stability and development. Fundamentally, MONUPEH's success stems from enabling Haitians to address chronic and fundamental issues that perpetuate gang violence and instability, thereby allowing Haitians to claim a future of peace, growth, and safety.

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

With an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince under gang control¹, Haiti's security and humanitarian crisis has raised urgent concerns for Haitian authorities and the international community. Following the end of the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission's mandate, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in consultation with the Haitian Government, authorized a more robust operation, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). On 1 April 2026, the first Chadian troops landed in the Haitian capital, alongside the GSF's Special Representative, Jack Christofides.

While still in its infancy, the GSF holds the promise of wresting back control from the gangs, heralding a potential turning point after years of brutal violence and political turmoil. Yet, even if the GSF is successful in its mission, this latest iteration by the international community will not fully resolve Haiti's crisis, whose root causes extend far beyond gang violence and security.

The central question both for the Haitian Government and the international community is not whether the GSF can restore order, but what comes next. Haitian authorities have called for another Chapter VII UN peacekeeping operation (PKO), underscoring that the demand for a more robust and durable international framework is not externally imposed. However, past international responses have largely failed to address the underlying drivers of instability, favoring fragmented and highly technical interventions over integrated political strategies.

Given Haiti's historically broken social contract and disintegration of the state, only a transformative solution which addresses the complex political-economic networks driving the violence and instability can bring about true peace. Drawing on extensive research into past peacebuilding missions in Haiti and beyond, as well as over 30 interviews with Haitian and international sources across the fields of academia, government, multilateral organizations, security, non-governmental organizations, and civil society, this report outlines an integrated, multidimensional UN peacekeeping mission designed to support Haitian-led institutional reconstruction and break the cycle of recurrent instability.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The findings and recommendations of this paper are based on research conducted between January and April 2026, combining qualitative desk research with expert interviews.

Desk research drew on a combination of academic journal articles, UN reports and Security Council documents, think tank and NGO publications, government documents, and news sources. Comparative case study analysis of five past UN peace operations, the

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC), alongside Haiti's own historical cycles of instability informed by the project's operational and policy recommendations.

To complement the desk research, the team conducted interviews with more than 30 experts and practitioners, both virtually and in person. Interviewees represented six sectors: academia, government, non-governmental organizations, UN staff, security personnel, and Haitian civil society. These conversations provided updated perspectives and on-the-ground insights that informed and enriched the analysis. Interviews were conducted under the Chatham House rule; views are not attributed to individual participants or their institutions, and no names or affiliations are listed in this report.

Research was organized across three interconnected workstreams, country context, UN institutional analysis, and peacekeeping operations, which together informed the Secure–Stabilize–Develop framework and the policy recommendations presented in this paper.

SECTION 2: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

BACKGROUND

Overview of the Current Situation

Haiti's current crisis cannot be understood without acknowledging the structural conditions that produced it. Since the US occupation of 1915, which dismantled Haiti's decentralized political and economic order and consolidated power in Port-au-Prince,² governance in Haiti has been underpinned by a culture of "*grands mangeurs*" ("big eaters"), producing a class of political entrepreneurs who pursue power as a means of personal accumulation within a context where few alternative paths to social mobility exist.³ Clientelism, corruption, and impunity have defined successive administrations, from François "Papa Doc" Duvalier's *Tonton Macoutes*⁴ to the PetroCaribe scandal under Jovenel Moïse, which triggered a year of mass protests in 2018.⁵

These deep structural vulnerabilities were dramatically exposed when President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in July 2021, plunging Haiti into a crisis from which it has yet to recover. Since then, Haiti has been trapped in a deepening cycle of political paralysis and violence.

Gangs have now seized an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince⁶ and function as de facto authorities. In Haiti, a country where 80 percent of imported goods pass through the capital's seaport and national roads, the main seaport Terminal Varreux has been blocked by gangs repeatedly since September 2022, halting fuel imports and shutting down hospitals and water pumps. National Route 1 and Route 2, the only highways connecting Port-au-Prince to the north and south, are dotted with illegal gang tolls.

Successive efforts to break that chokehold by the Haitian National Police (HNP), private military contractors such as Erik Prince, and the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission have largely failed. The MSS mission deployed its first 200 Kenyan police officers in June 2024, with an authorized ceiling of 2,500 personnel.⁷ By the end of its mandate on 2 October 2025, only about 1,000 personnel had been deployed, never reaching the planned threshold⁸. Outgunned and understaffed, the combined national, international and private security forces have reclaimed no major gang stronghold. Yet the same forces have killed an extraordinary number of people: in 2025 alone, over 6,000 homicides were recorded, of which the HNP was responsible for nearly 60 percent, approximately 3,600 deaths. The HNP claims that 90 percent of those killed were gang affiliated.⁹

Recent UN engagement in Haiti has moved through three successive phases¹⁰. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),¹¹ deployed in 2004 after Haiti's political collapse, operated as a traditional peacekeeping mission; in 2017 it was succeeded by the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH),¹²

which narrowed the focus to police, rule of law, and human rights; and in 2019 this was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH),¹³ a special political mission centered on political facilitation and institutional support. Rather than marking a durable resolution, these transitions reflected the UN's repeated effort to scale down and reframe its role in the absence of a stable Haitian political order.

In October 2024, citing the urgency of Haiti's situation, the former Chair of the Transitional Presidential Council, Leslie Voltaire, as well as the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the UN, Antonio Rodrigue, requested the non-UN MSS transition to a Chapter VII UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO).¹⁴ The United States and Ecuador, as co-penholders on the Haiti file, had previously circulated a draft resolution to this effect.¹⁵ Of the permanent members, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom expressed their support. However, China and Russia opposed, citing the 30 years of past UN peacekeeping efforts, the lack of legitimate Haitian leadership, and the dangerous nature of the operation.¹⁶ China's position was further complicated by the geopolitical dimensions of Haiti's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.¹⁷

Following the failure to advance a PKO resolution, when the MSS's mandate was set to expire in October 2025,¹⁸ the United States and Panama, as co-penholders, put forth the resolution for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) and Gang Suppression Force (GSF)^{19,20}, which was adopted 30 September 2025 and began operations in Haiti on 1 April 2026. This was not only supported by Haitian authorities and the UNSC but also the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

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Amidst this violence, a nominal government exists. Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé was installed by the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) in November 2024, after the previous prime minister, Garry Conille, was fired by the council.²² Created in April 2024 to manage the transition, the TPC reached the end of its mandate on 7 February 2026 without having organized elections, weakened throughout by corruption allegations, internal infighting, and open struggles over who should govern the transition. An effort was made by the TPC in January 2026 to oust Prime Minister Fils-Aimé,²³ but was halted in part by a show of support for him through the deployment of three American warships on 4 February 2026.²⁴ Without an electoral mandate, nor a monopoly on the use of force in the capital, Fils-Aimé's government controls little more than a few blocks of Port-au-Prince and is without an independent power base. Despite his strong backing from the US, domestically he is widely dismissed as a figurehead with no independent political agency. No democratically elected president has held office since Moïse's assassination, and the country has operated without a constitutionally mandated government for over four years.²⁵

Humanitarian crisis

This political paralysis and security crisis has translated into a humanitarian catastrophe for ordinary Haitians²⁶. In addition to rampant human rights violations, this atmosphere of fear, violence, and bloodshed has also displaced over 1.4 million people, accounting for nearly 12 percent of the population²⁷. Key buildings and sites have been damaged or destroyed, including ministries, courts, police stations, hospitals and the national palace.²⁸ Education has ground to a standstill, with more than 1,600 schools closed in Port-au-Prince²⁹, a quarter of which are occupied by gangs.

Not only are children being prevented from safely attending school, but they have also become targets of gang violence and the subjects of recruitment. In 2025, UNICEF's representative in Haiti, Geetanjali Narayan, highlighted that child recruitment into armed groups had surged by 200 percent, with reports estimating that roughly half of all current gang members are children.³⁰

Many children are coerced; others join out of economic desperation, with some reportedly earning up to \$1,000 a week.³¹

Compounding this crisis, Haiti is also the poorest country in the Latin America and Caribbean region.³² According to the World Food Program (WFP), 5.9 million Haitians do not have enough to eat, accounting for nearly half of the country's population.³³ Of these, over two million are expected to face an emergency level of hunger based on the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report, and 277,000 children are suffering from acute malnutrition.³⁴

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

Over the past three decades, Haiti has been the subject of numerous international interventions, especially by the United Nations. The first UN peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)³⁵ was established in 1993 to oversee the transition to a civilian government and the return of elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Successive missions including the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)³⁶, the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)³⁷, and UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)³⁸ were launched between 1996 and 2000 to support Haitian authorities in developing and professionalizing the Haitian National Police (HNP).

But perhaps the most well-known is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which lasted from 2004 to 2017. As a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH was established to restore security, stability, and the rule of law.³⁹ Its mandate included supporting the Transitional Government, assisting in the restructuring and reform of the HNP, helping with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs, assisting with the organization and monitoring of elections, reporting on human rights situations, promoting all-inclusive national dialogue, and following the devastating 2010 earthquake, supporting Haiti's immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts.

While these missions brought success in addressing Haiti's security dynamics and halting widespread violence, their effectiveness was limited and short-lived. They failed to establish a precedent for long-term stabilization and were unable to build durable state institutions capable of sustaining security and governance after the mission's withdrawal. Although progress was made in professionalizing the HNP and temporarily suppressing armed groups, underlying structural challenges including weak political institutions, corruption, economic fragility, and limited state legitimacy remained largely unresolved. As a result, many of the gains achieved during the UN missions eroded following their departure.

Moreover, MINUSTAH in particular was the subject of significant controversy,⁴⁰ having caused a cholera epidemic in 2010 by introducing the disease to the country through its peacekeepers, as well as being the source of widespread allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation. These incidents severely damaged the credibility of the United Nations among the Haitian population and highlighted significant shortcomings in the accountability mechanisms of peacekeeping operations. Subsequent missions now include preventative measures to avoid such violations, however, the damage caused to the Haitian people is irreversible and continues to shape public perceptions of international interventions.

Following MINUSTAH, the withdrawal of MINUJUSTH marked the end of peacekeeping operations in the country. Unlike its predecessor, this transitional mission, lasting from 2017 to 2019, was primarily established to strengthen the rule of law, support the HNP, and advance human rights, and therefore lacked the robust military security component of MINUSTAH. The smaller mission primarily relied on its formed police units and the HNP. MINUJUSTH in turn was succeeded by BINUH, a special political mission which remains active to this day to strengthen political stability and good governance, support inter-Haitian national dialogue, and protect human rights.

In more recent years, the deteriorating security situation has caused international operations in Haiti to resume. In an effort to respond to the rising violence, the UNSC authorized the formation and deployment of a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in 2023.⁴¹ However, the operation faced significant challenges in accomplishing its mandate due to staffing and funding shortages.⁴² On 30 September 2025, the Security Council authorized a more robust operation, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF).⁴³ Despite the promising nature of the GSF in addressing the security dimension of the crisis, it is unlikely to create durable peace as it is not mandated to tackle the root of the problems. Without parallel efforts to rebuild institutions, address impunity, support political processes, promote economic development, and support self-sustaining, Haitian-led initiatives, the security attained through force is unlikely to last.

HAITI'S GANG LANDSCAPE

Understanding the scale of Haiti's security crisis requires examining the gang ecosystem that has come to dominate the country's political and physical landscape.

From Rivalry to Coalition

Haiti's gang crisis is rooted in deliberate political engineering. The two main federations, the G9 Family and Allies, connected to the ruling PHTK party, and G-Pèp, associated with the political opposition, were originally created and financed by political elites as instruments of electoral violence and territorial control. Over time, both grew beyond the reach of their patrons, developing independent operational capacity and territorial dominance across Port-au-Prince. By the early 2020s, the two federations were locked in violent rivalry, with their clashes driving much of the civilian death toll across the capital's most densely populated neighborhoods.⁴⁴

That rivalry ended in late 2023 when the G9 and G-Pèp formed Viv Ansanm, meaning "Live Together" in Haitian Creole. The coalition was not born out of shared ideology but out of shared threat: the UN Security Council's authorization of the MSS, prompting gang leaders to set aside their differences and present a united front against external intervention.⁴⁵

The coalition's impact was immediate. In February and March 2024, Viv Ansanm launched simultaneous coordinated attacks across Port-au-Prince, including an assault on the country's main prison that freed thousands of inmates, strikes on the international airport, and attacks on government buildings, operations that directly forced Prime Minister Ariel Henry's resignation. It was the first time in Haiti's history that a gang coalition had removed a sitting head of government.⁴⁶

Scale, Reach, and Territorial Control

Viv Ansanm nonetheless remains a coalition of convenience rather than a unified command. Individual gangs retain their own hierarchies and territorial bases. It functions because member groups have established arrangements for distributing territory and dividing revenue from illicit activities, making cooperation more profitable than renewed conflict. Experts estimate the coalition collectively has between 12,000 and 20,000 members, of whom approximately 3,000 are heavily armed.⁴⁷ At least 26 gangs now operate across Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.⁴⁸

Emboldened by their hold onto the capital, gangs have expanded outward. In Kenscoff, overlooking the affluent neighborhood of Pétiion-Ville, gangs seized a telecommunications hub, extending their reach into communications infrastructure critical to the broader capital region.⁴⁹ In the Artibonite, expansion has been accompanied by extreme violence: on 29 March 2026, Gran Grif carried out a massacre in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite in which the UN Special Representative reported at least 70 people may have been killed, with at least 50 homes burned and thousands

displaced.⁵⁰ A UN human rights report published in March 2026 documented that gangs are now also expanding control over key sea and road routes across the country.⁵¹

From Predation to Parallel Governance: The Economic Model

With territorial control consolidated, gangs have transitioned from episodic predation to systematic extortion through coercive parallel governance. Having broken free from elite political patrons, they now sustain themselves through diversified revenue streams: illegal taxes on street vendors, businesses, power plants, bus companies, and firms at industrial parks and seaports; illegal tolls and checkpoints on the national highway connecting Port-au-Prince to the southern regions; maritime theft targeting cargo vessels; kidnapping; and drug trafficking.⁵² Gangs earn a further 60 to 75 million United States dollars annually from extorting shipments arriving from the Dominican Republic alone, according to the Haitian Ministry of Economy.⁵³ The UNODC reported to the UN Security Council in January 2026 that gangs now operate money-laundering infrastructure through front companies, cash smuggling, and unregulated remittance channels that interface directly with political financing.⁵⁴

THE STRUCTURAL DRIVERS OF CRISIS

With their seemingly lawless violence and carnival-esque brutality, much international attention has been captured by Haiti's gangs, who form the targets for military intervention.⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, gangs have caused untold amounts of human suffering, but to make them the focal point of international intervention is to reduce the crisis to a physical security problem and, to the detriment of Haitians, leaves the underlying drivers unaddressed. Thus, understanding how the security dimension both produces and is a product of conflict is crucial to an effective intervention.

“Leta pa fè leta” (‘The state does not make the state’)

The historical patterns outlined above are not merely contextual, they reflect a structural logic of state capture and elite extraction that has reproduced itself across every administration and every attempt at reform.

Through complex webs of clientelism and patronage, political and economic elites collaborate to share the spoils and sinecures of state office, the former providing the legitimacy and access required in exchange for the connections and resources of the latter.⁵⁶ Corruption and impunity abound, with the concept of ‘legal bandits’ captured in the figures of former presidents Michel Martelly and Jovenel Moïse.⁵⁷ Martelly has been sanctioned for his involvement in drug trafficking⁵⁸ while Moïse was linked to the \$3.4 billion PetroCaribe scandal which triggered a year of protests in 2018.⁵⁹ While lucrative for the privileged few, this clientelistic symbiosis comes at the expense of the state, which is hollowed out and denuded of its duty to the people, embodied in the title of Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot's book, *State Against Nation*.⁶⁰

It is telling of the degree of state capture that when Haitians use the term “*leta*” (‘state’), they refer to powerful individuals regardless of their formal ties to the state apparatus, invoking both the president and parliament, as well as the class of commercial elites.⁶¹ At the same time, the state is very much absent in the lives of many Haitians, who live under conditions of profound government neglect, which Haitian geographers describe as “*sans*” places, those ‘without’.⁶² Often forced to fend for themselves for electricity, water, trash collection, policing and other social services not provided by the state, rural inhabitants and the urban poor are pushed to “*fè leta*” (‘make the state’) on their own accord, prompting the emergence of entities like the ‘*baz*’ (informal neighborhood-based armed groups that emerged to fill the security vacuum left by the state) and other forms of informal governance to compensate for the state's absence.⁶³ This dynamic is present even under the current situation, where members of the Transitional Presidential Council received around \$76,000 each month in salary and additional perks,⁶⁴ while 60 percent of Haitians live on less than \$3.65 a day.⁶⁵

It is within this context of a hollowed-out state and a population left to fend for itself that violence has become not merely a symptom of Haiti's crisis but a central instrument of its political economy.

Violence and the elite-gang nexus

Since its origins as the world's first free black republic⁶⁶, violence has played a key role in shaping power relations in Haiti as both an instrument of repression and tool for liberation.⁶⁷ From the slave rebellion that became its founding story to the peasant uprisings against the American occupation and Duvalier dictatorships, much of Haitian politics has been driven by a “historical interchange of state despotism and popular militancy”.⁶⁸ Consequently, this has produced what Haitian political scientist Robert Fatton Jr. terms an “authoritarian habitus” whereby violence has become a central element in the exercise and challenge of power, which has endured to the present.⁶⁹

Weber famously defines statehood⁷⁰ by the possession of a monopoly of force. In Haiti, governmental organs of force such as the army have acted in equal parts against the welfare of the people as in defense of it, or cannot be relied upon to provide security for ordinary Haitians, pushing groups like the *baz* to claim force for themselves for self-defence. With violence as a key currency in the political marketplace, elites have also seen fit to harness force for their own ends, with wealthy families such as the Brands, Mevs and Apais spending millions to finance opposition groups and gang leaders⁷¹ to overthrow President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which they successfully achieved in 1991 and 2004. Even presidents themselves have contributed to this dispersion of force beyond the bounds of the state to form their own private militias, beginning with the infamous *Tontons Macoutes* established by François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, to Aristide's *chimères*, and Moïse's personal Palace Guard⁷². Far from being a rupture from the ‘normal’ order, the current crisis is a mere continuation of the Pandora's box that was opened since the alliance between elites and gangs was first struck decades ago.

Government legitimacy and institutions

The structural capture of the state described above has produced a government⁷³ that lacks not only capacity but legitimacy, a distinction that matters enormously for any intervention designed to restore democratic governance. Nowhere is this more visible than in Haiti's electoral history, which reveals not isolated failures but a repeating pattern of structural breakdown that has progressively eroded public trust in democratic institutions.

Elections in Haiti are notorious for their flaws, often seeing low turnouts of around 20 percent⁷⁴ (compared to nearly 70 percent in 1991)⁷⁵ and being directed by gangs, elites or international interests. Now however, even these external trappings of democracy have fallen away, with the last election having been in 2016, and a slew of appointed leaders since then. Following the unpopular government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry who took over after the assassination of President Moïse, the TPC was beset by infighting and failed to fulfil its mandate of organizing elections by 7 February 2026.⁷⁶ When five of its nine members attempted to remove Prime Minister Fils-Aimé counter to the wishes of the US with whom he shared a strong working relationship, three naval vessels were sent to Haiti's coast in an unsubtle warning⁷⁷. Although the Prime Minister has since

announced elections for August 2026, there is strong doubt that this goal can be realized.⁷⁸ Having made little progress on security over the past few years, further emphasized by recent massacres in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite⁷⁹, the government is widely distrusted and lacks legitimacy amongst the population.⁸⁰

SECTION 3: MISSION DESIGN – UN-led CH. VII Peacekeeping Operation

The Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Paix En Haïti (MONUPEH) will constitute a multi-dimensional UN-led Chapter VII Peacekeeping Operation with three phases, five Lines of Effort, 16 emphasized themes, and 31 separate tasks. Upon adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution, MONUPEH will assume authority and responsibility for UN operations in Haiti, incorporating the current United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Gang Suppression Force (GSF), and United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) into a unified command structure through a sequenced transition process. This section outlines the theoretical and strategic foundations of MONUPEH, beginning with the theory of change and lessons learned from MINUSTAH, then outlining the detailed conditions of the GSF transition, MONUPEH's key principles, mission structure, dependency rationale and strategy, and finally elaborating on the five Lines of Effort.

THEORY OF CHANGE

Haiti's crisis is a gordian knot which has trapped the country in a vicious cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment.⁸¹ In the absence of physical security and control over key infrastructure, the foundations for development cannot be laid, preventing the emergence of credible economic alternatives for Haiti's youth which would allow them to separate from gangs. Although past peacekeeping missions opened temporary windows of stability, these gains never survived the withdrawal of external forces.

Haiti's unfortunate history of repeated shocks, human-made or natural disaster-driven, prevents the formation of credible expectations about a stable future. In this context, short-term extraction is rational, and long-term investment is not. This system has created the mutually reinforcing relationship between political patronage and gang violence, in which elites provide resources and protection while gangs maintain an environment of controlled disorder that preserves elite privileges. It should be recognized, however, that peripheral gang members, unlike gang leaders, chose gangs not because of opportunistic gains but simply due to a lack of credible alternatives, as the dysfunctional state cannot provide services and normal job placements as gangs can.

This analysis provides a crucial perspective that Haiti's problem is not one that can be addressed solely using external support, but relates to the nation's intrinsic equilibrium. Past international interventions failed not because of military failure against the gangs, but because they withdrew military pressure immediately after gang control was reduced and then attempted to build political institutions based on an externally induced false equilibrium, where even if gangs were temporarily suppressed, the elite incentives and thus the demand structure for the gang economy was left intact. Knowing this to be the case, gangs simply hid or relocated, waiting for new opportunities after the forces'

withdrawal. Therefore, under the security vacuum and driven by the remaining demand for gangs, new groups quickly emerged and took over the streets.




Figure 1 Root Cause Illustration for the Situation in Haiti

Thus, beyond suppressing gangs through external military pressure, the intrinsic payoff structure that demands disorder and gang control must be altered to provide incentives for elites to abandon the gang economy and embrace a formal economic and political order. Building on the microeconomic logic of reducing demand versus curbing supplies, this framework seeks to leverage the former, as the latter risks strengthening the remaining suppliers by helping them eliminate competitors if their competitors are eliminated by an external force. Reducing demand, however, will lead to a natural die down of supplies.

To avoid repeating the counterproductive history of hijacking the state from the Haitian people and morphing their country into an “NGO Republic”,⁸² any successful intervention lies upon Haitian ownership of a self-sustaining trajectory. This requires creating an economic order that attracts “voting with feet” buy-in from local elites and creates a shared expectation that it will be capable of generating practical returns for its participants, rather than relying on the impractical assumption of perpetual external aid and unlimited international goodwill.

BOX 1: Lessons Learned from MINUSTAH

- Lack of integrated strategy linking stabilization with recovery; fragmented mission components and donor coordination undermined coherence.
- Security operations ignored political context, where alignment with a contested state and use of force reinforced confrontational politics and eroded legitimacy.
- Indiscriminate or heavy-handed operations (including civilian harm) radicalized communities and weakened follow-on institution-building.
- Loss of popular consent, crystallized by the cholera outbreak and cases of sexual abuse and exploitation, which reframed the mission as an occupying force.
- Deterrence effects proved temporary due to failure to address underlying drivers of violence, and gains collapsed once large force presence withdrew.

Implications for a new mission:

- **Build an integrated strategy from the outset while upholding the primacy of politics** – place security and institutional-building components under a single political-focused branch to avoid goal displacement.
- **Adopt a light footprint model** – avoid attrition tied to prolonged large force presence by enabling Haitian actors to deliver security themselves using fiscal gains from economic development initiatives.
- **Use intelligence-led operations with political oversight** – utilize analysts and civilian protection inputs to reduce civilian harm and manage political effects.
- **Differentiate targets** – isolate and pursue leadership while prioritizing DDR for rank-and-file, especially youth embedded in communities.
- **Ensure sustainability** – anchor sustainability in the mission structure and promote Haitian ownership so peace persists even after force withdrawal.




Figure 2 Structure of MINUSTAH⁸³

GSF TRANSITION TO MONUPEH

As of 1 April 2026, the GSF has arrived in Haiti.⁸⁴ The GSF is a UNSC-authorized parallel militarized entity comprised of volunteer-country forces, such as from Chad and El Salvador, with an authorized strength of 5,500 soldiers. Focused primarily on gang suppression and expulsion with a highly security-focused mandate, it exists in coordination with BINUH and with logistical support from UNSOH. Because the MONUPEH framework depends on a sequenced transition from clearance to stabilization, it is critical to specify how the mission should respond under different GSF outcomes. The central issue is how the GSF's success or failure will drive MONUPEH's force generation criteria in *Phase 0: Prepare*, as well as MONUPEH's focus on asserting Haitian authority over gang-controlled territory in *Phase 1: Secure*.

Assumptions

When MONUPEH assumes authority and responsibility for UN operations in Haiti, it does so with the expectation that the GSF is successful in achieving its mandate. This is labelled "Condition A," and it is the primary planning assumption, associated with the *Gantt Condition A* chart and the corresponding *Task Register Condition A*.

To ensure this project has versatility, however, the framework is built to be usable and applicable independent of GSF success or failure, with a contingency *Gantt Condition B* chart and *Task Register Condition B*.

MONUPEH will begin in *Phase 0: Prepare* under both Conditions A and B, but with differing expectations regarding timelines, task ownership, and the point at which GSF command authority transitions to the MONUPEH Force Commander. Notably, Condition A outlines simultaneous operations, where MONUPEH conducts *Phase 0: Prepare* phase tasks while the GSF (having already been operationally deployed) completes *Phase 1: Secure* tasks. As such, *Phase 0: Prepare* and *Phase 1: Secure* are combined into one under Condition A.

However, in Condition B, the phases are sequentially separated, signifying that MONUPEH will provide oversight, Command and Control (C2), and management of all *Phase 1: Secure* tasks. In both conditions, GSF manpower, resources, and operations will ultimately be overseen by the MONUPEH Force Commander – the difference lies in *when* that transition occurs relative to *Phase 1: Secure* operations.

Condition A

Condition A assumes that the GSF is successful in achieving its mandate, already advancing through SECURE-phase tasks (heavy clearance, node securing, targeted gang suppression) as MONUPEH is authorized and begins preparatory operations. Success should be understood as the degradation of gang control over key infrastructure, corridors, and strategic nodes sufficient to permit a shift from primarily kinetic operations to sustained stabilization. This approach is consistent with a broader logic

that prioritizes selective territorial control, sequencing, and consolidation to set the foundation for STABILIZE phase tasks.

MONUPEH stands up in parallel with ongoing GSF operations from month 1 – month 12, and assumes authority and responsibility for the GSF, BINUH, and UNSOH between month 7 and month 12 as Initial Operational Capability is achieved in Port-au-Prince. Specifically, the transition of C2 of the GSF to the MONUPEH Force Commander should occur when MONUPEH has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in Port au Prince. Until that point, GSF retains operational lead for *Phase 1: Secure* kinetic tasks but under UN oversight.

Two pathways for GSF integration are possible. The preferred pathway is re-hatting, in which all or part of the GSF is incorporated into the UN-commanded peacekeeping structure alongside mobilized UN peacekeeping forces. Re-hatting would preserve operational continuity, retain hard-won field knowledge, and reduce the risk of a security vacuum between the clearance and stabilization phases. It would also allow the UN to scale additional peacekeeping personnel as needed under a more coherent command structure.

If re-hatting is politically or operationally infeasible, the alternative is GSF demobilization concurrent with the deployment of a more numerous and comprehensive UN armed peacekeeping component, capable of serving militarized functions in support of policing operations.

Regardless of pathway, *Phase 2: Stabilize* should progressively transfer security responsibilities to the Head of the Police Component (HPC). Similarly, *Phase 3: Develop* will progressively transfer security responsibilities to the HNP and the Haitian government.

Example Transition (Condition A)

Sep 2026: GSF mandate renewed

Dec 2026: MONUPEH resolution passed

- *Phase 0: Prepare* begins (force generation, political preparation, etc.)

Jul 2027: MONUPEH establishes command and control capability in Port au Prince.

- MONUPEH assumes responsibility for all GSF, BINUH, and UNSOH authorities, personnel, resources, and equipment.
- Under MONUPEH, former GSF forces maintain operational initiative.

- MONUPEH-generated police forces begin launching to aid in stability operations and to begin sequencing security responsibility from militarized peacekeeping forces, in coordination with the HNP.

Declaring Condition A vs. Condition B

The determination of whether MONUPEH proceeds under Condition A or Condition B should be made by the SRSG-designate in consultation with DPO and the UNSC, based on a pre-deployment assessment of GSF progress against its mandate. Key indicators include: degradation of gang territorial control at strategic nodes (ports, airport, fuel depots, major corridors); reduction in gang-driven violence and displacement; and GSF operational coherence and HRDDP compliance. The decision should be made no later than month 6 to allow force generation to adjust accordingly, but could be known even prior to authorization of the mission.

BOX 2: GSF Failure Contingency (Condition B)

If the GSF is unsuccessful in establishing security in Haiti, MONUPEH should expect to force-generate greater numbers of military and police forces independent of the GSF.

MONUPEH will operate under the planning assumption that it must mobilize a larger, better equipped, and separate militarized peacekeeping force capable of establishing security and clearing gang control.

At this juncture, the GSF would either be incorporated into MONUPEH or dissolved, pending the political and tactical situation. MONUPEH should prepare to accomplish all *Phase 1: Secure* tasks listed in the Condition B Gantt Chart.

Upon MONUPEH achieving Initial Operational Capability in Port-au-Prince, the GSF should conduct an operational pause as it falls under an updated C2 architecture. A detailed review of reasons for failure will inform next steps for MONUPEH. Unlike Condition A, where GSF retains operational lead for *Phase 1: Secure* kinetic tasks under UN oversight, Condition B requires MONUPEH to conduct all *Phase 1: Secure* tasks directly, such as heavy clearance (1.2), node securing (1.5), and targeted gang suppression (1.7), with former GSF elements either re-hatted as a MONUPEH component or dissolved. This shifts substantially greater force generation, logistical, and political requirements onto MONUPEH during *Phase 0: Prepare* and extends the *Phase 1: Secure* timeline.

OVERARCHING MISSION DESIGN: PHASED AND INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

To establish lasting peace, security, and development in Haiti, this project proposes a five-year, UN-led Chapter VII peacekeeping operation. It will be executed in three phases, with five Lines of Effort, 16 emphasized themes, and 31 separate tasks.

BOX 3: Key principles

- Haitian Ownership
- Self-sustainability
- Holistic and Vertically Integrated Approach

To uphold these principles not just in its operations but in its very design, MONUPEH is a time-bound, multidimensional and light-footprint mission. It is not an expansive state-building project, but a temporary scaffold to support Haiti through a transition into a stable and peaceful country. Once a strong foundation for peace has been secured through the limited use of force and facilitating a locally driven political and economic transformation, MONUPEH will begin a gradual withdrawal, transitioning to a smaller Special Political Mission or simply the Country Team. Recognizing the abundant capacity already present in Haiti in the form of its civil society and community groups, and conscious of past mistakes in turning Haiti into a ‘Republic of NGOs’,⁸⁵ MONUPEH will have a minimally intrusive presence, designed around empowering and collaboration with local actors and institutions. This entails engaging on international staff only for expertise and oversight functions, allowing Haitians to take the lead on designing and implementing projects where possible. Collaborations with local actors will focus not only on capacity *building* to ensure that progress can be sustained independently, but on capacity *sharing* in acknowledgement of the value that the UN system itself can gain. MONUPEH cannot be ignorant to the tarnished legacy it inherits as it enters Haiti, and has thus been designed with a strong awareness of the UN’s past failings, and an equally fervent conviction to do better.

Mission Structure




Figure 3 Mission Structure (Color coded to Match the LOEs of the Mission)

This proposal outlines an integrated, multi-stage, multi-dimensional PKO structure (See Figure 3) that seeks to break the country free from its current vicious cycle. It is deliberately designed to be different from conventional UN Mission structures to ensure maximum strategic alignment and consistency in development efforts. In addition to the standard administrative and logistics branches under the Chief of Staff and Mission Support branches, MONUPEH includes a political element led by a DSRSG of Political Affairs and a development element led by a triple-hatted DSRSG/ Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC).

This model makes two notable diversions from conventional mission structures (See BOX 1: Lessons Learned from MINUSTAH). Firstly, rather than being a distinct branch operating in parallel with the DSRSGs, the military and police branches have been placed under the authority of the DSRSG for Political Affairs. This reorganization responds directly to coordination challenges experienced in past PKOs, where the distance between the force component of missions and their political branch led to strategic misalignments, goal displacement and the fragmentation of efforts. Given the principle of the primacy of politics, the force components should operate synergistically with the

other sections of the mission, which can best be ensured by having the DSRSG for Political Affairs collectively overseeing these elements, rather than having the force components as a stand-alone structure with a distinct operational logic.

Secondly, in recognition of the importance of ensuring a smooth transition and exit strategy for the mission, MONUPEH has been designed to have its successor mission written into its very structure. While the DSRSG for Political Affairs focuses specifically on guiding Haiti through a transition period into a post-conflict context, in addition to taking up the hat of Humanitarian Coordinator, the other DSRSG/RC will have a more long-term and developmental perspective, and oversee BINUH and the UN Country Team (UNCT). When the short-term mandate of political transition is achieved and the political-military branch of MONUPEH withdraws, this branch under the DSRSG/RC/HC will remain and take on any outstanding tasks, without the need for a new successor mission. By making this transition internal and within MONUPEH, this facilitates the handover of responsibilities and removes the risk of a sudden vacuum being created as the result of unpredictable UNSC politics or funding problems. Furthermore, with this division of labor, this development branch will have an explicitly long-term outlook which ensures that its activities center around sustained development and political support, rather than being directed by short-term timelines and objectives. Thus, this model ensures continuity and sustainability in the UN's presence in Haiti, preventing disruptions, as this development branch can remain on, transitioning into a smaller role akin to that of BINUH or a UN Country Team rather than requiring a handover to a new entity. By having this section a part of MONUPEH, this ensures a sense of continuity even after the withdrawal of the larger mission, preventing jarring disruptions or sudden gaps emerging.

In essence, this framework seeks to first establish a minimum level of physical security in the country that could sustain some economic activities for demonstrative purposes and then use the demonstrative effect to support and sustain the security apparatus – thereby reversing the vicious cycle into a virtuous one. The key to the success of this framework is therefore the correct sequencing of different elements so that the ensuing ones could build on the success of the preceding ones and retroactively help sustain them.

Dependency Rationale

This framework seeks to formulate the correct sequencing of a set of vertically integrated activities so that all activities contribute to a common outlook, thereby avoiding goal displacement or an arbitrary selection of fragmented treatments that are not sustainable for the long run outlook, which is the key to widespread elite buy-in.

- *Phase 1: Secure* consolidates GSF gains by securing and holding critical infrastructure and economic nodes, creating the minimum operating space for state authority and market activity to re-emerge.
- *Phase 2: Stabilize* leverages targeted aid and investment to expand and solidify stability through sequenced political-economic pilots: an anchored economic zone to shape elite expectations, DDR pathways to draw fighters into the formal economy, and institutional measures to lock in gains; backed by a light footprint surge mechanism to deter and respond to relapse.
- *Phase 3: Develop* transitions all lines of effort to Haitian ownership, with security, governance, and economic functions sustained through domestically generated fiscal capacity and no reliance on standing external force presence.

It shall be mentioned that while the ultimate objective of this design is to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive political-economic recovery of Haiti, a national long march that pragmatically will span decades, this particular PKO seeks to serve as the five-year “kick-starter” of this national endeavor. This is done by moving the country from the current gang economy equilibrium to a more cooperative equilibrium through increasing cost of defection and the expected gains of cooperation by shaping shared expectations.

Strategy

This framework employs the strategic ways of brute force in *Phase 1. Secure* and coercion in *Phase 2. Stabilize & Phase 3. Develop*. *This report employs the conceptual framework of Schelling, which distinguishes between brute force and coercion by whether or not initiative is yielded to the adversary.* Whereas coercion seeks to make the adversary do our will by altering their cost-benefit calculus such that they voluntarily choose to switch to a cooperative strategy, brute force is about using all kinds of means that we have, military or non-violent, to directly seize our strategic objectives regardless of the will of the opponent.⁸⁶

At the core of this framework is the strategic logic of economically induced coercion in the second phase. Crucially, this strategy shifts the center of gravity in Haiti from the illicit gang economy to a formal political economic order by altering the incentive calculus of Haitian elites and gang members. By creating a new self-sustaining equilibrium at which all stakeholders spontaneously converge, this lays the foundation for a durable peace and security without requiring the UN to remain in Haiti indefinitely. For the elites, who are the root cause of the problem and whose decisions determine key resource allocations in the country, the combination of security presence raising their cost of running a gang economy and the expected gains from a formal economic order providing inducement should incentivize them to move toward the cooperative

equilibrium (See Technical Box 4 below for a detailed model). For the peripheral gang members, a credible outlook of a formal economic outlook and thus the potential abandonment of elites should constitute a “departing train” situation where if they separate from the gangs early they can still be part of that future, whereas if they stick with the gangs they will face isolation, prosecutions, or even death – thus incentivizing them to leave their groups if this turned out to be the choice of many of their peers, which further weakens the gangs and make the gang economy’s collapse even more credible.

Meanwhile, as the establishment of any DDR, economic pilot and institutional capacity building process depends on the initial physical control of key infrastructural nodes, and because coercive leverage remains scarce at the beginning of the mission’s life-cycle, brute force with a focus on intelligence-led arrests is employed in the first phase as a way to decisively establish territorial control and open a window of opportunity for ensuing phases.

BOX 4: Game Theoretical Coercion Logic for the Framework

For the elites, who are the root cause of the problem and determine key resource allocations, the combination of security presence raising their cost of running a gang economy and the expected gains from a formal economic order providing inducement should incentivize them to move toward the cooperative equilibrium.

1. PRE-MISSION GAME

Let an elite choose between:

- *C*: join the formal economic order
- *D*: remain in the gang-patronage economy

Let $x \in [0,1]$ be the expected share of other elites who choose *C*.

Utility of cooperation before the mission:

$$u_C^0 = \lambda a - Q(1 - x)$$

where:

- a = baseline value of the formal economy.
- $\lambda \in (0,1)$ = confidence coefficient capturing how Haiti’s history of repeated shocks depresses elite expectations that a formal economic order will endure.
- $Q(1 - x)$ = cost imposed on participation in the formal economy by spoiler activity. Let $Q = q(1-x)$. If most elites remain in the gang economy, violence, extortion, and predation make formal participation costly. As x rises, this spoiler cost falls.

Utility of defection before the mission:

$$u_D^0 = d + H(1 - x)$$

where:

- d = baseline value of staying in the gang economy, including rents and avoidance of social obligations.

- $H(1 - x)$ = added value from remaining in the gang-patronage system when many other elites also remain there. Let $H = h(1-x)$. If many elites stay in the patronage system, gangs remain funded, protected, and viable.

Pre-mission equilibrium:

Before the mission: λa is low; $Q(1 - x)$ is high because x is low; d is high; $H(1 - x)$ is high because most elites remain in the same system.

Thus:

$$u_D^0 > u_C^0$$

and elites rationally choose D .

2. MISSION LOGIC

The mission changes the game by modifying the utility of both choices.

Utility of cooperation after the mission:

$$u_C = \lambda a + R + Bx - Q'(1 - x)$$

where:

- R = expected value created by the new economic outlook generated by the demonstration zone.
- Bx = additional expected return from coordination: the more elites join the formal order, the larger and more profitable that market becomes
- $Q'(1 - x)$ = remaining spoiler cost after the mission, with $Q' < Q$ as x is expected to be higher.

Utility of defection after the mission:

$$u_D = d - T + H'(1 - x)$$

where:

- T = expected cost of future punishment from credible security pressure, as a result of initial GSF operation and the surge mechanism.
- $H'(1 - x)$ = residual value of the gang economy when other elites remain in it, with $H' < H$ due to expected increase in x . As fewer elites remain in it, elites expect gangs to be less funded, less politically protected, and less able to survive.

3. DECISION CONDITION

An elite chooses C if $u(C) > u(D)$, that is:

$$\lambda a + R + Bx - Q'(1 - x) \geq d - T + H'(1 - x)$$

4. TIPPING POINT INTERPRETATION

There will be some threshold level of expected elite buy-in, call it x^* , such that:

- if elites expect $x < x^*$, they choose D
- if elites expect $x > x^*$, they choose C

Specifically, the tipping point is:

$$x^* = \frac{d - T + h - \lambda a - R + q}{B + q + h}$$

Thus the strategic objective is not necessarily to persuade every elite individually from the start, but rather to lower the threshold χ^* enough that cooperation becomes self-reinforcing. This is the rationale behind a limited demonstration pilot zone – it alters game theoretical calculus without requiring the mission to immediately include every elite.

5. TO LOWER χ^*

- **Raise T** : make future punishment more credible through a reliable surge mechanism.
- **Raise R** : make the demonstration zone visibly profitable so it creates a believable economic outlook.
- **Raise B** : concentrate early buy-in among key elites so the market value of cooperation grows faster.
- **Reduce Q'** : protect formal economic activity so spoiler costs fall quickly.
- **Reduce H'** : weaken the gang economy's support base by peeling away elite backers and peripheral participants.
- **Raise λ** : increase confidence that formal gains will endure despite Haiti's history of shocks; consider building an economic subcenter less exposed to geological risks.

LINES OF EFFORT: A ROADMAP FOR UN INTERVENTION

MONUPEH is built around five Lines of Effort (LOEs). Within these LOEs, project research supports 16 critical Themes.

LOE 1: Establishing Security and Rule of Law

- Theme 1: Limited Objectives and Clear Transitions of Responsibility
- Theme 2: Standing Surge Capacity
- Theme 3: Civilian Harm Mitigation and Accountability Mechanisms
- Theme 4: Security Sector Reform

LOE 2: Economic Stabilization and Development

- Theme 5: Cash for Work
- Theme 6: Economic Pilots
- Theme 7: Redefining Haiti's Relationship with the Global Economy

LOE 3: Fostering Democracy and Political Culture

- Theme 8: Integrating Elections with Security and Peacebuilding
- Theme 9: Establishing Electoral Credibility
- Theme 10: Ensuring Access to Vote
- Theme 11: Encouraging Democratic Participation

LOE 4: Building Institutions and Good Governance

- Theme 12: Anti-corruption, Financial Crimes, Banks, and Currency
- Theme 13: Criminal Justice Reform

LOE 5: Justice, Reconciliation, and Recovery

- Theme 14: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
- Theme 15: Community Violence Reduction (CVR)
- Theme 16: Transitional Justice

A modular Gantt Chart and Task Register for use by MONUPEH is also provided. The Gantt Chart sequences each task chronologically, organized by phase. The Task Register lists every task with an associated timeline, description, trigger, and lead entity.

LOE 1: ESTABLISHING SECURITY AND THE PROTECTING CIVILIANS

As a prerequisite for broader stabilization and peacebuilding activities, establishing a base level of security is the primary goal of the force component of the mission and will pick up where the GSF left off in wresting territorial control back from armed gangs. At the same time, in recognition of the limitations of force in ensuring durable peace, the focus of this LOE extends beyond immediate military operations towards longer-term security sector reform and redefining the relationship between the state, society and organs of force in Haiti, thus creating space and a conducive environment for much-needed social, political and economic transformation.

Importantly, even when empowered with offensive mandates, robust peacekeeping missions must be wary of the dangers and consequences of using force, by being judicious and limiting its usage where necessary, and always as a contingent and time-bound measure. While justified by crisis situations, there is a tendency for the use of force to extend beyond the confines for which it was initially mobilized and become “increasingly detached from its intended ends”.⁸⁷ This may lead to an inadvertent militarization and securitization as force becomes embedded within the “structures, logics and temporalities” of peacekeeping efforts, becoming “integrated as a new normal” and in turn undermining or displacing the primacy of politics as the governing logic of the mission.⁸⁸ As past experience from UN missions and Haitian history has demonstrated, force cannot serve as the foundation for a legitimate political order, a lesson which must be internalized and reflected in the design and implementation of the mission.

Underlying this entire line of effort is the fundamental aim of Protection of Civilians (POC), which will take on different meanings as the security situation in Haiti evolves, and thus demand an equally dynamic and adaptive approach by the mission.⁸⁹ Since gangs currently constitute the greatest threat to the population, MONUPEH’s first objective is to reclaim territorial control of Port-au-Prince and significantly erode gang capacity, which will be primarily executed by the mission’s military components. Once the extraordinary threat posed by gangs is addressed, allowing for other actors to operate safely, efforts to promote security should shift towards a long-term approach, which envisions community-based policing carried out by the HNP. To best realize this vision, MONUPEH’s strategy towards POC will focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR) to induce positive and long-lasting change in Haitian actors and institutions, instead of directly providing security through patrols and other activities which may inadvertently create dependencies and reduce political will to develop a capable and independent HNP.

Limited objectives and clear transitions from military to police components

Given that Haiti is not classified as an armed conflict, it is somewhat unconventional that current security operations are carried out from a military, rather than law enforcement, perspective, in no small part due to the severity of its security challenges and the failure of the earlier Kenya-led MSS mission. While a military posture may be necessary in light

of the formidable threat posed by Haiti's heavily armed gangs, it is nonetheless crucial that this military force is used only as a measure in response to this exceptional state of insecurity, and then transitioned to a law enforcement approach as soon as possible.

Considering the extensive reach of gangs as political-economic actors into various illicit activities, as well as the comparative weakness of state institutions such as maritime and border control, complete interdiction is unrealistic. Rather than aiming to neutralize all gang capacity in Haiti, the military force should position itself as paving the way for the police and civilian components of the mission. Consequently, it should focus on a few key priorities, namely ensuring that major infrastructure nodes and corridors are securitized and then kept open, including airport access, port facilities, fuel routes, and other strategic arteries. Relatedly, the military force should also aim to disrupt the ability of gangs to dominate targeted zones through checkpoints, extortion, and coercive control, which constitute significant sources of economic and strategic power. After territory has been reclaimed, Area Domination Patrols should be conducted including in surrounding areas to ensure that threats have been definitively neutralized and prevent gang members from being displaced to different areas where they may launch retaliatory attacks. Where possible, Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs) and Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) can be established to ensure rapid response to threats such as the Artibonite Massacre in April 2026, during which the Gran Grif gang erected roadblocks that delayed arrival by the police and later returned to burn down homes after the police had left.⁹⁰

Drawing on the NATO POC Handbook,⁹¹ an Understanding the Human Environment (UHE) approach should be adopted, where threats are identified and interpreted from a "population-centric" rather than military or operational perspective, preventing situations such as where instead of focusing on the elite-funded gangs that were responsible for overthrowing President Aristide, MINUSTAH primarily targeted members of the *baz*, who although responsible for some violence, were more so representatives of the poor urban class, thus increasing instead of reducing precarity for those it was meant to protect.⁹²

Once these targets have been met, which provide a level of security that enables freedom of movement and access for humanitarian and other peacebuilding actors, the military force should begin a gradual withdrawal while police forces take on primary responsibility for upholding law and order. By making specific provisions for the military's exit, the mission can avoid falling into a dependency trap and unwittingly supplanting the role of law enforcement in ensuring security in Haiti, leading to an excessively militarized approach towards long-term security in Haiti. Thus, once the overwhelming threat posed by gangs is addressed, police forces will be empowered to take charge of upholding law and order, which they are better suited to do in a manner that is both sustainable and constructive for peacebuilding.

In the early stages while the HNP is still undergoing capacity building, MONUPEH's police components will play an important role in providing the necessary manpower to serve the population in affected areas. However, to uphold the principle that protecting civilians is the primary responsibility of the government, the HNP must have ownership over this duty of providing security to its people from the beginning. MONUPEH encourages this by consciously adopting a light-footprint approach and positioning itself as a supportive force to the HNP, preventing a security vacuum as seen following MINUSTAH's withdrawal in 2017.⁹³

Standing Surge Capacity (SSC)

Although the mission's multidimensional strategy seeks to target the underlying drivers and enabling factors behind Haiti's gang phenomena and avoid relying on external stabilization forces, miscalculations or the premature withdrawal of security forces may enable the re-emergence of gangs. Furthermore, if gangs and elites expect the force presence to be temporary, particularly in light of the financial constraints faced by the UN, they may seek to strategically hedge and wait until force withdrawal, after which they can revert to their previous modus operandi.

While extending the presence of security forces indefinitely would overcome this problem by maximizing the coercive threat, this is neither feasible nor desirable. As a solution, this framework proposes a flexible SSC mechanism that minimizes financial burden while ensuring coercive credibility over the long run. This model utilizes a small UN Military Observer element stationed in Port-au-Prince and Saint-Marc along with a larger pool of pre-cleared, ready-to-deploy peacekeepers from UN force contributing members to provide flexible response options for rapidly changing gang environments in Haiti. The military observer elements stationed in the country ensure basic security along with the HNP and conduct routine patrols in key areas while evaluating risks of regression in security status in the country. They also maintain the essential Command and Control structure to ensure rapid reactivation of a scaled-up response.

Based on the evaluation of this observer element, peacekeepers in the SSC pool can be rapidly activated and deployed within one week to flexibly establish additional deterrence against potential gang activities. If risks of regression decrease, these forces return to their parent forces within their national armed forces. Such a flexible response capacity depends upon force and cost-sharing agreements pre-signed by the mission in Haiti and their country of nationality, which will be a crucial part of negotiations around this framework. Nevertheless, TCCs and Council members will likely find this plan more preferable than a boots-on-the-ground option, which would require significantly more funding and resources ultimately assigned to the member states. As the UN will only have to cover costs incurred during the deployment period using peacekeeping budgets, which increases the credibility of the threat by making it more affordable and thus plausible. Such a mechanism can be based on established OCHA and UNDSS best

practices, as well as MINUSTAH's own small SSC element tested during its mission period, which can be scaled up to accommodate this renewed pool.

This element provides a safeguard and assurance that withdrawal will not lead to a complete degeneration of security, while creating space for other long-term initiatives such as HNP capacity building, DDR/CVR programs, economic pilots, and political and institutional reforms without prohibitive financial demands. Over time, as political and economic conditions become stabilizing factors of their own, the less the SSC mechanism needs to be activated, allowing for a natural phase-out to take place.

Civilian Harm Mitigation and Accountability Measures

While MINUSTAH is generally regarded as having successfully reduced gang presence through its operations, many Haitians remember it for killing innocent civilians and using disproportionate force. Of particular note was Operation Iron First, launched on 6 July 2005, during which 440 troops were deployed into Cité Soleil at 4.30am, with almost 1,000 more securing a perimeter. Across seven hours, 22,700 rounds of ammunition and 78 grenades were fired⁹⁴ in the densely populated residential slum, consisting largely of corrugated iron, wood and cardboard. 23 civilians were killed, (although MINUSTAH later suggested that they may have been killed in retaliatory attacks by gangs), prompting UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial and Summary Executions, Philip Alston, to seek an explanation from the mission leadership.

Unfortunately, recent operations by the HNP and private security contractors have been similarly criticized for causing numerous civilian casualties, particularly due to their heavy reliance on drones and what a March 2026 UN human rights report referred to as “real time intelligence of unknown reliability.” For instance, a December 2025 drone strike on a wedding in Cité Soleil reportedly killed at least 14 civilians, while September 2025 strike on a birthday party where an alleged gang member was distributing gifts killed at least 13 people, including eight children.⁹⁵

Thus, to preserve and restore the moral and professional reputation of the UN as it returns to Haiti with another PKO, it is essential that the protection of civilians is centered as a core concern of both military and police forces. To this end, operations should be designed in ways that reduce the likelihood of collateral damage, such as by using cordons; drawing combat away from highly populated areas; using night vision, infrared capabilities and snipers, as well as tactical diversions and operational-level feints to keep gangs off balance.⁹⁶

Prior to operations, security forces should consider communicating with civilians such as by dropping leaflets with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as was done by MINUSTAH in 2007 or by engaging local community leaders with connections to the community, which can be done in collaboration with the HNP.⁹⁷ Ensuring that each unit has at least one French, if not Creole, speaker to communicate with communities, as

well as child protection and gender officers where appropriate, may also be beneficial, as MINUSTAH operations were heavily limited by the lack of trust and the language barrier.

Where possible, alternative means of neutralizing the gangs should be pursued, including encouraging voluntary defections and using legal or economic tools to target the finances of gangs. This is due not only to the possibility of civilian casualties, but also the preponderance of children within gangs themselves. Where necessary, force should be used with restraint and for maximum impact, with an emphasis on human intelligence. For instance, strategically selecting high-value targets to secure early symbolic victories and publicizing this heavily on social media can persuade gang members that their best option is to defect rather than face the formidable GSF, serving as a ‘force multiplier’ of sorts.

Finally, protection of civilians must also apply to a zero-tolerance approach towards Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) conducted by peacekeepers. In yet another stain on the UN’s record in Haiti, the MSS mission has been implicated in four sexual abuse cases which have been substantiated following investigations by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), according to a 16 February 2026 UN report.⁹⁸ To break this longstanding pattern of abuse tied to foreign interventions, UN missions must do more to ensure the aboveboard conduct of their forces.⁹⁹ This can include expanding capacity to monitor sexual violence allegations and deploying human rights monitors to areas of troop deployment where they can provide well-publicized, accessible and survivor-centered support.¹⁰⁰ When allegations are made, they should be investigated by an independent mechanism such as the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services in a trauma-informed and culturally sensitive manner, rather than internally as was done in the case of the MSS, as it was not considered a UN force.¹⁰¹ Findings should be made public and translated into French and Haitian Creole, with clear legal pathways, financial reparations and long-term support, especially for children born from abusive relationships. Only in this way can faith in the transparency, accountability and credibility of the UN be restored.

Security Sector Reform

Considerable investment and resources have been devoted to strengthening Haiti’s security system but have produced limited results. Donor-supported efforts have traditionally focused on professionalization through providing technical expertise in policing, investigation, customs and corrections reform, as well as capacity building by increasing the number of police officers, particularly under MINUSTAH. Nonetheless, a 2016 assessment of HNP officers found that only “7 percent could write a police report with appropriate detail, 5 percent could identify an illegal substance, and only 2.2 percent were able to achieve 70 percent accuracy with shooting at a target located 12 feet away”.¹⁰² While progress was made on building infrastructure and recruitment particularly for anti-narcotics and crowd control operations, only 65 percent of activities

identified in the HNP Strategic Development Plan as part of Second Generation SSR (2GSSR) were completed or near completion in 2016, and areas such as gender equality enjoying minimal success with only 7.5 percent of female personnel in contrast to the 30 percent envisioned in the 2012 Constitutional reforms.¹⁰³ Even after increased deployments beyond the capital in 2015, police-to-population ratios remained low, resulting in significant human resource and material challenges.¹⁰⁴

Heavily reliant on UN and international funding, Haiti's security sector virtually collapsed following the withdrawal of MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH, culminating in a riot in Gonaïves civil prison in October 2019 due to the dire conditions, a national walkout by HNP officers demanding the right to form a trade union to represent them in negotiations for better working conditions, and a general failure to provide security services throughout the country.¹⁰⁵ Beyond these issues, an even more fundamental problem with security forces has been their illegitimacy in the eyes of Haitian civilians, for whom they have more so been sources of violence rather than protection. The HNP has consistently been implicated in human rights violations, ranging from sexual assaults to police brutality and summary executions, particularly during the violent 2018 street protests.¹⁰⁶

A better approach to SSR should focus on transforming the way force is used in Haiti by redefining the relationship between police officers and society, enforcing law and order through people-centered policing instead of violence and intimidation. For many Haitians, the HNP serves as “a key interface between state and society” and “the most visible manifestation of the Haitian state”.¹⁰⁷ Demonstrating to the population that they are public servants rather than oppressors will thus be crucial in gaining confidence that a new social contract is emerging. Contrary to the stabilization approach of MINUSTAH in ‘cleaning up’ supposedly problematic urban areas like Bel Air, Cité Soleil and other ‘neighborhoods of intervention’, community policing reorients police officers from ‘soldiers’ to ‘community guardians’, adopting an ‘everyday security lens’ which focuses on serving local needs and earning public trust.¹⁰⁸ Rather than being done to people, community policing is something done with people. Under the 2012-2016 HNP plan, pilots exploring community policing in Jacmel, Les Cayes and Port-au-Prince showed early promise, with the organization of bicycle patrols and cultural events highlighted in particular.¹⁰⁹ However, they suffered from poor institutionalization and coordination, and were sometimes viewed by senior HNP officials as a “public relations exercise” distracting from the “core business of getting tough on crime”.¹¹⁰

As the prevalence of gangs in Haiti hopefully decreases, insecurity will likely take on different forms, such as domestic or intimate partner violence. Without adapting to this new context and paradigm, the HNP may struggle to deal with juvenile delinquents, drunks and violent mentally ill people, whom the current carceral system is ill-designed to address.¹¹¹ Specialized units such as Gender-Based Violence Units and the Minors’

Protection Brigade that were created in the past should be revived and given the necessary material support, with a shift to community violence reduction strategies.¹¹²

Finally, SSR must be connected to governance, rule of law and justice to be meaningful. A mission that trains units but leaves courts, prisons, prosecutorial systems, and public accountability mechanisms untouched may improve short-term coercive reach, but is unlikely to rebuild public trust or produce durable stability. In a 2010 survey on public attitudes to the HNP, a frequent complaint was that criminals were often released without being charged or even seeing a judge, a situation that can be attributed to a stagnant judicial system and lack of detention facilities. This in turn pressures the police to take justice into their own hands, often by enacting their own punishments or committing extrajudicial executions when accountability cannot be delivered by courts.¹¹³ Thus, a whole-of-government approach must be taken to link SSR with judicial and broader governance reforms.

LOE 2: ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Building on the Security LOE, the Economic LOE seeks to incentivize elites and gang members to spontaneously shift their decisions from the gang economy equilibrium to a formal economic order rooted in Haiti's natural endowments and comparative advantage. As articulated in the sections above, an economic development roadmap is an integral part of the PKO strategy, but to avoid scope creeps and in respect for Haitian ownership, some of the activities outlined below will be implemented by local partners under UN project assurance, which is a model consistent with UN development project standard practices.

Cash for Work

Cash-for-work (CFW) can play an important role in providing short-term relief¹¹⁴ during transition periods and supporting demobilization efforts by providing an economic alternative to violence. At the same time, if not strategically implemented in a sustainable manner on a context-specific basis and with sensitivity to local power relations, it runs the risk of derailing peacebuilding efforts and harming communities.

In Haiti, past CFW programming particularly in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake has been criticized on several fronts. Firstly, some programs failed to ensure an impartial selection process for beneficiaries by allowing local mayors to select team leaders, who would in turn select the workers.¹¹⁵ Not only did this promote corruption and favoritism, these programs also became enmeshed in local politics, with senior gang leaders often being granted decision-making authority which would be used to coerce or sexually exploit vulnerable individuals. In addition, some programs were also disruptive to local efforts by diverting attention away from joint rehabilitation projects organized by communities themselves, undermining '*konbit*' culture where members come together voluntarily to contribute to their communities.¹¹⁶ Without deliberate planning, CFW may also harm or exclude groups such as women, persons with disabilities or those otherwise unable to work. Although eager to work, women who had household responsibilities could not participate, and some who did were attacked on their way home as cash disbursements were done late in the day from faraway distribution sites.¹¹⁷

Thus, it is imperative that before implementing CFW programs, thorough needs assessments are carried out, with special attention for vulnerable groups. Communities and local leaders should not only be consulted, but empowered to design or reject programs depending on their specific circumstances. Provisions should be made to ensure protection, inclusivity and impartiality throughout the project, with clear communication regarding the process of selecting beneficiaries, project parameters, intended outcomes and the limits. If connected with a DDR program, care must be taken to share benefits to both civilians and former gang members, to prevent resentment and a sense of unfairness.

Economic Pilots

After an initial aid relief period, the key would be to help the nation build a formal economic order. Haiti's geographic traits as a resource-deficient island country determine that it needs to develop an export-oriented economy. Traditionally, Haiti's economy has been largely agrarian, which is a natural result of the country's natural endowments, whose main economic products include coffee, sugar, fruits, as well as their processed products. Currently, however, this is challenged by several impediments. First, the inability for the state to control key infrastructural nodes such as national highways and ports means that agricultural products cannot be exported at a competitive price internationally.¹¹⁸ Even though this problem can be mitigated through GSF operations as proposed by this framework, the cumulated effect from deforestation throughout its history of foreign extractions also makes the country's farmlands less productive.¹¹⁹ Adding to this is Haiti's cultural influence which undermines the attractiveness of agricultural production, associating farming with low social status, which is understandable given the low income from this occupation. As a result, a job in agriculture probably won't suffice to constitute an attractive economic alternative to participating in the gang economy. Meanwhile, local agriculture also proved inefficient in attracting foreign investment or boosting private-sector confidence, as low return simply cannot justify the high risk of operation in this country.¹²⁰ Therefore, while agriculture will remain a key economic sector absorbing undereducated labor across the country, a more modern economic outlook should be explored to launch the country's economic recovery process.

Based on an analysis of the country's geographic advantages, this report recommends that Haiti can position itself as a Francophone AI services hub, supplying high-quality human-in-the-loop data for French-language and Global South AI systems, leveraging cost competitiveness, linguistic advantage, and geographic proximity to North American and European markets. Such an industry can be experimentally established in a newly constructed economic subcenter less exposed to risks and therefore more friendly for foreign or diaspora investments.

This project envisions a modernized economic outlook building upon the economic corridor secured by GSF and MONUPEH force operations. Geographically, such a corridor should be centered around the RN-1 national highway that connects Port-au-Prince with Saint-Marc, the latter of which is already a population subcenter and gateway to Haiti's agricultural resources in the department of Artibonite. Building an economic subcenter in Saint-Marc enhances investment potentials automatically, as the region is further away from the geological fault line beneath Port-au-Prince, which constantly disrupts economic development centered around the capital and makes investment less appealing. In connection with the DDR program, disarmed peripheral gang members can be relocated to temporary hubs along the RN-1 corridor, which not only allows them to gain leniency by contributing to the infrastructural recovery of the corridor, but also protects them from *Bwa Kale* revenge if they were immediately sent

back to their original communities. Using the secured corridor, agricultural goods from the Artibonite can be transported to shipping ports at PAP at a lower cost and therefore allow the goods to be sold at a more competitive price.

Meanwhile at Saint-Marc, an experimental AI Service economy can be experimented with select international AI firms that demand affordable French-speaking data labelling service. This can be possible due to Haiti's unique comparative advantages where there is affordable labor who can speak French, has cultural proximity to Africa, and located in the same time zone with US and Canada where numerous AI start-ups are based. As data for the developing countries and in French are quite under-represented in today's market, the aforementioned traits make Haiti an appealing option as a service provider. This industry also has relatively low educational thresholds, as basic literacy for data labelling is generally ample for start-up AI development. The tools it requires are also relatively flexible, making it less vulnerable to geographic risks. In the long run, this opens up opportunities for scaled-up digital literacy and attracts highly educated Haitian diasporas in the United States to return and invest in their homeland.

To establish demonstrative effects, the mission should negotiate with elites controlling key infrastructure and economic sectors to secure their consent – this effort should be led by the Economics Program Officer based on intelligence provided by JMAC and UNODC field personnel. A national dialogue should be used to communicate diverse support in the initiative, thus creating the 'departing train' momentum for bystanding economic actors. The Economics Program Officer shall coordinate with the DDR Program Officer within the Political Affairs Pillar to provide construction or other work opportunities in infrastructural recovery of the zone to defected peripheral gang members as inducements and opportunities of leniency, which would simultaneously build confidence for the development of the region. The pilot zone should be run by the government with support from the RC System in the form of providing project assurance, with revenues first deposited transparently in a UN-run account or fund managed by the mission, and reimbursed to the Haitian government to cover fiscal spendings. As the newly elected government proves more compliant with anti-corruption rules, direct access to the account can be gradually released to the Haitian state. Start-up costs should be covered by International Finance Institutions (IFI) loans or grants and/or donor stabilization funds.

To prevent security regression in the pilot zone, PKO observer elements under the Saint-Marc Command should be stationed in the zone to report security incidents to JMAC and UNODC who will then evaluate the risk of security degradation, so that Surge units can be rapidly deployed if risks of regression occur. The Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFPs), especially UNDP, under the RC can use its global policy network and global marketplace to help attract investments in the region, and provide Direct Implementation (DIM) project management support to each investment/pilot project. With improved prospects for foreign investment, key international actors may also

become more committed in their support for Haiti with the intention of protecting their investments. Human rights elements of the mission should work with the Haitian State to prevent exploitation of basic labor rights in the region.




Figure 4 Map of Haiti and Regional Fault Lines¹²¹

Redefining Haiti’s Relationship with the Global Economy

In a 2009 report sponsored by the UN, Oxford economist Paul Collier locates the cause of Haiti’s economic woes in the government’s failure to provide a stable environment for foreign companies.¹²² By investing in critical infrastructure and reliable energy, private investment could be catalyzed, enabling economic development chiefly through the fields of low-cost garment manufacturing and export-oriented agricultural production.¹²³

This is not the first time this has been suggested. In fact, it was precisely the economy policy pursued during the 1970s and 1980s under the Duvalier regime, where Haiti was aggressively marketed as a low-cost manufacturing hub with significant financial assistance from the US and other international lenders, and has been replicated countless times during subsequent international interventions.¹²⁴ While providing steady profits to multinational corporations benefiting from cheap labor, Haitian workers received pitiful wages far below minimum requirements, embodying the dynamic of extraction, exploitation and inequality that has long characterized Haiti’s relationship with the international economy.

Directed by technocratic logic with limited knowledge of local contexts, external interventions have also had distortionary impacts on the Haitian economy, particularly in accelerating unsustainable waves of rural-to-urban migration and promoting excessive centralization in Port-au-Prince.¹²⁵ Drawn by the available of jobs in the manufacturing industry, rural migrants with few other opportunities again flooded Port-au-Prince, leading to “haphazard construction to provide shelter for workers in the American-owned sweatshops” and densely populated neighborhoods.¹²⁶ President Clinton’s rice subsidies in 1995 crippled Haiti’s ability to be self-sufficient in rice production,¹²⁷ forced additional hundreds of thousands of peasants to relocate to the capital, living in informal cinder-block housing.¹²⁸ When the 2010 earthquake struck, the result was devastating.

This is not to say that Haiti should remain closed off to the rest of the world. Foreign and private sector investment will be needed for Haiti’s recovery, but there must be a break with past modes of exclusionary, neoliberal engagement that prioritizes elite accumulation and relies on ‘trickle-down economics’ to combat poverty.¹²⁹ Haiti’s economy must be democratized, which entails undoing the stratification between the center and periphery, and between Port-au-Prince and Pétion-Ville, where it is said that “*l’argent reste dans les hauteurs, il ne descend pas*” (‘the money remains up above, it does not come down’).¹³⁰ Foreign corporations should not base themselves in Haiti and take advantage of cheap labor without benefiting local communities, only to transfer profits over to Miami. Wealth should not be concentrated in the hands of a few elite families like the Bigios, Boulos, Apaidis, Acras and Mevs,¹³¹ but distributed to enable all Haitians to have opportunities for mobility. Jobs must provide dignity and be responsive to local socio-economic needs.

Many of these changes must be made by the Haitian government, but others relate to the way international companies, governments and organization interact with Haiti. Regardless, without a paradigmatic shift in the ideology underpinning Haiti’s economy, its 12 million citizens will continue to remain poor, marginalized and vulnerable to the trap of violence.

LOE 3: FOSTERING DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Through violence, exclusionary elitist politics and neoliberal international interventions, Haitians have long been disempowered from having a voice in politics, a truth that is not limited to, but captured in, the series of empty elections that have been organized to provide a facade of representation. True democracy, which is founded on a political system and culture that centers the universal dignity of Haitians, cannot be built through institutions or elections alone, but a genuine transformation of the broken social contract between the people and the state.

To catalyze real structural change and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, these efforts must be spearheaded by Haitian civil society in all its diversity, which must reestablish a political class that does not hold onto the past vices of corruption and self-gratification. Elections can play a symbolic role in consolidating and building confidence in democratic gains, but must be carefully and strategically administered with institutional reforms and safeguards to avoid derailing the larger peacebuilding process. While the mission and other international actors can offer valuable technical and logistical support in organizing elections and promoting civic education, these initiatives must primarily be directed and implemented by Haitian actors, upholding the principle of local ownership in this crucial arena.

Integrating elections with security and peacebuilding

With almost a decade having passed since any approximation of democratic elections took place, and the current administration suffering from a severe dearth of legitimacy, it is long overdue for Haitians to have a say in defining their country's future, and potentially even essential to provide a legitimate foundation for peace. The interim government has called for elections to take place in August 2026, but the feasibility of this timeline is highly suspect – at least 30 percent of the country's communes remain entirely inaccessible to state authorities due to gang activities, and no functional electoral registry exists. Furthermore, given how elections have historically been a flashpoint for violent political competition through gangs, there is a strong risk that they may derail any burgeoning hopes for peace in Haiti.

This conundrum over when to organize elections demonstrates the complexity of balancing the imperative for democratic representation and Haitian ownership over the peace process with pragmatic security concerns and broader strategic considerations. While there is no one objective answer, the track record of elections in Haiti and other (post-)conflict contexts has demonstrated that the only election worth having is a well-run one that reinforces rather than detracts from the peacebuilding process. In addition to being free from violence and electoral manipulation, this entails having a strong turnout to communicate public acceptance of the process as legitimate, something that has been tellingly lacking in previous cycles.

There is a real possibility that the current Haitian government, at the behest of certain member states, may attempt to hold an election either this year or the next, without ensuring the necessary conditions and preparations to guarantee a credible process. If this were to occur, it is recommended that another properly run election should be organized even if the full presidential term has not elapsed to elect a new leader with a genuine popular mandate. Unfortunately, having yet another meaningless vote at the behest of international pressure will only further undermine the population's trust in the electoral process, which is why it is not advised to do so unless there is relative confidence that it will uphold the spirit of democracy. Nonetheless, if such a situation were to pass, even more work must be done to demonstrate to the public that this cycle will be different, which comes through clear communication and substantive changes being made.

Subject to ongoing developments on the ground, a potential model for electoral sequencing would begin preparation for elections once basic security conditions are fulfilled, such as reaching minimum security thresholds across a defined percentage of territory. The lead time to actually holding the election is estimated to be around 12 months, which provides sufficient time to establish the necessary logistics and architecture without excessive delay. These tasks include re-establishing the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP); operationalizing a Financial Forensics Electoral Bureau (FFEB) to manage campaign finances; registering voters and candidates; vet workers; and agreeing on standard protocols for polling and results transmission.

Rather than strictly following calendar deadlines alone, progress through each phase should be contingent on achieving defined benchmarks, such as voter registration completion rates, to avoid turning elections into a box-ticking exercise. Ultimately, the mission's electoral objective is not fulfilled by the holding of a vote, but when certification is issued and broadly accepted across the political spectrum, creating the conditions for a legitimate governmental transition.

Establishing electoral credibility through institutional reconstruction and transparency

The first step in administering credible elections is the re-establishment of the CEP which will lead and set the tone for the electoral process as a whole. Thus, it is essential that the CEP is reconstituted through a transparent, documented multi-stakeholder process in which eligibility criteria, technical competence, independence, and absence of documented corruption or gang links, are publicly defined before nominations open, and verified by an independent body, such as the mission's Electoral Assistance component. This process can consist of inter-party and civil society dialogues through which criteria are agreed and sector nominees are identified, and will serve as the basis of the CEP's legitimacy.

To establish a binding legal basis for subsequent activities, this electoral framework must be approved by the appropriate Haitian authorities, with the Prime Minister's

office issuing a decree to formalize the reconstituted CEP. Crucially however, they should not directly interfere to select or veto decisions, but merely to endorse the process, thus ensuring its independence. International and regional organizations such as the mission, CARICOM and the OAS can act as neutral observers to create external accountability without supplanting Haitian authority, while the UNDP and UN Electoral Assistance Division can provide funding and technical assistance to support the electoral process.¹³²

Before the campaign period opens, an FFEB should also be created as an independent wing of the CEP to serve as a campaign finance enforcement mechanism. This body will be responsible for verifying detailed financial statements submitted by candidates, including five years of tax compliance records, in real time; processing major campaign expenditures through monitored escrow accounts to prevent untraceable cash flows; and integrating banking and mobile money data to flag high-risk financial flows. Rather than relying on new internationally funded positions that disappear when donor support ends, the FFEB can be staffed by existing Haitian statutory bodies, such as the *Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption* (ULCC), *Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers* (UCREF), *Direction Générale des Impôts* (DGI), *Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif* (CSCCA). When violations are identified and remain unresolved after a 72-hour response period, the FFEB would transmit a formal investigative report simultaneously to the CEP's electoral dispute chamber and the public prosecutor, following which a National Electoral Tribunal would issue a binding ruling within 15 days, making enforcement automatic and preventing the selective non-prosecution that has enabled impunity in every previous cycle.

For the essential element of safeguarding election results from manipulation, a parallel verification system must be set up to prevent tampering between polling stations and the tabulation center, which has historically been the site where outcomes were tampered with or contested.¹³³ Every tally sheet from every polling station must be photographed and uploaded to a publicly accessible server in real time before physical materials leave the station, creating an independently verifiable digital record that cannot be altered in transit. Three simultaneous independent tabulation streams must operate in parallel: the official CEP stream, a domestic civil society stream through formally accredited observer organizations, and an international stream through the OAS Electoral Observation Mission. Any discrepancy above a threshold defined in advance in the electoral decree triggers automatic review before results are certified, to be led by the National Electoral Tribunal. Where disputes exceed the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction or involve constitutional questions, constitutional and judicial bodies serve as the next tier of review, ensuring that no certification challenge goes without a legal resolution pathway and guaranteeing the integrity of the process.

Ensuring access to vote

With 1.4 million Haitians displaced, others in gang-controlled areas and even more missing identity documents, there is a significant risk that many Haitians will be unable to vote. Currently, the ability to vote requires one to hold a valid *Carte d'Identification Nationale* (CIN) which incorporates multi-biometric data, fingerprints, iris recognition, facial recognition, and photo, something which many Haitians lack.¹³⁴ To overcome this problem, the *Office for National d'Identification* (ONI) should lead emergency CIN reissuance, targeting IDP settlements and gang-affected areas before the registration period opens. Voter list compilation and biometric registration infrastructure should be managed by the CEP with technical and financial support from UNDP, while IOM and UNHCR can provide logistical support in displacement camps and other areas. An independent vetting panel, convened jointly by civil society organizations, MONUPEH, and the Haitian Bar Association, should verify all temporary electoral workers before deployment, with a codified prohibition on placing party-affiliated staff at stations in their own political strongholds.

On election day, the general population will be able to vote using CIN biometric verification at polling stations administered by the CEP. For internally displaced people, designated temporary secure polling centers must be established in or near IDP settlements, allowing them to vote at the nearest accessible secure location rather than their original registered address. MONUPEH's force component, HNP, and UNPOL can jointly secure polling station perimeters under a protocol that gives them no access to electoral materials, maintaining the essential separation between security provision and electoral administration. However, security on election day alone is insufficient. Intimidation operates in the weeks and months before voting, through threats, neighborhood control, and the visible presence of armed actors who have historically determined electoral outcomes in the areas they control.¹³⁵ Community-level presence by security actors during the campaign period is therefore essential to creating conditions under which citizens can exercise independent political judgment.

Building Democratic Participation: Civic Engagement and Political Culture

The institutional reforms outlined above address the structural conditions for credible elections. They do not, on their own, address a deeper problem: a population that has rationally disengaged from democratic participation after decades of elections that changed nothing. As of early 2024, less than two percent of Haitians expressed confidence in how elections are conducted, and only 13 percent were certain they would vote in the next polls.¹³⁶ Rebuilding participation as a meaningful act requires deliberate investment in civic engagement and political culture that runs alongside, and outlasts, any single electoral cycle.

There is a critical distinction between voter information, which covers the mechanics of registration and voting, and civic education, which builds citizens' understanding of the relationship between participation, accountability, and governance. Haiti needs both,

but civic education is more important for long-term political culture. Citizens who understand that elected officials accountable to criminal financiers can be removed through the ballot are more likely to treat participation as meaningful. Fortunately, Haiti has a vibrant civil society that is more than able to take the lead on this, and their efforts should be whole-heartedly supported by international actors.

With 45 percent of the population under 18,¹³⁷ the political culture of the next electoral cycle will be shaped overwhelmingly by citizens with no personal memory of a functional democratic process. This demographic reality means that civic education embedded in the school curriculum, in areas where security has been restored, is the most sustainable long-term investment available. Evidence shows that students who receive sustained civic education demonstrate 14 percent higher levels of political participation in early adulthood than those who do not.¹³⁸

Women's political participation requires equally deliberate attention. In Haiti's electoral history, women have been systematically underrepresented in both candidacy and political decision-making. UNDP and UN Women have piloted women's situation rooms (WSR) in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where networks of trained women observers coordinated real-time monitoring of electoral violence, shared information with security actors, and conducted community-level peace advocacy.¹³⁹ This model is directly transferable to Haiti because the structural conditions that made it effective in both contexts are present in comparable form. The WSR was built on two preconditions: the absence of reliable state security in electoral areas, and the existence of organized civil society networks with community trust that formal institutions cannot replicate.

In Sierra Leone's 2012 elections, the WSR operated through the Women's Forum Sierra Leone, a civil society coalition active since 1996,¹⁴⁰ in conflict hotspot areas where state electoral workers could not safely operate, contributing to an 87 percent voter turnout in a post-conflict environment where formal security institutions remained fragile.¹⁴¹ In Liberia in 2011, a coalition of over 30 women and youth organizations mobilized under UNDP support beyond state reach, with results compelling enough for the African Union to adopt the model as a continental best practice in January 2012.¹⁴²

Both preconditions are met in Haiti: gang control renders state-led electoral security impossible across large parts of the country, and UN Women Haiti documents an existing Alliance of over 740 women's organizations with 250,000 members across all ten departments.¹⁴³ Haitian women's civil society organizations, supported by UNDP and UN Women, can therefore serve both as electoral monitors and as the primary channel for civic education outreach in communities where male-dominated political and gang networks have crowded out independent political voices. Women's representation in restored local governance structures at the communal section level is what makes democratic participation tangible in daily life.

LOE 4: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

While security plays a fundamental role in addressing the current gang crisis in Haiti, long-term stability and development requires a strong focus on rebuilding legitimate and capable institutions. Functioning governance structures capable of delivering justice, political accountability, and basic services to its citizens are required to prevent armed forces from re-emerging after the GSF and/or other international security forces withdraw. One could argue that this was part of the challenge following MINUSTAH. When a significant international presence withdraws, the state must be able to fill the vacuum it leaves behind, or else this void can be filled by other actors, such as armed groups/gangs and result in instability.

In Haiti, gang violence has flourished not only because of extreme poverty and inequality, but because state institutions have been unable to enforce the rule of law or maintain territorial authority. The lack of a legitimate, elected government, minimal police and military presence, overcrowded prisons and court systems, the collapse of basic services such as healthcare facilities and schools, and widespread corruption, all contribute to this challenge and must be addressed. Lessons from past missions suggest that restoring law and order without parallel investments in governance, risks reproducing cycles of instability. Therefore, any future UN-supported mission must make institution and capacity-building a priority.

Effective governance structures can strengthen the legitimacy of the Haitian state, ensure accountability for criminal networks and political elites, and create the conditions necessary for sustainable peace.

Building these institutions requires a targeted approach in several key sectors. First, the mission must strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms and provide financial oversight to disrupt the economic networks that sustain Haiti's gangs and political patronage systems. Additionally, Haiti's criminal justice system must be strengthened and developed as it currently faces severe constraints including overcrowded prisons, limited capacity, and a backlog of cases. This has also significantly undermined public confidence in the rule of law, which must be re-established. At the same time, security sector reform (SSR), particularly within the Haitian National Police (HNP) will be critical to ensuring law enforcement can operate independently of political or criminal influence and can take over the role of maintaining security once international forces depart.

Combining these efforts aims to rebuild and develop the institutional foundations needed for good governance and long-term stability in Haiti.

Anti-Corruption, Financial Crimes, Banks, and Currency

Anti-corruption efforts in Haiti have historically failed¹⁴⁴ from a fundamental absence of political will and the capture of domestic oversight bodies by the very elites they are meant to monitor. The PetroCaribe scandal remains the defining example: an audit by

Haiti's Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes found that billions of dollars in Venezuelan subsidized oil funds were systematically looted between 2008 and 2016¹⁴⁵. Projects such as the Île-à-Vache tourism mega-project and the *Ti Manman Cheri* social program were either never completed or riddled with ghost beneficiaries, with contracts often awarded before proper approvals were in place.¹⁴⁶ While a 2014 anti-corruption law created the legal basis for prosecution, no high-level official has ever been convicted. The Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) has attempted to assert its authority and submitted 63 cases to the courts as of late 2025¹⁴⁷, but its director Hans Jacques Ludwig Joseph has faced political pressure, and investigations often lack judicial follow-through. The Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF) has similarly identified money laundering and illicit enrichment by public officials, including two former mayors charged in 2025, yet convictions remain elusive. These failures stem from a predatory system where the state is weaponized for private gain.

Recognizing that the Haitian state cannot independently sever the elite-gang nexus that drives the current conflict, a dedicated anti-corruption and illicit-finance tracking component should be embedded within MONUPEH's capacity-building pillar. As outlined in Task 2.10 of the stabilization plan, this component will become operational only after two security and intelligence prerequisites are met: (1) intelligence fusion centers (Task 1.4) are generating credible financial intelligence linking corrupt enablers to armed groups, and (2) security operations have secured key economic corridors sufficiently to make revenue transparency a meaningful objective (Task 2.5). Once these conditions are in place, the component will enter a 34-month operational phase (months 30 to 64). It will be led by the UN mission's rule-of-law and justice section, working in close coordination with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti (which reports to the Security Council Sanctions Committee), and Haiti's own Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) and Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF).

Crucially, the component's effectiveness will depend on voluntary contributions from member states, particularly the United States, Canada, and European partners to fund technical experts, forensic auditors, and data systems. These external donors should not direct operations but can provide enabling resources that the UN-assessed budget cannot cover. The component will operate outside the core mission's chain of command only to the extent necessary to insulate it from political interference; its reporting lines will run directly to the SRSG and, for sanctions-related intelligence, to the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

Activities will unfold chronologically: first, establishing an independent monitoring unit staffed and operational; second, deploying an aid-tracking system covering all major reconstruction and government revenue streams; third, conducting corruption investigations within Haitian state institutions and security forces, with findings referred to Haitian judicial authorities or to the UN Sanctions Committee for targeted

measures; and fourth, producing regular public reporting on fund flows and compliance. By running a dedicated political-financial tracking line within the UN mission, MONUPEH aims to map, expose, and help sever the networks that divert state resources into criminal hands.

Criminal Justice Reform

Haiti's criminal justice system is plagued with corruption, political interference, and severe institutional overcapacity. With a legal system based in Napoleonic code, Haiti has four judiciary levels: the Court of Cassation, courts of appeal, civil courts, and magistrates' courts.¹⁴⁸ While Haiti's constitution designates the Superior Council on Judicial Power (CSPJ) as an independent body to govern the administration and discipline of judges in these courts, in practice, executive interference has significantly undermined autonomy. Past Haitian presidents have repeatedly used their power to influence and interfere with judiciary outcomes, especially in politically sensitive cases. Moreover, the constitution grants authority to the President to appoint judges to Haiti's highest court, the Court of Cassation¹⁴⁹, creating structural vulnerabilities to politicization and weakening judicial independence at the highest level.

In an effort for reform, a few changes have been made to re-establish a working judiciary. The former Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, appointed eight judges to the Court of Cassation in February 2023 to restore its operation, a controversial decision for its constitutional legitimacy.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, in May, July, and September 2025 criminal hearings with and without jury assistance were organized in Les Cayes and Port-au-Prince, to address 79 cases and begin reducing the backlog.¹⁵¹ These efforts were further supported by a joint resolution between the Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor)'s Office, the Dean's Office of the Cap Haitian Court of First Instance, and the local Bar Council to help reduce prison congestion by reconstructing missing case files and expediting hearings.

Despite this progress, judicial proceedings remain extremely slow. Chronic underfunding and budget freezes have led to frequent strikes and friction by judges and clerks, creating bottlenecks in the system. This dysfunction is not only due to reliance on external funding, but also the resistance of local elites who benefit from a non-functional system which enables them to evade justice and accountability.

This has had severe impacts on Haiti's penitentiary system. As of June 2025, Haiti's current prison population consisted of 82 percent pre-trial detainees, reflecting the judiciary's inability to process cases in a timely manner and resulting in extensive overcrowding.¹⁵² With 17 established prison facilities, the official intended capacity is 3,900 people, yet reports indicate a current prison population of 7,163.¹⁵³ This figure remains strikingly high considering 4,000 inmates from Haiti's largest facilities, the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets Civil Prison, were released by the armed gangs in March 2024. Compounding this, the extreme conditions of the prisons subject inmates to inhuman and degrading treatment. The March 2026 Report of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the unsanitary facilities, insufficient food, limited access to drinking water, and inadequate medical care, also reporting the death of 118 prisoners between March and December 2025.¹⁵⁴

Hence to address the institutional and infrastructural deficit, MONUPEH's operations will involve a key focus on building new, high-capacity penitentiary facilities to reduce current overcrowding and account for the future intake of arrested gang-affiliated members. With an estimated 12,000 to 20,000 gang members (3000 heavily armed)¹⁵⁵, the current overcapacity detention system designed to hold 3,900 individuals, is not structurally capable of absorbing a surge in detainees at this time. The mission should therefore support the rapid expansion of temporary detention facilities. Operationally, this involves rehabilitating and expanding current facilities, including securing and restoring the gang-controlled National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets Civil Prison, as well as building large-scale temporary detention facilities using modular structures.

Courthouse facilities, including the Palace of Justice in the Bicentenaire district, should be returned to full functionality. Mobile courts and temporary courtroom capacity should also be implemented to increase judicial throughput.

This expansion, however, must be addressed in tandem with broader judicial reforms. Building on the joint coalitions' efforts to tackle backlogs and expedite cases, a joint-case review taskforce composed of Haitian judicial authorities, prosecutors, and international legal advisors should be established.

The mission should also implement a classification system to separate detainees by risk level. High-risk gang leaders should be held in the most secure facilities, while low-level affiliates, and non-violent detainees (both currently detained and in-future) should be prioritized for expedited review/processing, conditional release, or alternative measures.

Juvenile detainees should be immediately separated from adult prisoners¹⁵⁶, as is outlined under Haitian Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which Haiti is signatory to. Due to the limited infrastructure and overcrowding, this has not been practiced. However, with the additional reforms listed above, the mission should prioritize implementing and enforcing this standard.

Moreover, MONUPEH should establish more specialized youth facilities focused on rehabilitation, including access to education, psychological, and reintegration services. Where necessary, adult detainees currently occupying such spaces should be transferred to temporary facilities.

LOE 5: JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, AND RECOVERY

DDR

Given the unconventional nature of the crisis in Haiti, which features gang violence resembling the conditions of a war, but does not constitute an armed conflict, both DDR and CVR programs would be appropriate – DDR to deal with the immediate priority of demobilizing gangs as soon as possible and encouraging voluntary defection to reduce the reliance on kinetic operations and thus the loss of life, while CVR addresses the long-term structural drivers of gang violence.

A significant challenge for DDR in Haiti is the fact that fighting is still ongoing, necessitating a level of securitization which is at odds with the traditionally conciliatory and rehabilitative spirit of DDR programs, and further challenged by the lack of detention facilities. In addition, the dense, urban character of the crisis creates spatial constraints when some degree of physical separation is typically necessary. Furthermore, the particularly high number of minors involved also necessitates dedicated programming in recognition of the special needs and rights of child perpetrators in conflict contexts.¹⁵⁷ Thus, conventional DDR programs must be adapted to the Haitian context in a way that does not compromise justice or Haitian ownership.

To this end, a three-part model is proposed to deal both with gang members arrested and those who voluntarily defect, and seeks to balance the fragile security conditions while still providing a durable foundation for sustainable reintegration, within the context of limited time, resources and space. If gang members are arrested, they will be automatically disarmed and added to a registry. Those who are not sent to prison will have the option to go to a transit center or remain in the community, unless they reoffend and are sent to prison. Gang members that choose to voluntarily demobilize can do so by turning themselves in, after which they will go through the same procedure. They also have the option of demobilizing unofficially, which still achieves the goal of reducing the strength of the gangs, but precludes the possibility of further follow-up and ensuring disarmament. To encourage them to demobilize through official channels, yet not to the point where civilians are incentivized to pass themselves off as gang members or grow resentful, it should be communicated that being added to the registry does not affect one's likelihood of being arrested, which can happen regardless. However, without making any promises, voluntarily demobilizing may be taken as a positive factor in the event that one is later arrested, to demonstrate remorse and good behavior.

Prison The first path is designed for a very limited list of senior and highly dangerous gang leaders, who will be sent to prison. Given that Haiti currently only has a few functional prisons which are all over-capacity, of which two have suffered a break at the hands of gangs,¹⁵⁸ this is not an ideal option and should be reserved only for those who pose the greatest threat to communities if not securely detained. Efforts are already underway to build additional prisons, and more should be done to accelerate the judicial process for current occupants of the prisons, the majority of whom have been detained for years without receiving a trial. Moreover, more must be done to improve the security

of the prisons, including providing technical assistance and retraining to the HNP, and investigating the circumstances of the previous break-ins to prevent reoccurrences.

Transit centers The second path involves ‘transit centers’ outside of Port-au-Prince, to which demobilized gang members can choose to be relocated temporarily if they are fearful of remaining in the capital. These transit centers will resemble halfway houses, providing a degree of structure and order without excessively restrictive or carceral features.¹⁵⁹ Occupants must disarm and commit to a standard of behavior, and risk being sent to prison if infractions are repeated or sufficiently severe. To prevent them from being idle which may prompt renewed criminality, occupants should be allowed to participate in activities such as cash-for-work programs; vocational and entrepreneurship training; or educational modules.¹⁶⁰ In addition, rehabilitation should be provided, including counseling and psychological services; resocialization programs; and informal support groups.¹⁶¹ Ideally, separate centers can be set up to cater to children and their families, women and those with families or dependents, but barring that, special provisions must be made at the very least to ensure the safety of all occupants and that their needs are met.

Given the relatively poor history of international intervention in Haiti, these centers should ideally be built and run by the Haitian government, which should collaborate with local groups such as civil society organizations and churches to do so. The international community can provide financial support and share expertise on program design and implementation, but the bulk of the DDR response should be driven by Haitians, several of whom already run similar programs in their own communities and with great success.¹⁶²

There are two reasons for locating these centers outside of the capital. The first is the fragile and uncertain security situation, which not only makes it difficult to build the necessary facilities in time to receive demobilizing gang members, but also creates a very reasonable risk that these centers will be attacked by gangs or vigilante groups. This would then necessitate manpower be dedicated to guarding these centers, which would detract from the focus on offensive operations while also creating an unfavorable atmosphere for DDR. In the event of a security incident, the DDR program would also lose significant credibility, discouraging gang members from defecting for fear of their lives. Secondly, shifting these centers away from Port-au-Prince would help to alleviate the burden on the capital, which has been the center of fighting and is also overpopulated, putting a strain on resources. Organizations located outside the center may have more capacity to run these transit centers, and may even benefit from their presence.

To ensure the smooth running of these centers, it is essential that communities are consulted before transit centers are built, with honest and transparent conversations regarding their circumstances and objectives. This demonstrates respect for the communities who will be affected by these transit centers while also increasing buy-in,

which is crucial for the success of the transit center and the rehabilitation of former gang members. Based on past programs run in Colombia, local communities can benefit from these centers, which bring typically young, able-bodied individuals, facilities such as medical centers or schools, and injections into the local economy. Programs should be extended to local residents, and shared community spaces and activities should be organized to build relationships that can enhance rehabilitation.¹⁶³ Depending on the resources available and personal decisions, the duration of the transit centers can vary, but plans must be made and communicated to all affected parties in advance to prevent disruptions to the outcomes.

Community release The third path is community release, where demobilized gang members are able to return to their own homes, or to community-run shelters similar to the transit centers described above, but located in their own neighborhoods. This option grants the most freedom, but also carries risk of members returning to gangs due potentially to the lack of physical separation or the lack of alternatives. Consequently, offering programs such as CFW or mentorship can help reduce the likelihood of recidivism.

This model of providing alternative pathways and offramps for gang members to demobilize diverges from the “disarm or die” strategy pursued by MINUSTAH in 2006 under President Préval.¹⁶⁴ While the primary aim is to demobilize as many gang members as possible thus reducing the need to use force, it also recognizes how violence and gang membership in Haiti are embedded into structural economic and security conditions, and applies this logic to the gang neutralization strategy. While primarily designed as a transitory measure, this system lays a foundation for the reintegration of gang members into society that should be integrated with justice and long-term CVR programming.

CVR

In contrast with securitization approaches, community-based peacebuilding initiatives locate Haiti’s crisis not only in the direct violence perpetrated by gang members, but in broader structures of poverty, exclusion and state neglect.¹⁶⁵ As Kivland writes, the gang crisis is not “the product of a culture *of* violence, but a culture *in* violence”. Consequently, the response lies in transforming these structural conditions rather than seeking to eliminate gang members, and must be rooted in local communities, particularly marginalized neighborhoods and regions.¹⁶⁶

Several such projects have been implemented in the past, typically by international NGOs such as Viva Rio and Concern Worldwide.¹⁶⁷ Emphasizing dialogue and promoting community-level social cohesion, these programs champion restorative justice over retributive justice, often engaging former gang members in their programming. Development, social activities and economic opportunities ranging across the fields of health, culture, sports, environment and education are a cornerstone of this approach,

offering an alternative survival strategy and path for former or prospective gang members, turning rhetoric for peace into a real possibility.

Haitian civil society and community groups are the best placed to spearhead this project from the perspective of local knowledge and sustainability, and should be empowered to do so. Rather than consisting of short-term and ad-hoc projects run by international NGOs, CVR should be written into strategies of local and national governance, as a collaboration with, rather than substitute for, state services.

Transitional Justice

With extensive human rights violations in Haiti, accountability, acknowledgement, and justice for the victims must be addressed. A key concern is the inability of the judicial system in successfully investigating, prosecuting, and holding those responsible accountable. According to a January 2026 report by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Haiti's judicial system is facing significant issues with disorganization, insecurity, and underfunding.¹⁶⁸ The challenge is not the absence of law, but the inability of institutions to enforce accountability. Public trust in these institutions has been further damaged, in recent years, by the little to no progress in several major human rights cases.

For instance, no one has been held accountable following the 2018 La Saline Massacre, whereby gangs killed at least 71 people and destroyed over 400 homes.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, the more recent 2024 Wharf Jérémie Massacre, which included the execution of more than 200 people in Port-au-Prince, has had some investigation with over 70 witnesses heard.¹⁷⁰ However, due to pending judicial warrants, the alleged perpetrators have yet to be arrested, further illustrating the gap between the state's legal framework and its ability to meaningfully enforce it.

Establishing a transitional justice system could help bring these issues to light by strengthening the rule of law and providing an avenue for addressing past abuses. Following the successful implementation of a DDR program and legitimate Haitian government, an extensive, adaptive justice system must be implemented. As outlined in a December 2025 report by the International Crisis Group, “in cooperation with international experts, the [Haitian] administration should also start to design a transitional justice system that provides benefits and a measure of judicial reprieve to those who disarm and cooperate with the authorities, while also guaranteeing that there will be no general impunity”.¹⁷¹

Given the context, Haiti's transitional justice system will need to function along a continuum of accountability mechanisms, ranging from prosecutions for the most serious crimes and atrocities, to truth seeking and reintegration programs for children associated with armed groups. MONUPEH can support Haiti by building on the specialized *pôles judiciaires* ('judicial poles') established by decree in April 2025¹⁷², while


also expanding pathways for further prosecution, transitional processes, and victim reparations, through hybrid courts. Comparable mechanisms have been used in post-conflict contexts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Criminal Court in Central African Republic, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Hybrid judicial arrangements helped prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for mass crimes while strengthening domestic judicial capacity.¹⁷³

It is important to note that Haiti's armed groups and gang leaders are not the only ones who must be held responsible for the violence and ongoing crisis. Political elites and corrupt officials who have financed and enabled Haiti's armed groups must also be held accountable through prosecution and anti-corruption investigations to reinforce rule of law and establish a precedent of intolerance for impunity.

Perhaps the most difficult component of the transitional justice program will be addressing the role children have played in perpetrating violence. Under international law, children are considered victims of recruitment and exploitation and are to be protected.¹⁷⁴ However, with nearly half of gangs now made up of children under the age of 18, measures must be taken to provide rehabilitation programs, education, and psychological support. Experiences with child soldiers following Sierra Leone's civil war have informed concerns that the threat of prosecution could deter children from disarming or cooperating with authorities.¹⁷⁵ For this reason, reintegration-focused approaches will be essential to encouraging disengagement from armed groups and preventing cycles of violence from continuing. These re-integration and transitional justice programs must be Haitian-led and community-based, with a strong reliance on local community leaders and civil society groups to design and implement culturally appropriate programs and rebuild trust within affected communities.

GANTT CHART – CONDITION A FIGURE 5

MONUPEH Implementation Gantt
GSF Successful (Condition A)



Color Legend / Lines of Effort

Security	Peacekeeping and Establishing Security	Force, HNP, UN reserve, security operations
Econ	Economic Stability and Development	Economic relief, corridors, scale-up
Capacity Building	Institutions & Good Government	National handoff, governance, administration
Democracy	Fostering Democracy	Elections and Political Processes
Justice	Justice, Reconciliation, and Recovery	Protection of Civilians and Transitional Justice

TASK REGISTER CONDITION A (PHASE 1 PREPARE/SECURE) FIGURE 6

ID	Phase	Line of Effort	Activity	Start (Month)	End (Month)	Duration (Months)	Trigger	Task Description	Lead Actor	Funding Source
0	PREPARE	Phase Summary	MONUPEH PREPARES	1	12	12	UN Security Council and key member states agree to a six-year Chapter VII mission framework and begin pre-deployment shaping.	Umbrella pre-deployment phase that establishes the legal, political, force-generation, logistics, and institutional groundwork for the mission, while selected enabling tasks continue into the early secure phase.	UN Secretariat mission start-up team (DPPA-DPO/DOS) with Security Council leads	UN assessed peacekeeping start-up costs plus preparatory bilateral and voluntary contributions
0.1	PREPARE	Capacity Building	Justice Infrastructure Build-out in Port-au-Prince	1	12	12	International donor pledges secured; agreement with Haitian Prime Minister on justice sector priorities; site assessments completed.	Rehabilitate and construct courthouses, detention facilities, and legal aid offices in Port-au-Prince before mission deployment. No clearing operations yet; security only for infrastructure build-out. Recruit and begin training judicial and corrections personnel. Establish interim case management systems. Coordinate with UNDP and bilateral donors on construction and procurement. Address the backlog of pre-trial detainees by preparing fast-track trial capacity. Be prepared to accept detainees from ongoing GSF operations.	DSRSG	Peacekeeping rule-of-law funding, UNDP trust-fund support, and bilateral justice-sector grants
0.2	PREPARE	Security	Force Generation: Assemble, Marshal, Est LNO Network	1	12	12	UNSC resolution authorizing Chapter VII mission; troop-contributing countries (TCCs) identified and MoUs signed; force generation process initiated.	Marshal UN peacekeeping contingents at staging areas. Establish Liaison Officer (LNO) networks between the UN Mission, GSF, HNP, Vectus, and the Haitian Gov. Conduct pre-deployment training including HRDDP compliance, POC frameworks, rules of engagement, and Haiti-specific cultural/operational orientation. Establish logistics and supply chains, forward operating bases, and communications architecture.	Chief of Mission Support and MONUPEH Force Commander-designate	UN peacekeeping budget for mission support; contingent-owned equipment reimbursements; limited bilateral enablers
0.3	PREPARE	Capacity Building	Political Preparation	1	12	12	UNSC members signal willingness to consider Chapter VII authorization; Haitian gov agrees to engage; policy community analysis completed; transition logic from GSF/BINUH arrangements.	Negotiate the UNSC mandate text, including scope, benchmarks, and sunset provisions. Secure host-nation consent from the Haitian Gov. Define the Status of Forces Agreement (SofA). Coordinate with PS members and regional actors (CARICOM, OAS). Establish the political framework for the mission including the relationship between the SRSG, the Haitian Gov, and the GSF. Set conditions for eventual elections.	Security Council with DPPA-DPO political leadership	Core UN regular-budget / special political mission resources, later supplemented by mission-planning funds
0.4	PREPARE	Econ	Immediate CSO Relief Activation	1	18	18	CSO partnerships pre-established during PREPARE; donor funding released; humanitarian access corridors identified.	Activate civil society organizations (CSOs) to deliver immediate relief in cleared and stabilized areas. Deploy food distribution, emergency medical services, shelter support, and psychosocial services. Prioritize displaced populations and communities most affected by gang violence. Begin cash-for-work programs to provide immediate income alternatives. Coordinate with OCHA and humanitarian cluster system.	DSRSG / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator	Humanitarian pooled funds, agency program budgets, donor emergency grants, and limited mission quick-impact / enabling support
1	SECURE	Phase Summary	GSF SECURES	1	18	18	Prepare phase outputs are sufficient to begin in-country operations.	Umbrella security phase focused on regaining control of strategic nodes, protecting civilians, degrading gang capability, and creating conditions for institutional stabilization.	SRSG and Integrated Mission Leadership Team (IMLT)	Primarily UN peacekeeping contributions, with residual voluntary support for partner capabilities
1.1	SECURE	Security	Protection of Civilians (POC) / HRDDP	1	60	60	Mission deployed (M1); HRDDP screening of all force components completed during 0.2; ROE established.	Mission deployed (M1); HRDDP screening of all force components completed during 0.2; ROE established.	SRSG-led Protection of Civilians architecture	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
1.2	SECURE	Security	Peacekeeping Force Bridging & Heavy Clearance	1	12	12	UN mission deployed (M1); Peacekeeping Force operational with UN oversight via LNOs (from 0.2); intelligence picture established; POC/HRDDP framework active (1.1).	Conduct major clearance operations to dislodge gang control from critical infrastructure (ports, fuel depots, national highways, airport). GSF conducts kinetic operations under agreed UN-Haitian coordination arrangements with HRDDP compliance. UN provides cordon, logistics, and holding support. Apply the Clear-Hold-Build loop: GSF clear nodes, HNP holds cleared areas, UN provides coordination/services. Prioritize nodes based on economic and strategic value.	GSF Commander	Hybrid financing: UN support-office assessed costs plus voluntary contributions and troop-contributor national costs during bridging period
1.3	SECURE	Security	HNP Vetting & Anti-Gang Training (begin SSR)	1	42	42	Mission deployed (M1); HNP baseline assessment completed; vetting criteria established with Haitian authorities and UN Police component.	Conduct systematic vetting of all HNP personnel to identify and remove officers with gang affiliations, corruption records, or human rights violations. Deliver specialized anti-gang training including urban operations, community policing, intelligence-led policing, and human rights compliance. Rebuild HNP capacity toward the 2.2:1,000 police-to-population ratio benchmark. Establish internal affairs and accountability mechanisms within HNP.	Police Commissioner / MONUPEH Police Component	UN assessed police-component funding plus bilateral police-assistance packages
1.4	SECURE	Security	Intel Fusion	1	42	42	LNO network operational (from 0.2); mission deployed with intelligence component.	Establish a Joint Intelligence Fusion Cell integrating UN mission intelligence, HNP criminal intelligence, GSF/Peacekeeping Force operational intelligence, and international partner feeds. Map gang networks, patronage structures, revenue streams, and arms supply chains. Produce actionable targeting packages for gang suppression operations. Support DDR planning by identifying disengagement opportunities within gang hierarchies.	Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) / mission intelligence fusion leadership	UN assessed peacekeeping budget with possible donor-provided technical enablers
1.5	SECURE	Security	Securing Nodes (Ports & Airport)	1	42	42	Clearance operations underway (1.2); intelligence on gang presence at target nodes (1.4); HNP units available for holding (1.3).	Secure and hold critical economic infrastructure including Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Port-au-Prince seaport, fuel depots, and major highway corridors. Establish permanent security presence combining UN peacekeepers and vetted HNP.	Force Commander through Joint Operations Center	UN assessed peacekeeping budget; host-state in-kind support for facilities where available
1.6	SECURE	Justice	DDR: Child Disengagement	1	60	60	Security conditions permit access to gang-affected communities (1.2, 1.5 progress); intel identifies children in gang structures (1.4)	Implement the PRE/EUNES child disengagement program targeting children and youth associated with armed gangs. Establish transit centers for immediate care, psychosocial support, and family tracing. Deliver education, vocational training, and reintegration support. Work with child protection actors (UNICEF, NGOs) on case management. Address recruitment prevention through community-based programs and livelihood alternatives for families.	UNICEF with mission DDR/Child Protection leadership	UNICEF and child-protection donor funding, peacekeeping program support, and bilateral grants
1.7	SECURE	Security	Targeted Gang Suppression	1	18	18	Initial clearance operations demonstrate capability (1.2 underway); intel fusion cell producing targeting packages (1.4); POC/HRDDP framework active (1.1).	Conduct precision operations against gang leadership, weapons caches, and revenue collection points based on intelligence-led targeting. Disrupt gang command-and-control, reduce territorial control in secondary areas beyond the priority nodes, and degrade capacity for reconstitution. Apply pressure to incentivize gang member defection and disengagement.	GSF and Police Commissioner	UN assessed peacekeeping budget, plus member-state support for specialized enablers and some national HNP operating costs
1.8	SECURE	Security	GSF Phase-Out / Re-hatting; HPC increases responsibility	7	12	6	Heavy clearance phase substantially complete (1.2 concluded); HNP capacity growing (1.3 underway); UN force at authorized strength (0.2). MONUPEH must be able to effectively command and control all peacekeeping forces. Transfer of Authority can occur as soon as 6 months after MONUPEH approved, but should happen no later than 1 year after approval.	Transition the Gang Suppression Force from lead security role to support/advisory role under MONUPEH. Evaluate GSF personnel for potential integration ("re-hatting") into UN force following rigorous HRDDP vetting. Address accountability for any GSF human rights violations during clearance phase. As conditions allow, begin transferring lead security responsibilities from MONUPEH FC to MONUPEH HPC on a sectored or gradual basis.	SRSG with DPO transition planning cell; FC, HPC, HNP Head, and GSF leadership.	UN assessed peacekeeping budget as roles shift from bridging force to standing mission structure

TASK REGISTER CONDITION A (PHASE 2 STABILIZE) FIGURE 7

2	STABILIZE	Phase Summary	STABILIZE	13	42	30	Security gains at key nodes are stable enough to move from break-in operations toward institutional consolidation.	Umbrella stabilization phase centered on political transition, justice and detention reform, DDR/CVR, economic corridor recovery, and controlled transfer of governance functions.	SRSRG and Haitian executive transition steering mechanism	Mixed financing: assessed peacekeeping resources, agency program budgets, Multi Domain Trust Funds, bilateral aid, and Int'l Financial Institution support
2.1	STABILIZE	Democracy	Benchmark-Based Electoral Preparation	13	18	6	Political framework established (0.3); security conditions permit political organizing in key areas; Haitian Gov engages on electoral timeline.	Develop benchmark-based conditions for credible elections. Establish or reconstitute an independent electoral commission. Draft or update electoral law and voter registration frameworks. Build electoral infrastructure including polling stations, voter rolls, and ballot security. Set objective benchmarks (security thresholds, voter registration rates, political party registration) that must be met before elections proceed.	DSRSG / Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance leadership	UNDP-managed electoral basket funds, bilateral election support, and assessed mission security / logistical backing
2.2	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	High-Risk Detention / Corrections Reform	13	42	30	Justice infrastructure build-out underway (0.1); gang suppression producing detainees (1.2, 1.7); detention facilities at critical overcrowding.	Reform the detention and corrections system to address severe overcrowding, prolonged pre-trial detention, and inhumane conditions. Establish classification and separation of high-risk gang detainees. Implement fast-track trial procedures for detained gang members. Build corrections officer capacity and establish oversight mechanisms. Address the enormous pre-trial detention backlog through case review and processing.	Justice and Corrections Section	Bilateral corrections assistance and infrastructure grants
2.3	STABILIZE	Security	UN Force Standing Surge Capacity	13	36	24	GSF phasing out (1.8); potential for gang reconstitution or spoiler violence; force generation process established (0.2).	Maintain a standing UN force surge capacity to respond to flare-ups, spoiler violence, or gang reconstitution attempts during the stabilization phase. Pre-position rapid reaction units and maintain reserve forces. Ensure the mission can reinforce any sector within defined response timelines. Coordinate with regional standby arrangements.	Force Commander	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
2.4	STABILIZE	Econ	Economic Corridor Pilots	15	60	46	Key infrastructure nodes secured (1.5); CSO relief providing baseline services (0.4); private sector engagement initiated.	Establish pilot economic corridors in secured areas connecting ports, markets, and production zones. Restore commercial activity along key transport routes. Support formal market reopening and small business revival. Introduce microfinance and credit access programs. Coordinate with international financial institutions on targeted economic recovery programming. Begin dismantling gang-controlled parallel economic systems.	DSRSG / RC-led stabilization and recovery	IFI loans / grants, donor stabilization funds.
2.5	STABILIZE	Justice	Community Violence Reduction (CVR) & Cash for Work	18	42	25	Cleared and held areas expanding (1.5); DDR child disengagement underway (1.6); community access established; CSOs operational (0.4).	Implement Community Violence Reduction programs in stabilized areas as a complement to DDR. Provide livelihoods, cash-for-work, skills training, and psychosocial support to at-risk populations including former gang associates, youth, and affected communities. Use CVR as an entry point for broader reintegration and peacebuilding. Establish community-based reconciliation mechanisms. Support women-led community security initiatives.	Mission DDR/CVR Section	Assessed mission program funds, peacebuilding / stabilization trust funds, and bilateral community-recovery grants
2.6	STABILIZE	Democracy	Electoral Process, Voting, and Certification	19	42	24	Electoral benchmarks met (2.1); security conditions permit nationwide polling (1.5, 2.3 progress); voter registration completed; political parties registered; international observers deployed.	Prepare, secure, conduct, monitor, certify, and politically defend elections as a core milestone in restoring legitimate authority. This includes voter registration, polling operations, counting, dispute resolution, results certification, and managed post-election transition support.	Provisional Electoral Council	Electoral basket fund / bilateral donor support, with assessed peacekeeping financing for security and logistics
2.7	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Integrated Transitional Governance Support	19	52	34	Haitian Gov functioning (0.3); cleared areas require governance (1.2, 1.5).	Establish integrated transitional governance support structures in which UN civilian officials co-locate with Haitian national and municipal counterparts to deliver essential government services. Focus on revenue collection, basic public administration, service delivery (health, education, water/sanitation), and local governance. Gradually transfer capacity and decision-making authority to Haitian officials as capacity develops. Build municipal governance capacity outside Port-au-Prince.	SRSRG and Haitian transitional executive (joint steering)	Predominantly assessed mission funding with tightly conditioned donor technical-assistance packages
2.8	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Anti-Corruption Tracking	19	52	34	Intel fusion producing financial intelligence (1.4); economic corridors requiring revenue regulation (2.4).	Encourage US-led (with international partners) anti-corruption monitoring and tracking mechanism operating parallel to UN structures. Track diversion of aid, reconstruction funds, and government revenues. Investigate corruption within Haitian state institutions and security forces. Provide independent oversight that reinforces but does not duplicate UN internal mechanisms. Produce regular public reporting.	If possible, U.S.-led anti-corruption and illicit-finance task force	Primarily bilateral U.S. assistance and national law-enforcement budgets; complementary donor governance funds
2.9	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Judicial Recovery & Case Management	21	37	17	Justice infrastructure built out (0.1); detention reform underway (2.2); hybrid administration supporting governance (2.7).	Rebuild the judicial system including courts, prosecution services, and legal aid. Establish modern case management systems to address the massive case backlog. Train and deploy judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. Establish judicial independence safeguards. Prioritize cases related to gang violence, human rights violations, and corruption. Support transitional justice mechanisms.	Justice and Corrections Section with Haitian Ministry of Justice	Assessed rule-of-law resources plus bilateral justice-sector and digital-governance support
2.10	STABILIZE	Econ	Formal Economy Incentive Structuring	21	42	22	Economic corridors demonstrating viability (2.4); anti-corruption tracking providing transparency (2.8); government revenue collection resuming (2.7).	Design and implement incentive structures to shift economic activity from informal/gang-controlled systems to formal economy. Establish tax incentives, business registration simplification, and regulatory frameworks that reduce barriers to formal economic participation. Support import/export normalization through secured ports. Coordinate with IFIs on structural reform programming. Address elite economic capture through competition and transparency measures.	DSRSG / RC economic recovery cell	IFI policy-based support, donor economic-governance grants, and host-state revenue measures
2.11	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Transfer Admin to National Bodies	30	52	23	Hybrid administration has built sufficient Haitian capacity (2.7 mature); elections conducted or imminent (2.6); judicial system functioning (2.9).	Systematically transfer administrative authority from hybrid UN-Haitian structures to fully national bodies. Develop transition plans for each government function. Conduct capacity assessments and address remaining gaps before handover. Ensure institutional memory transfer through documentation and mentoring. Maintain advisory presence during transition period. Transfer routine administrative control from international or hybrid mechanisms to Haitian national bodies in sequenced priority sectors. Complete transfer of primary security responsibilities to MONUPH HPC and HNP as conditions allow, but before initiating Task 3.1.	SRSRG / DSRSG governance transition cell	Assessed mission transition funding tapering into donor budget-support / technical-assistance streams
2.12	STABILIZE	Justice	Transitional Justice	36	60	25	CVR and disengagement programming active (2.5); judicial recovery underway (2.9); communities in recovered areas require structured accountability, dialogue, and reintegration pathways.	Launch an explicit transitional-justice line of effort tied to DDR/CVR in order to reduce revenge dynamics, support reintegration, and build legitimacy for the wider stabilization process. Establish nationally anchored but internationally supported mechanisms for victim acknowledgment, community dialogue, truth-telling, selective accountability, sentence mitigation or alternative dispositions where appropriate, and reconciliation processes linked to demobilization and community violence reduction. Integrate victim support, local mediation, reparative measures, and referral pathways so that DDR/CVR programs are connected to justice rather than perceived impunity.	Haitian Ministry of Justice; Justice and Corrections Section; Civil Affairs; OHCHR/UN human-rights advisers; victims' groups; faith leaders; women and youth organizations; UNDP and peacebuilding partners	Assessed mission program funds, Peacebuilding Fund / stabilization trust funds, and bilateral justice-and-reconciliation grants


TASK REGISTER CONDITION A (PHASE 3 DEVELOP) FIGURE 8

3	DEVELOP	Phase Summary	DEVELOP	43	60	18	Stabilization benchmarks show that Haitian institutions can absorb primary authority with a reduced external role.	Umbrella development phase focused on durable Haitian control, reserve deterrence, economic scale-up, elected governance, and mission exit.	Haitian elected government with SRSRG-led transition oversight	Declining assessed peacekeeping funding, increasing national budget responsibility, and longer-term development finance
3.1	DEVELOP	Security	HNP Assumes Primary Security Control (cont'd SSR)	43	60	18	HNP vetting and training substantially complete (1.3); HNP capacity approaching benchmarks; GSF phased out (1.8); UN surge capacity provides backstop (2.3).	HNP, supported by MONUPH HPC, assumes primary responsibility for internal security across Haiti. UN peacekeepers shift to support, mentoring, and reserve roles. HNP leads all routine policing, community security, and anti-gang operations. UN provides technical advisory support, logistics backstop, and rapid reaction reserve. Establish HNP-led security coordination mechanisms replacing UN-led structures.	HNP Director General	Primarily Haitian state budget with bilateral police assistance and limited assessed advisory support
3.2	DEVELOP	Security	Enduring Joint Peripheral Security	43	60	18	HNP increasingly controls routine internal security (3.1); transition planning shifts toward border and coastal resilience; trafficking routes and peripheral corridors remain vulnerable to criminal exploitation.	Establish an enduring joint UN-HNP peripheral security architecture focused on border management, customs enforcement, coast-guard support, maritime interdiction, and disruption of transnational criminal networks. Maintain joint mentoring, intelligence fusion, and operational accompaniment for PoliFront, customs, coast guard, port security, and other specialized units in order to reduce illicit arms flows, narcotics trafficking, revenue leakage, and cross-border support to gangs.	Police Commissioner and HNP Director General (joint lead)	Assessed peacekeeping police and mission-support resources, supplemented by bilateral border-security, customs-modernization, and maritime-security assistance
3.3	DEVELOP	Security	UN Shifts to Deterrent Reserve	43	60	18	HNP assuming primary control (3.1 initiated); security conditions stable; force drawdown planning initiated.	Transition UN peacekeeping force from active security operations to a deterrent reserve posture. Maintain sufficient force presence to deter spoiler violence, protect key infrastructure, and support HNP in extremis. Begin force drawdown by repatriating contingents no longer required for active operations. Maintain rapid reaction capability until security conditions confirm irreversibility.	Force Commander	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
3.4	DEVELOP	Capacity Building	Phasing out NGO Substitutes	43	54	12	Government services operational through hybrid/national administration (2.7, 2.11); service delivery capacity demonstrated; budget allocations in place.	Systematically transition service delivery from international NGOs and CSOs to Haitian government institutions. Develop transition timelines for each sector (health, education, water/sanitation, shelter). Ensure government budget allocations and staffing before NGO withdrawal. Maintain residual international support for capacity gaps. Prevent service delivery disruptions during transition.	Haitian line ministries with DSRSG / RC transition support	Agency development budgets, donor grants, host-state budget absorption, and IFI service-sector financing
3.5	DEVELOP	Econ	Economic Scale-up & State Transition	43	60	18	Economic corridors successful (2.4); formal economy incentives enacted (2.10); anti-corruption mechanisms providing confidence (2.8); government revenue growing (2.7, 2.11).	Scale up economic recovery from pilot corridors to national economic policy. Transition from emergency/stabilization economic programming to long-term development. Support government capacity to manage economic policy, trade, and revenue independently. Coordinate with IFIs on longer-term development programming. Promote private sector investment and job creation. Address structural economic challenges including elite capture, import dependence, and rural underdevelopment.	Haitian Ministry of Finance and Planning with UN country team / IFI support	Haitian state revenue, IFI finance, bilateral development assistance, and private investment mobilization
3.6	DEVELOP	Democracy	Transition to Elected Government / Assumption of Power	49	60	12	Elections held and certified (2.6); elected officials prepared through transition support; administrative transfer substantially complete (2.11).	Support the full transition to elected government and the formal assumption of power by democratically elected officials. Manage the political transfer from the Prime Minister to the elected government, ensure continuity of government functions, provide advisory support to incoming officials on governance, security, and economic management, and establish the political framework for post-mission governance.	Constitutional Haitian executive and electoral authorities	Host-state electoral / transition budget plus donor backstopping and residual mission support
3.7	DEVELOP	Capacity Building	UN Mission Drawdown & Exit	49	60	12	HNP in primary security control (3.1); elected government in power (3.6); administrative transfer complete (2.11); security conditions permit drawdown (3.3 validated).	Execute the planned drawdown and exit of the UN peacekeeping mission. Repatriate military and police contingents. Close forward operating bases and transfer or dispose of mission assets. Transition remaining advisory and capacity-building functions to a successor UN political presence (e.g., BINUH-type office) or bilateral arrangements. Conduct lessons learned review. Ensure no security vacuum during drawdown.	SRSRG with DPO-led transition and drawdown cell	Final-year UN assessed peacekeeping drawdown funding plus follow-on UNCT / donor program resources

GANTT CHART CONDITION B FIGURE 9

MONUPEH Implementation Gantt

All Tasks (Condition B)



Color Legend / Lines of Effort

- Security** (Dark Blue): Peacekeeping and Establishing Security Force, HNP, UN reserve, security operations
- Econ** (Green): Economic Stability and Development Economic relief, corridors, scale-up
- Capacity Building** (Red): Institutions & Good Government National handoff, governance, administration
- Democracy** (Light Blue): Fostering Democracy Elections and Political Processes
- Justice** (Yellow): Justice, Reconciliation, and Recovery Protection of Civilians and Transitional Justice

TASK REGISTER CONDITION B (PHASE 1 PREPARE & PHASE 2 SECURE) FIGURE 10

ID	Phase	Line of Effort	Activity	Start (Month)	End (Month)	Duration (Months)	Trigger	Task Description	Lead Actor	Funding Source
0	PREPARE	Phase Summary	PREPARE	1	12	12	UN Security Council and key member states agree to a six-year Chapter VII mission framework and begin pre-deployment shaping.	Umbrella pre-deployment phase that establishes the legal, political, force-generation, logistics, and institutional groundwork for the mission, while selected enabling tasks continue into the early secure phase.	UN Secretariat mission start-up team (DPPA-DPO/DOS) with Security Council leads	UN assessed peacekeeping start-up costs plus preparatory bilateral and voluntary contributions
0.1	PREPARE	Capacity Building	Justice Infrastructure Build-out in Port-au-Prince	1	12	12	International donor pledges secured; agreement with Haitian Prime Minister on justice sector priorities; site assessments completed.	Rehabilitate and construct courthouses, detention facilities, and legal aid offices in Port-au-Prince before mission deployment. No clearing operations yet; security only for infrastructure build-out. Recruit and begin training judicial and corrections personnel. Establish interim case management systems. Coordinate with UNDP and bilateral donors on construction and procurement. Address the backlog of pre-trial detainees by preparing fast-track trial capacity. Be prepared to accept detainees from ongoing GSF operations.	DSRSG	Peacekeeping rule-of-law funding, UNDP trust-fund support, and bilateral justice-sector grants
0.2	PREPARE	Security	Force Generation: Assemble, Marshal, Est LNO Network	1	12	12	UNSC resolution authorizing Chapter VII mission; troop-contributing countries (TCCs) identified and MoUs signed; force generation process initiated.	Marshal UN peacekeeping contingents at staging areas. Establish Liaison Officer (LNO) networks between the UN Mission, GSF, HNP, Vectus, and the Haitian Gov. Conduct pre-deployment training including HRDDP compliance, POC frameworks, rules of engagement, and Haiti-specific cultural/operational orientation. Establish logistics and supply chains, forward operating bases, and communications architecture.	Chief of Mission Support and Force Commander-designate	UN peacekeeping budget for mission support; contingent-owned equipment reimbursements; limited bilateral enablers
0.3	PREPARE	Capacity Building	Political Preparation	1	12	12	UNSC members signal willingness to consider Chapter VII authorization; Haitian gov agrees to engage; policy community analysis completed; transition logic from GSF/BINUH arrangements.	Negotiate the UNSC mandate text, including scope, benchmarks, and sunset provisions. Secure host-nation consent from the Haitian Gov. Define the Status of Forces Agreement (SofA). Coordinate with PS members and regional actors (CARICOM, OAS). Establish the political framework for the mission including the relationship between the SRSG, the Haitian Gov, and the GSF. Set conditions for eventual elections.	Security Council penholders with DPPA-DPO political leadership	Core UN regular-budget / special political mission resources, later supplemented by mission-planning funds
0.4	PREPARE	Security	GSF transitions to fall under MONUPEH FC for C2	7	12	6	MONUPEH must be able to effectively command and control all peacekeeping forces. Transfer of Authority can occur as soon as 6 months after MONUPEH approved, but should happen no later than 1 year after approval.	Transition the Gang Suppression Force to fall under MONUPEH FC. Evaluate GSF personnel for potential integration ("re-hatting") into UN force following rigorous HRDDP vetting. Address accountability for any GSF human rights violations during clearance phase. GSF should conduct operational pause to determine causes of failure and facilitate C2	SRSG with DPO transition planning cell; FC, HPC, and HNP Head.	UN assessed peacekeeping budget as roles shift from bridging force to standing mission structure
1	SECURE	Phase Summary	SECURE	13	24	12	Prepare phase outputs are sufficient to begin in-country operations.	Umbrella security phase focused on regaining control of strategic nodes, protecting civilians, degrading gang capability, and creating conditions for institutional stabilization.	SRSG and Integrated Mission Leadership Team (IMLT)	Primarily UN peacekeeping contributions, with residual voluntary support for partner capabilities
1.1	SECURE	Security	Protection of Civilians (POC) / HRDDP	13	72	60	Mission deployed (M13); HRDDP screening of all force components completed during 0.2; ROE established.	Implement the Protection of Civilians framework across all mission components. Operationalize the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) to ensure all UN-supported security operations comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. Establish early warning systems, community alert networks, and civilian reporting mechanisms. Monitor and report on human rights violations by all actors, including MONUPEH peacekeeping force, GSF, and HNP. Ensure gender-responsive protection measures including prevention of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).	SRSG-led Protection of Civilians architecture	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
1.2	SECURE	Security	Peacekeeping Force Bridging & Heavy Clearance	13	24	12	UN mission deployed (M13); Peacekeeping Force operational with UN oversight via LNOs (from 0.2); intelligence picture established; POC/HRDDP framework active (1.1).	Conduct major clearance operations to dislodge gang control from critical infrastructure (ports, fuel depots, national highways, airport). MONUPEH Force Commander leads kinetic operations (with former GSF elements re-hatted under MONUPEH per 0.4) under agreed UN-Haitian coordination arrangements with HRDDP compliance. UN peacekeepers provide cordon, logistics, and holding support. Apply the Clear-Hold-Build loop: MONUPEH clears nodes, HNP holds cleared areas, UN civilian components provide coordination/services. Prioritize nodes based on economic and strategic value.	MONUPEH Force Commander	Hybrid financing: UN support-office assessed costs plus voluntary contributions and troop-contributor national costs during bridging period
1.3	SECURE	Security	HNP Vetting & Anti-Gang Training (begin SSR)	13	54	42	Mission deployed (M13); HNP baseline assessment completed; vetting criteria established with Haitian authorities and UN Police component.	Conduct systematic vetting of all HNP personnel to identify and remove officers with gang affiliations, corruption records, or human rights violations. Deliver specialized anti-gang training including urban operations, community policing, intelligence-led policing, and human rights compliance. Rebuild HNP capacity toward the 2.2:1,000 police-to-population ratio benchmark. Establish internal affairs and accountability mechanisms within HNP.	Police Commissioner / MONUPEH Police Component	UN assessed police-component funding plus bilateral police-assistance packages
1.4	SECURE	Security	Intel Fusion	13	54	42	LNO network operational (from 0.2); mission deployed with intelligence component.	Establish a Joint Intelligence Fusion Cell integrating UN mission intelligence, HNP criminal intelligence, GSF/Peacekeeping Force operational intelligence, and international partner feeds. Map gang networks, patronage structures, revenue streams, and arms supply chains. Produce actionable targeting packages for gang suppression operations. Support DDR planning by identifying disengagement opportunities within gang hierarchies.	Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) / mission intelligence fusion leadership	UN assessed peacekeeping budget with possible donor-provided technical enablers
1.5	SECURE	Security	Securing Nodes (Ports & Airport)	13	54	42	Clearance operations underway (1.2); intelligence on gang presence at target nodes (1.4); HNP units available for holding (1.3).	Secure and hold critical economic infrastructure including Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Port-au-Prince seaport, fuel depots, and major highway corridors. Establish permanent security presence combining UN peacekeepers and vetted HNP.	Force Commander through Joint Operations Centre	UN assessed peacekeeping budget; host-state in-kind support for facilities where available
1.6	SECURE	Justice	DDR: Child Disengagement	13	72	60	Security conditions permit access to gang-affected communities (1.2, 1.5 progress); intel identifies children in gang structures (1.4)	Implement the PRE/EUNES child disengagement program targeting children and youth associated with armed gangs. Establish transit centers for immediate care, psychosocial support, and family tracing. Deliver education, vocational training, and reintegration support. Work with child protection actors (UNICEF, NGOs) on case management. Address recruitment prevention through community-based programs and livelihood alternatives for families.	UNICEF with mission DDR/Child Protection leadership	UNICEF and child-protection donor funding, peacekeeping program support, and bilateral grants
1.7	SECURE	Security	Targeted Gang Suppression	17	30	14	Initial clearance operations demonstrate capability (1.2 underway for ~4 months); intel fusion cell producing targeting packages (1.4); POC/HRDDP framework active (1.1).	Conduct precision operations against gang leadership, weapons caches, and revenue collection points based on intelligence-led targeting. Disrupt gang command-and-control, reduce territorial control in secondary areas beyond the priority nodes, and degrade capacity for reconstitution. Apply pressure to incentivize gang member defection and disengagement.	Force Commander and Police Commissioner	UN assessed peacekeeping budget, plus member-state support for specialized enablers and some national HNP operating costs
1.8	SECURE	Econ	Immediate CSO Relief Activation	18	30	13	Cleared areas available for humanitarian access (1.2 progress); CSO partnerships pre-established; donor funding released.	Activate civil society organizations (CSOs) to deliver immediate relief in cleared and stabilized areas. Deploy food distribution, emergency medical services, shelter support, and psychosocial services. Prioritize displaced populations and communities most affected by gang violence. Begin cash-for-work programs to provide immediate income alternatives. Coordinate with OCHA and humanitarian cluster system.	DSRSG / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator	Humanitarian pooled funds, agency program budgets, donor emergency grants, and limited mission quick-impact / enabling support

TASK REGISTER CONDITION B (PHASE 3 STABILIZE) FIGURE 11

2	STABILIZE	Phase Summary	STABILIZE	25	54	30	Security gains at key nodes are stable enough to move from break-in operations toward institutional consolidation.	Umbrella stabilization phase centered on political transition, justice and detention reform, DDR/CVR, economic corridor recovery, and controlled transfer of governance functions.	SRSRG and Haitian executive transition steering mechanism	Mixed financing: assessed peacekeeping resources, agency program budgets, Multi Domain Trust Funds, bilateral aid, and Int'l Financial Institution support
2.1	STABILIZE	Democracy	Benchmark-Based Electoral Preparation	25	30	6	Political framework established (0.3); security conditions permit political organizing in key areas; Haitian Gov engages on electoral timeline.	Develop benchmark-based conditions for credible elections. Establish or reconstitute an independent electoral commission. Draft or update electoral law and voter registration frameworks. Build electoral infrastructure including polling stations, voter rolls, and ballot security. Set objective benchmarks (security thresholds, voter registration rates, political party registration) that must be met before elections proceed.	DSRSG / Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance leadership	UNDP-managed electoral basket funds, bilateral election support, and assessed mission security / logistical backing
2.2	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	High-Risk Detention / Corrections Reform	25	54	30	Justice infrastructure build-out underway (0.1); gang suppression producing detainees (1.2, 1.7); detention facilities at critical overcrowding.	Reform the detention and corrections system to address severe overcrowding, prolonged pre-trial detention, and inhumane conditions. Establish classification and separation of high-risk gang detainees. Implement fast-track trial procedures for detained gang members. Build corrections officer capacity and establish oversight mechanisms. Address the enormous pre-trial detention backlog through case review and processing.	Justice and Corrections Section	Bilateral corrections assistance and infrastructure grants
2.3	STABILIZE	Security	UN Force Standing Surge Capacity	25	48	24	GSF transitioned under MONUPH FC (0.4); potential for gang reconstitution or spoiler violence; force generation process established (0.2).	Maintain a standing UN force surge capacity to respond to flare-ups, spoiler violence, or gang reconstitution attempts during the stabilization phase. Pre-position rapid reaction units and maintain reserve forces. Ensure the mission can reinforce any sector within defined response timelines. Coordinate with regional standby arrangements.	Force Commander	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
2.4	STABILIZE	Econ	Economic Corridor Pilots	27	72	46	Key infrastructure nodes secured (1.5); CSO relief providing baseline services (1.8); private sector engagement initiated.	Establish pilot economic corridors in secured areas connecting ports, markets, and production zones. Restore commercial activity along key transport routes. Support formal market reopening and small business revival. Introduce microfinance and credit access programs. Coordinate with international financial institutions on targeted economic recovery programming. Begin dismantling gang-controlled parallel economic systems.	DSRSG / RC-led stabilization and recovery	IFI loans / grants, donor stabilization funds.
2.5	STABILIZE	Justice	Community Violence Reduction (CVR) & Cash for Work	30	54	25	Cleared and held areas expanding (1.5); DDR child disengagement underway (1.6); community access established; CSOs operational (1.8).	Implement Community Violence Reduction programs in stabilized areas as a complement to DDR. Provide livelihoods, cash-for-work, skills training, and psychosocial support to at-risk populations including former gang associates, youth, and affected communities. Use CVR as an entry point for broader reintegration and peacebuilding. Establish community-based reconciliation mechanisms. Support women-led community security initiatives.	Mission DDR/CVR Section	Assessed mission program funds, peacebuilding / stabilization trust funds, and bilateral community-recovery grants
2.6	STABILIZE	Democracy	Electoral Process, Voting, and Certification	31	54	24	Electoral benchmarks met (2.1); security conditions permit nationwide polling (1.5, 2.3 progress); voter registration completed; political parties registered; international observers deployed.	Prepare, secure, conduct, monitor, certify, and politically defend elections as a core milestone in restoring legitimate authority. This includes voter registration, polling operations, counting, dispute resolution, results certification, and managed post-election transition support.	Provisional Electoral Council	Electoral basket fund / bilateral donor support, with assessed peacekeeping financing for security and logistics
2.7	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Integrated Transitional Governance Support	31	64	34	Haitian Gov functioning (0.3); cleared areas require governance (1.2, 1.5).	Establish integrated transitional governance support structures in which UN civilian officials co-locate with Haitian national and municipal counterparts to deliver essential government services. Focus on revenue collection, basic public administration, service delivery (health, education, water/sanitation), and local governance. Gradually transfer capacity and decision-making authority to Haitian officials as capacity develops. Build municipal governance capacity outside Port-au-Prince.	SRSRG and Haitian transitional executive (joint steering)	Predominantly assessed mission funding with tightly conditioned donor technical-assistance packages
2.8	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Anti-Corruption Tracking	31	64	34	Intel fusion producing financial intelligence (1.4); economic corridors requiring revenue regulation (2.5).	Encourage US-led (with international partners) anti-corruption monitoring and tracking mechanism operating parallel to UN structures. Track diversion of aid, reconstruction funds, and government revenues. Investigate corruption within Haitian state institutions and security forces. Provide independent oversight that reinforces but does not duplicate UN internal mechanisms. Produce regular public reporting.	If possible, U.S.-led anti-corruption and illicit-finance task force	Primarily bilateral U.S. assistance and national law-enforcement budgets; complementary donor governance funds
2.9	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Judicial Recovery & Case Management	33	49	17	Justice infrastructure built out (0.1); detention reform underway (2.2); hybrid administration supporting governance (2.7).	Rebuild the judicial system including courts, prosecution services, and legal aid. Establish modern case management systems to address the massive case backlog. Train and deploy judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. Establish judicial independence safeguards. Prioritize cases related to gang violence, human rights violations, and corruption. Support transitional justice mechanisms.	Justice and Corrections Section with Haitian Ministry of Justice	Assessed rule-of-law resources plus bilateral justice-sector and digital-governance support
2.10	STABILIZE	Econ	Formal Economy Incentive Structuring	33	54	22	Economic corridors demonstrating viability (2.4); anti-corruption tracking providing transparency (2.8); government revenue collection resuming (2.7).	Design and implement incentive structures to shift economic activity from informal/gang-controlled systems to formal economy. Establish tax incentives, business registration simplification, and regulatory frameworks that reduce barriers to formal economic participation. Support import/export normalization through secured ports. Coordinate with IFIs on structural reform programming. Address elite economic capture through competition and transparency measures.	DSRSG / RC economic recovery cell	IFI policy-based support, donor economic-governance grants, and host-state revenue measures
2.11	STABILIZE	Capacity Building	Transfer Admin to National Bodies	42	64	23	Hybrid administration has built sufficient Haitian capacity (2.7 mature); elections conducted or imminent (2.6); judicial system functioning (2.9).	Systematically transfer administrative authority from hybrid UN-Haitian structures to fully national bodies. Develop transition plans for each government function. Conduct capacity assessments and address remaining gaps before handover. Ensure institutional memory transfer through documentation and mentoring. Maintain advisory presence during transition period. Transfer routine administrative control from international or hybrid mechanisms to Haitian national bodies in sequenced priority sectors. Complete transfer of primary security responsibilities to MONUPH HPC and HNP as conditions allow, but before initiating Task 3.1.	SRSRG / DSRSG governance transition cell	Assessed mission transition funding tapering into donor budget-support / technical-assistance streams
2.12	STABILIZE	Justice	Transitional Justice	48	72	25	CVR and disengagement programming active (2.5); judicial recovery underway (2.9); communities in recovered areas require structured accountability, dialogue, and reintegration pathways.	Launch an explicit transitional-justice line of effort tied to DDR/CVR in order to reduce revenge dynamics, support reintegration, and build legitimacy for the wider stabilization process. Establish nationally anchored but internationally supported mechanisms for victim acknowledgment, community dialogue, truth-telling, selective accountability, sentence mitigation or alternative dispositions where appropriate, and reconciliation processes linked to demobilization and community violence reduction. Integrate victim support, local mediation, reparative measures, and referral pathways so that DDR/CVR programs are connected to justice rather than perceived impunity.	Haitian Ministry of Justice; Justice and Corrections Section; Civil Affairs; OHCHR/UN human-rights advisers; victims' groups; faith leaders; women and youth organizations; UNDP and peacebuilding partners	Assessed mission program funds, Peacebuilding Fund / stabilization trust funds, and bilateral justice-and-reconciliation grants

TASK REGISTER CONDITION B (PHASE 4 DEVELOP) FIGURE 12

3	DEVELOP	Phase Summary	DEVELOP	55	72	18	Stabilization benchmarks show that Haitian institutions can absorb primary authority with a reduced external role.	Umbrella development phase focused on durable Haitian control, reserve deterrence, economic scale-up, elected governance, and mission exit.	Haitian elected government with SRSG-led transition oversight	Declining assessed peacekeeping funding, increasing national budget responsibility, and longer-term development finance
3.1	DEVELOP	Security	HNP Assumes Primary Security Control (cont'd SSR)	55	72	18	HNP vetting and training substantially complete (1.3); HNP capacity approaching benchmarks; GSF transitioned under MONUPFH (0.4); UN surge capacity provides backstop (2.3).	HNP, supported by MONUPFH HPC, assumes primary responsibility for internal security across Haiti. UN peacekeepers shift to support, mentoring, and reserve roles. HNP leads all routine policing, community security, and anti-gang operations. UN provides technical advisory support, logistics backstop, and rapid reaction reserve. Establish HNP-led security coordination mechanisms replacing UN-led structures.	HNP Director General	Primarily Haitian state budget with bilateral police assistance and limited assessed advisory support
3.2	DEVELOP	Security	Enduring Joint Peripheral Security	55	72	18	HNP increasingly controls routine internal security (3.1); transition planning shifts toward border and coastal resilience; trafficking routes and peripheral corridors remain vulnerable to criminal exploitation.	Establish an enduring joint UN-HNP peripheral security architecture focused on border management, customs enforcement, coast guard support, maritime interdiction, and disruption of transnational criminal networks. Maintain joint mentoring, intelligence fusion, and operational accompaniment for Polifront, customs, coast guard, port security, and other specialized units in order to reduce illicit arms flows, narcotics trafficking, revenue leakage, and cross-border support to gangs.	Police Commissioner and HNP Director General (joint lead)	Assessed peacekeeping police and mission-support resources, supplemented by bilateral border security, customs-modernization, and maritime security assistance
3.3	DEVELOP	Security	UN Shifts to Deterrent Reserve	55	72	18	HNP assuming primary control (3.1 initiated); security conditions stable; force drawdown planning initiated.	Transition UN peacekeeping force from active security operations to a deterrent reserve posture. Maintain sufficient force presence to deter spoiler violence, protect key infrastructure, and support HNP in extremis. Begin force drawdown by repatriating contingents no longer required for active operations. Maintain rapid reaction capability until security conditions confirm irreversibility.	Force Commander	UN assessed peacekeeping budget
3.4	DEVELOP	Capacity Building	Phasing out NGO Substitutes	55	66	12	Government services operational through hybrid/national administration (2.7, 2.11); service delivery capacity demonstrated; budget allocations in place.	Systematically transition service delivery from international NGOs and CSOs to Haitian government institutions. Develop transition timelines for each sector (health, education, water/sanitation, shelter). Ensure government budget allocations and staffing before NGO withdrawal. Maintain residual international support for capacity gaps. Prevent service delivery disruptions during transition.	Haitian line ministries with DSRS / RC transition support	Agency development budgets, donor grants, host-state budget absorption, and IFI service-sector financing
3.5	DEVELOP	Econ	Economic Scale-up & State Transition	55	72	18	Economic corridors successful (2.4); formal economy incentives enacted (2.10); anti-corruption mechanisms providing confidence (2.8); government revenue growing (2.7, 2.11).	Scale up economic recovery from pilot corridors to national economic policy. Transition from emergency/stabilization economic programming to long term development. Support government capacity to manage economic policy, trade, and revenue independently. Coordinate with IFIs on longer term development programming. Promote private sector investment and job creation. Address structural economic challenges including elite capture, import dependence, and rural underdevelopment.	Haitian Ministry of Finance and Planning with UN country team / IFI support	Haitian state revenue, IFI finance, bilateral development assistance, and private investment mobilization
3.6	DEVELOP	Democracy	Transition to Elected Government / Assumption of Power	61	72	12	Elections held and certified (2.6); elected officials prepared through transition support; administrative transfer substantially complete (2.11).	Support the full transition to elected government and the formal assumption of power by democratically elected officials. Manage the political transfer from the Prime Minister to the elected government, ensure continuity of government functions, provide advisory support to incoming officials on governance, security, and economic management, and establish the political framework for post-mission governance.	Constitutional Haitian executive and electoral authorities	Host-state electoral / transition budget plus donor backstopping and residual mission support
3.7	DEVELOP	Capacity Building	UN Mission Drawdown & Exit	61	72	12	HNP in primary security control (3.1); elected government in power (3.6); administrative transfer complete (2.11); security conditions permit drawdown (3.3 validated).	Execute the planned drawdown and exit of the UN peacekeeping mission. Repatriate military and police contingents. Close forward operating bases and transfer or dispose of mission assets. Transition remaining advisory and capacity-building functions to a successor UN political presence (e.g., BINUH-type office) or bilateral arrangements. Conduct lessons learned review. Ensure no security vacuum during drawdown.	SRSG with DPO-led transition and drawdown cell	Final-year UN assessed peacekeeping drawdown funding plus follow-on UNCT / donor program resources

SECTION 4: MISSION GOVERNANCE

BUDGETING & POTENTIAL FUNDING SOURCES

This section estimates the total cost of the MONUPEH under two scenarios: Condition A is a 5-year plan that assumes the GSF successfully clears strategic nodes before MONUPEH deploys; MONUPEH then maintains only a minimum military presence and focuses on stabilization and development. Condition B is a 6-year plan that assumes GSF failure; MONUPEH must provide its own full military capacity for 12 months (heavy clearance, node securing) plus major military capacity for another 6 months, followed by a longer stabilization phase. Estimating the financial requirements for MONUPEH requires grounding the analysis in two complementary reference frameworks: the historical budgets of UN missions in Haiti and the 2025 OAS roadmap for the country's stabilization cost estimates. MINUSTAH had an annual budget of approximately \$346 million in its later years and cost \$7.5 billion over its 13-year lifespan. The OAS roadmap, presented by Secretary-General Albert Ramdin in October 2025, covers the 2025-2028 period with a total estimated cost of \$2.6 billion. Using evidence-based unit costs, we estimate:

Condition A: \$4.8 - 5.3 billion (mid-point \$5.05 billion)

Condition B: \$8.5 - 10.2 billion (mid-point \$9.35 billion)

Condition B is more expensive because it requires a large independent UN military force for 18 months and a longer, more intense humanitarian response. Condition A faces a funding gap of \$1-3 billion, and Condition B's gap is \$4-6 billion.

Under Condition A (GSF successful), the total cost estimate is derived from MONUPEH's three-phase structure (PREPARE+SECURE, STABILIZE, DEVELOP) as follows:

PREPARE + GSF SECURES (Months 1-18): approximately \$2.41-2.66 billion. This phase covers justice infrastructure build-out, force generation, political preparation, immediate CSO relief, POC/HRDDP, heavy clearance, HNP vetting/training, intel fusion, node securing, DDR child disengagement, targeted gang suppression, and GSF phase-out/re-hatting.

STABILIZE (Months 13-42): approximately \$2.05-2.20 billion. Key activities include electoral preparation, high-risk detention/corrections reform, UN standing surge capacity, economic corridor pilots, CVR and cash-for-work, electoral voting/certification, integrated transitional governance, anti-corruption tracking, judicial recovery and case management, formal economy incentives, transfer of administration to national bodies, and transitional justice.

DEVELOP (Months 43-60): approximately \$0.60-0.75 billion (not itemised in Table 2 but derived from previous annual breakdowns). This phase includes HNP primary security control, enduring joint peripheral security, UN deterrent reserve, phasing out NGO substitutes, economic scale-up and state transition, transition to elected government, and mission drawdown.

The total for Condition A is approximately \$4.80-5.30 billion (mid-point \$5.05 billion). This amount is a mix of UN-assessed contributions (covering UNSOH and core military/police functions) and voluntary contributions (for humanitarian response, part of DDR/CVR, electoral support, economic corridors, and some governance activities).

If the mission were to shift to Condition B (GSF failure), MONUPEH would need to conduct all clearance operations independently, with a larger UN military force (9,000 troops for 12 months, plus 5,500 troops for another 6 months) and an extended timeline of 72 months (six years). Humanitarian access would be delayed until Month 13 and continue longer, with an extended declining profile. Total cost would rise to \$8.0-9.7 billion (mid-point \$8.85 billion), higher than Condition A. Core assessed peacekeeping costs would amount to \$4.0-4.8 billion, leaving a significantly larger voluntary funding gap, particularly for humanitarian response and reconstruction.

Voluntary contributions are required for humanitarian response, anti-corruption tracking, electoral support, transitional justice, economic corridor pilots, and urban reconstruction. Under Condition A (60 months), total voluntary needs are approximately \$2.0-2.5 billion, while Condition B (72 months) raises them to \$4.0-4.7 billion due to a longer, delayed humanitarian response and larger reconstruction burden. Existing pledges remain limited: the United States has partially disbursed roughly \$380 million to the predecessor MSS mission, Canada has offered \$43 million conditionally, the EU has provided \$21 million in budget support, and the World Bank's \$320 million and IDB's \$283 million grants are spread over several years. In Condition A, the annual voluntary funding gap reaches \$0.5-0.8 billion in Year 1 and \$0.8-1.0 billion in Year 2; in Condition B, the gap peaks at \$0.9-1.1 billion in Year 2 alone, with a cumulative six-year voluntary shortfall of \$3.0-4.0 billion. Humanitarian funding is especially precarious, with only 18.5% of the \$880 million 2026 appeal covered. Closing these gaps will require new contributions—such as €150-200 million from France and Spain, \$50-80 million from the UN Peacebuilding Fund, \$100-150 million annually from diaspora reconstruction bonds, and a \$300-400 million emergency stabilization window from the World Bank and IDB. Without a concerted effort to secure these voluntary funds, MONUPEH risks the same donor fatigue that crippled previous voluntary-only missions.

SECURITY COUNCIL DYNAMICS: RELUCTANCE, DONOR FATIGUE, AND THE LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY FINANCING

The Security Council has consistently resisted authorizing a traditional PKO for Haiti, relying instead on two voluntary security missions (MSS and GSF) that suffered from chronic underfunding. China and Russia have opposed previous U.S. attempts to establish a UN PKO, insisting on Haitian-led solutions, though they moved from veto to abstention in the September 2025 vote on the GSF. The central question is whether they can be brought to vote in favor of MONUPEH, and on what terms. Based on our research, for a positive vote, three conditions are necessary: a narrowly framed mandate focused on gang suppression and stabilization (avoiding “nation building” language), a budget at the lower end of the estimate (\$2.6-2.9 billion over five years) with explicit cost-control and drawdown triggers, and intensive diplomatic engagement offering China and Russia visible oversight roles during the operation, recognizing that the UNSC would in any case retain oversight through the mission’s annual renewal process.. Russia’s reported blocking of Haitian politicians from the sanctions list indicates it will resist any mandate that directly targets political elites.

A five-year mission with peak personnel comparable to MINUSTAH is within historical precedent, but China and Russia are skeptical of long PKOs. The Council typically authorizes an initial 12-month mandate with annual renewals, likely conditioned on progress in HNP security handover within 18-24 months, successful elections and government transition by the end of *Phase 2: Stabilize*, and a clear drawdown plan with 12-month benchmarks. Renewals beyond Year 2 would depend on demonstrable progress; failure could trigger opposition. To secure authorization, UN Headquarters and Council members should frame the mandate narrowly around stabilization, rely on standard UNSC oversight mechanisms including regular SRSG briefings and annual mandate renewal, and pair that mandate with a lean budget, transparent annual costings and an aim to reduce costs by 15-20 percent after the first 24 months, and engage diplomatically early, with the U.S. as penholder coordinating during informal consultations.

Even with assessed PKO funding, several critical activities (anti-corruption tracking, electoral support, transitional justice, economic corridors) depend on voluntary contributions. Donor fatigue is already evident: the 2025 humanitarian appeal received only 24 percent funding¹⁷⁶, and the 2026 appeal less than 4 percent as of early February 2026. The Secretariat should therefore secure multi-year pledges before mandating adoption and designing these components to be scalable without undermining core security operations. Most likely, the Council would tolerate annual renewals for up to five years, but with increasingly rigorous review. If security benchmarks are not met by the end of Year 2, China and Russia would probably threaten to block further renewals; if elections are held and HNP assumes primary control, the Council could be persuaded to extend into Years 4-5 with reduced force levels.

SUCCESS CRITERIA

The purpose of MONUPEH is to shift Haiti from a cycle of coercion and institutional collapse toward a more durable equilibrium in which the Haitian state can provide security, exercise authority, and manage political transition with decreasing external support.

Therefore, success for MONUPEH will be assessed continually throughout its deployment.

Prepare/Secure Phase:

MONUPEH deploys on sound political and operational footing. It enters Haiti with a clear mandate, functioning command structure, force-generation and logistics in place, agreed liaison arrangements with the HNP and Haitian authorities, and the legal and administrative groundwork necessary to operate effectively.

The mission secures and holds key terrain. This phase succeeds only if major infrastructure nodes and corridors are securitized and then kept open, including airport access, port facilities, fuel routes, and other strategic arteries. This also requires that gangs lose the ability to dominate targeted zones through checkpoints, extortion, and coercive control, while the mission and Haitian counterparts retain freedom of movement and humanitarian access.

Security gains transfer into Haitian holding capacity. MONUPEH should not remain the permanent provider of day-to-day security. A central measure of success is whether the HNP becomes capable of holding areas with better vetting, training, internal accountability, logistics, and command-and-control.

Stabilize Phase:

The justice chain begins functioning. Arrests and security operations must feed into functioning courts, detention, corrections, and case processing. Success therefore requires functioning justice infrastructure, reduced case bottlenecks, credible detention capacity, and visible movement away from impunity and procedural paralysis.

The GSF transition does not create a vacuum. Whether the GSF is rehatted, phased out, or replaced by a UN-led armed component, the transition between clearance and stabilization must be orderly. A critical indicator of success is that the mission can absorb or replace bridging-force functions without losing control of ground already secured.

Develop Phase:

Political transition occurs organically as Haitian institutions carry more burden. MONUPEH has created enough order for transitional administration, electoral preparation, and basic state functions to proceed under more normal conditions. Elections need to be credible enough to mark institutional legitimization.

The state becomes more visible and more legitimate over time. If the UN or parallel external actors are primary empirical governing authorities in lieu of the Haitian state, the mission is not yet complete. Success means Haitian institutions, however imperfect, are more present, more functional, and more accepted than they were at the outset.

Peripheral and transnational security pressures are contained. To secure Port-au-Prince but leave open the wider channels for arms, drugs, and criminal reconstitution will invite regression and backsliding – MONUPEH must ensure the Haitian security apparatus has developed enduring joint peripheral security, including border, customs, coast guard, and maritime functions.

Drawdown. Haitian authorities should be carrying the majority of the routine governance burden while UN forces shift to residual deterrence, advisory, and backstopping roles. MONUPEH will conclude with the transition to a UN support mission.

WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY

The MONUPEH withdrawal strategy is built around three specific tasks in the Task Register, focused on gradually reducing responsibility from MONUPEH to Haitian government bodies and eventual termination of the mission. Conditions on the ground will determine the feasibility and suitability of follow-on UN presence.

(Stabilize) Task 2.11 Transfer Admin to National Bodies

This task, led by the SRSG/DSRSG governance transition cell and funded through assessed mission transition funding, transfers remaining administrative responsibilities from hybrid UN-Haitian structures to fully national bodies. It completes transition plans for remaining hybrid government functions, conducts capacity assessments to address remaining gaps before handover, and ensures institutional memory transfer through documentation and mentoring. An advisory presence is maintained during the transition period to prevent disruptions as routine administrative control passes to Haitian institutions in sequenced priority sectors.

(Develop) Task 3.4 Phasing out NGO Substitutes

This task, led by Haitian line ministries with DSRSG/Resident Coordinator transition support and funded through agency development budgets, donor grants, host-state budget absorption, and IFI service-sector financing, transitions service delivery from

international NGOs and CSOs to Haitian government institutions across health, education, water/sanitation, and shelter. It develops sector-by-sector transition timelines, verifies that government budget allocations and staffing are in place before any NGO withdrawal, and maintains residual international support for remaining capacity gaps.

(Develop) Task 3.7 UN Mission Drawdown & Exit

This task, led by the SRSG with a DPO-led transition, is funded through final-year UN assessed peacekeeping drawdown budgets, plus follow-on UNCT and donor program resources. This task executes the planned drawdown and exit of the UN peacekeeping mission. It repatriates military and police contingents, closes forward operating bases, and transfers or disposes of mission assets. Remaining advisory and capacity-building functions transition to a successor UN political presence (e.g., a BINUH-type office) or bilateral arrangements.

CONCLUSION

MONUPEH is designed as a bounded, conditions-based mission: an estimated five-year, \$2.6 billion commitment underwritten by 12,000 authorized personnel across five mutually reinforcing lines of effort. It accepts the lesson that preceding UN missions in Haiti, from MINUSTAH through BINUH, generated short-term stabilization without leaving behind durable state institutions. The framework proposed here prioritizes Haitian primacy at every phase, sequencing security recovery, rule-of-law restoration, governance and civic reform, economic opportunity, and human security so that no line of effort outruns the domestic capacity that must sustain it.

The plan is deliberately modest in its end state. Success is a Haitian National Police that can maintain day-to-day security without foreign military backstop, an elected government seated through credible elections, and a functioning judicial backbone in the three pilot jurisdictions. Those are the preconditions for the deeper reforms Haiti's own political class must own. Anything more ambitious, on a five-year horizon, is a forecast the mission cannot responsibly make.

Three risks dominate. First, the Security Council consensus that authorizes MONUPEH is fragile and will be tested by the first casualty event or corruption scandal. Second, Viv Ansanm retains the adaptive capacity to shift from territorial control to dispersed insurgency, which would stretch the security capacity of MONUPEH and the HNP. Third, the Haitian political transition and whatever government emerges may refuse or slow-walk the reforms on which drawdown is conditioned. The phased drawdown logic in Section 3.7 is the mission's principal hedge against all three: benchmarks, not timelines, govern force reduction, and a residual UN political presence remains to accompany Haitian institutions after the uniformed footprint departs.

The broader claim of this paper is that peacekeeping in Haiti has failed not for want of resources but for want of a theory of handover. MONUPEH offers one: a mission that enters with clear authorities and leaves when Haitian institutions can hold the line. Whether that theory survives contact with reality depends on choices that lie outside any mission design. What this plan commits to is a mission that will not, on its own terms, extend the pattern of arrival without departure.

ANNEX A: MONUPEH ORGANIGRAM




Figure 9 Mission Structure (Color coded to Match the LOEs of the Mission)

ANNEX B: BUDGET

Table 1: MONUPEH Evidence-based Cost Breakdown – Condition A

Cost Component	Gantt-derived duration	Calculation	Estimate (USD billion)
UNSOH	60 months	Initial 24mo covered; 36 mo @ 25% (\$89M×3)	0.27
GSF military	Months 1-12: 5,500 troops	Already covered	-
UN Standing Surge Capacity	Months 13-36: ~1,500 troops	\$150M/year × 2 years	0.30
Deterrent reserve	Months 37-60: ~500 troops	\$50M/year × 2 years	0.10
Subtotal military cost			0.67
Humanitarian response	4-year declining curve	Year1 \$1.2B + Y2 \$0.8B + Y3 \$0.4B + Y4 \$0.2B	2.60
DDR/CVR	60 mo child + 25 mo CVR	Mid-range	0.25
Judicial & corrections	30 months	Mid-range	0.125
Electoral process	30 months (prep + voting)	OAS benchmark	0.11
Economic corridors	46 months	IDB / OAS scaled	0.325
Urban reconstruction	18 months (Develop phase)	5,000-10,000 units @ \$41-83k	0.40
Governance & transition	34 months (hybrid admin + transfer)	Civilian personnel, anti-corruption	0.175
Mission drawdown	12 months	Standard transition	0.09

Other (anti-corruption, formal economy incentives)	22-34 months	Miscellaneous	0.075
TOTAL Condition A	60 months		4.8 - 5.3 (mid-point 5.05)

Notes: Annual cost breakdown available upon request; Humanitarian response follows 4-year declining curve: Y1 \$1.2B, Y2 \$0.8B, Y3 \$0.4B, Y4 \$0.2B, allocated across phases; UNSOH phased: 100% Months 1-12, 50% Months 13-24, 25% Months 25-60; Military strength: GSF 5,500 (month 1 - 12), UN surge 1,500 (month 13 - 36), deterrent reserve 500 (month 37 - 60).

Table 2: MONUPEH Evidence-based Cost Breakdown – Condition A

Phase	Duration (months)	Key Activities (by Task ID)	Estimate (USD)	Primary Funding Sources
PREPARE + GSF SECURES	1-18	0.1 Justice infrastructure build-out; 0.2 Force generation; 0.3 Political preparation; 0.4 Immediate CSO relief; 1.1 POC/HRDDP; 1.2 Heavy clearance; 1.3 HNP vetting/training; 1.4 Intel fusion; 1.5 Securing nodes; 1.6 DDR child disengagement; 1.7 Targeted gang suppression; 1.8 GSF phase-out/re-hatting	\$2.41 - 2.66B	UN assessed (UNSOH), voluntary contributions (GSF trust fund), UN OCHA humanitarian appeal, bilateral donors (US, Canada, EU), UNDP, World Bank
STABILIZE	13- 42	2.1 Electoral preparation; 2.2 High-risk detention/corrections reform; 2.3 UN standing surge capacity; 2.4 Economic corridor pilots; 2.5 CVR & cash for work; 2.6 Electoral voting/certification; 2.7 Integrated transitional governance; 2.8 Anti-corruption tracking; 2.9 Judicial recovery & case	\$2.05 - 2.20B	UN assessed (peacekeeping, UNSOH), IDB, World Bank, EU bilateral, OCHA humanitarian, peacebuilding fund, US bilateral

		management; 2.10 Formal economy incentives; 2.11 Transfer admin to national bodies; 2.12 Transitional justice		
DEVELOP	43 - 60	3.1 HNP primary security control; 3.2 Enduring joint peripheral security; 3.3 UN deterrent reserve; 3.4 Phasing out NGO substitutes; 3.5 Economic scale-up & state transition; 3.6 Transition to elected government; 3.7 Mission drawdown & exit	\$0.60 - 0.75B	UN assessed (final year drawdown), IDB Recovery Plan (\$283M), World Bank, EIB (\$62M), Haitian state revenue, bilateral development assistance
TOTAL	1 - 60		\$4.8 - 5.3B	

Table 3: Estimated Budget by Line of Effort

Line of Effort	Estimated Budget (USD)	Key Gantt Activities (by ID)
Security	\$0.85 - 1.15B	0.2 Force generation; 1.1 POC/HRDDP; 1.2 Heavy clearance; 1.3 HNP vetting/training; 1.4 Intel fusion; 1.5 Securing nodes; 1.7 Targeted gang suppression; 1.8 GSF phase-out/re-hatting; 2.3 UN standing surge capacity; 3.1 HNP primary security control; 3.2 Enduring joint peripheral security; 3.3 UN deterrent reserve; 3.7 Mission drawdown; UNSOH logistics (all phases)
Econ	\$3.00 - 3.25B	0.4 Immediate CSO relief activation; 2.4 Economic corridor pilots; 2.10 Formal economy incentive structuring; 3.5 Economic scale-up & state transition; 3.5 Urban reconstruction; Humanitarian response (4-year declining curve: \$1.2B + \$0.8B + \$0.4B + \$0.2B)
Capacity Building	\$0.45 - 0.55B	0.1 Justice infrastructure build-out; 0.3 Political preparation; 2.2 High-risk detention/corrections reform (capacity component); 2.7 Integrated transitional governance support; 2.9 Judicial recovery & case management (capacity component); 2.11 Transfer admin to national bodies; 3.4 Phasing out NGO substitutes; 2.8 Anti-corruption tracking

Democracy	\$0.22 - 0.27B	2.1 Benchmark-based electoral preparation; 2.6 Electoral process, voting & certification; 3.6 Transition to elected government
Justice	\$0.33 - 0.48B	1.6 DDR: child disengagement; 2.2 High-risk detention/corrections reform (justice component); 2.5 Community violence reduction (CVR) & cash for work; 2.9 Judicial recovery & case management; 2.12 Transitional justice; 1.1 Protection of Civilians (as defined)
TOTAL (Condition A)	\$4.8 - 5.3B	<i>All activities across 60 months</i>

Table 4: MONUPEH Estimated Annual Budget by Year (USD millions)

Cost Component	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Total (mid-point)
UNSOH	-	-	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.267
GSF military	-	-	-	-	-	-
UN Standing Surge	-	0.150	0.150	-	-	0.300

UN deterrent reserve	-	-	-	0.050	0.050	0.100
Humanitarian response	1.200	0.900	0.400	0.150	-	2.650
DDR/CVR	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.040	0.030	0.250
Judicial & corrections	-	0.050	0.050	0.025	-	0.125
Electoral process	-	0.040	0.040	0.030	-	0.110
Economic corridors	-	0.070	0.085	0.085	0.085	0.325
Urban reconstruction	-	-	-	0.200	0.200	0.400
Governance & transition	0.020	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.035	0.175
Mission drawdown	-	-	-	-	0.090	0.090
Other	0.015	0.020	0.020	0.010	0.010	0.075
Total per Year	1.295	1.308	0.934	0.719	0.589	5.05

Table 5: Identified Donor Commitments and Funding Gaps (USD)

Donor/ Source	Commitment/ Pledge	Timeframe (Period Covered)	Annualized Amount (USD)	Applicable Activities	Funding Gap Exposure
United States (bilateral)	\$356.7M requested (FY2025)	12 months (Oct 2024–Sep 2025)	\$356.7M	Democratic institutions, security, basic needs	Covers part of Year 1; Year 2+ unfunded
United States (MSS)	\$380M pledged	Multi-year, partial disbursement	~\$190M/year (if spread over 2 years)	Phase 1 security operations	\$600M annual MSS requirement vs. ~\$190M annual pledge → ~\$410M annual gap
Canada	CAD 60M (~\$43M)	Announced Sep 2025; conditional	\$43M (one-time)	MSS bridging, maritime security	One-time; does not recur annually
European Union	€19.5M (~\$21M) budget support	Feb 2025 (one-time)	\$21M (one-time)	Macroeconomic stability, governance	One-time; no recurring commitment
World Bank	~\$320M grant financing	5 years (2025–2029)	~\$64M/year	Governance, economic resilience	Spread thin; covers ~\$64M of annual economic pillar needs
IDB	\$243M non-reimbursable financing	2 years (2025–2026)	~\$121.5M/year	Sustainable development	Covers ~\$121.5M/year of OAS economic pillar (\$256.1M over 2 years ≈ \$128M/year)
UN Trust Fund (MSS)	\$85M received of \$600M annual requirement ¹⁷⁷	Ongoing	\$85M (actual received)	Phase 1 security operations	\$515M annual gap (600-85)
UN Humanitarian Pooled Funds	\$908M requested; 19.5% funded	2025 appeal (12 months)	\$177M funded (\$908M 19.5%) ×	POC, CSO relief, transitional justice	\$731M gap for 2025 alone

TOTAL IDENTIFIED (annualized)	-	-	~\$580-600M (one-year equivalent)	All pillars	-
REQUIREMENT Year 1	-	12 months	\$750-800M	-	Year 1 gap: \$150-220M
REQUIREMENT Year 2	-	12 months	\$550-650M	-	Year 2 gap: ~\$500-600M (minimal committed funding)
REQUIREMENT Years 3-5	-	36 months	\$1.2-1.55B total	-	Virtually no committed funding

Table 6: MONUPEH Evidence-based Cost Breakdown – Condition B

Cost Component	Gantt-based duration / intensity	Estimate (USD billion)
UNSOH (larger force, longer peak)	12 mo @ 100% + 12 mo @ 50% + 48 mo @ 25%	1.05 - 1.35
MONUPEH military	12 mo full (12,000 @ \$1.2B) + 6 mo major (6,000 @ \$600M) + residual (500 @ \$40M/year for 4.5 yrs)	2.00 - 2.50
Humanitarian response (delayed, extended)	Y1 (pre-clearance) \$0.2B; Y2 \$1.2B; Y3 \$0.8B; Y4 \$0.4B; Y5 \$0.2B; Y6 \$0.1B	2.90
DDR/CVR (larger caseload)	+30% from Condition A (\$0.25B → \$0.33B)	0.33
Judicial & corrections (more detainees)	+50% from Condition A (\$0.125B → \$0.19B)	0.19
Electoral & governance (delayed)	Same total budget as Condition A (\$0.11B)	0.11
Economic corridors & urban reconstruction	Same total budget as Condition A (\$0.73B) – but later start, similar total	0.73

Mission drawdown	Same total budget as Condition A (\$0.09B)	0.09
Other	Same total budget as Condition A (\$0.10B)	0.10
TOTAL Condition B	72 months	8.5 - 10.2 (mid-point 9.35B)

Table 7: Condition A vs. Condition B

Metric	Condition A	Condition B
Total mission duration	60 months	72 months
Total cost (mid-point)	\$5.05B	\$9.35B
Total cost range	\$4.8-5.3B	\$8.5-10.2B
Humanitarian start	Month 1	Month 13
Humanitarian total	\$2.6B	\$2.9B
Military peak	GSF 5,500 (inherited)	MONUPEH 12,000 (self-generated)

**ANNEX C: RECOMMENDED TEXT FOR A DRAFT RESOLUTION****Resolution #### (YYYY)**

Adopted by the Security Council at its #th meeting, on DD Month YYYY

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions concerning Haiti, particularly resolutions 1542 (2004), 2653 (2022), 2699 (2023), 2751 (2024), 2752 (2024), 2785 (2025), 2793 (2025), and 2814 (2026),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Recognizing that the deterioration of security conditions, driven by armed gang violence and the erosion of State authority, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for addressing these challenges rests with the Government of Haiti, and *emphasizing* that international support should be provided at the request of, and in close cooperation with, the Haitian authorities,

Commending the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) on 1 April 2026 as requested by its resolution 2793 (2025), and *urging* all parties to support the implementation of the GSF's mandate,

Recognizing that, in support of stabilization efforts, targeted and time-bound assistance, drawing on existing capacities of United Nations agencies, funds and programs, may contribute to the restoration of basic economic activity and the functioning of essential State institutions, at the request of and in close coordination with the Government of Haiti,

Welcoming the continued engagement of the Security Council in providing strategic guidance and oversight of United Nations activities in Haiti, including through regular briefings by the Secretary-General,

Determined to support the restoration of a secure and stable environment in Haiti in a manner that is targeted, time-bound, and supportive of Haitian ownership,

Recognizing the importance of predictable, sustainable and adequate financing for the effective implementation of mandated activities, and *reaffirming* the obligation of all Member States to fulfil their financial commitments to the Organization in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Determining that the continuation of disorder in Haiti constitutes a threat to international peace and security,



1. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Mission for Peace in Haiti (MONUPEH) for an initial period of 12 months covering its Securing Phase, with the intention to renew, subject to progress on the ground;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who shall have overall authority for the coordination of United Nations activities in Haiti;

3. *Decides* that MONUPEH shall consist of a military, police and civilian component, configured in a lean and cost-effective manner, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that resource requirements remain within prudent limits and are subject to regular review;

4. *Acting under* Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to paragraphs (a) through (e) below, *decides* that MONUPEH shall, in support of the Government of Haiti:

(a) support efforts to restore a secure and stable environment conducive to the establishment of community-based no-violence zones and a nationally owned economic pilot zone in Saint-Marc, including by assisting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in countering armed gang violence and securing key population centres and critical infrastructure;

(b) provide operational and logistical support to the HNP, including through mentoring, training and joint planning, with a view to enabling the progressive transfer of security responsibilities to Haitian authorities;

(c) use all necessary means within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians, while upholding the highest humanitarian standards;

(d) contribute to the restoration of public order and the functioning of basic security institutions, including through support to policing and corrections systems;

(e) facilitate safe and unimpeded humanitarian access;

(f) maintain appropriate monitoring and assessment capacities to inform the timely adjustment of the Mission's security posture, including, as appropriate, the activation, deployment, and drawdown of surge capacities provided by Member States, in coordination with the Government of Haiti;

5. *Decides* that MONUPEH shall assume, as appropriate and in coordination with the Government of Haiti, responsibilities currently undertaken by the GSF;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure a phased, orderly and conditions-based transition, taking into account security conditions on the ground, from the GSF to MONUPEH, in coordination with the Government of Haiti, including the progressive transfer of command and control arrangements to the Mission as it attains operational capability, and further requests that:

(a) where conditions on the ground permit, existing GSF elements may be integrated into or reconfigured within MONUPEH, including through their incorporation under United Nations command structures;

(b) where such conditions are not met, UNSISMH shall, as appropriate, deploy its own capabilities to assume relevant security responsibilities, including through the reconfiguration or drawdown of GSF elements;

7. *Decides* that MONUPEH shall, within its existing capacities and in coordination with United Nations agencies, funds and programs, and in collaboration with local partners, support the re-establishment of conditions necessary for the

resumption of basic economic activity and the establishment of a political environment conducive to national reconciliation and inclusive governance under capable political institutions and processes, including through the stabilization of key economic corridors and selected pilot areas, and through creating conditions necessary for UN-supported free and fair elections, as agreed upon by the Government of Haiti, with a view to reinforcing sustainable stabilization;

8. *Affirms* that MONUPEH shall operate in full respect of the sovereignty of Haiti and shall not undertake functions related to political governance, sanctions designation, or activities beyond its stabilization mandate;

9. *Emphasizes* that the activities of MONUPEH shall be conducted with a view to the progressive handover of responsibilities to Haitian authorities within a defined timeframe, including the phased reduction and eventual transfer of security functions undertaken pursuant to Chapter VII to the Haitian State, and the corresponding reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Haiti towards a sustainable framework focused on advisory, humanitarian and development support, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in close coordination with the United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, and *requests* the Secretary-General to include in his reports clear benchmarks related to:

- (a) the operational capacity of the HNP,
- (b) the restoration of State authority, and
- (c) the reduction of armed violence;

10. *Takes note of* the need for the Haitian National Police to have access to appropriate equipment to effectively carry out its security responsibilities, and *invites* the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti to consider, as appropriate, this matter in accordance with its mandate;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit quarterly reports on the implementation of this mandate, including progress against benchmarks and recommendations regarding the adjustment or drawdown of the Mission;

12. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of MONUPEH in light of these reports, including with a view to reducing its footprint as conditions permit;

13. *Encourages* Member States and international partners to support Haiti's stabilization and recovery efforts, including through voluntary contributions, in coordination with the United Nations;

14. *Calls upon* all Haitian stakeholders to engage constructively in efforts aimed at restoring stability and enabling the functioning of State institutions;

15. *Welcomes* bilateral technical and apolitical cooperation arrangements, agreed in good faith between Member States and the Government of Haiti, consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

16. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

ANNEX D: GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

ACLED – Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project – a non-profit organization that collects real-time data on political violence and protest events.

AFH – Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d'Haïti) – Haiti's national military force, reconstituted in 2017 after being disbanded in 1995.

BINUH – United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti) – a UN political mission established in 2019 to succeed MINUJUSTH, focused on governance and human rights.

BTI – Bertelsmann Transformation Index – a global dataset assessing the quality of democracy, market economy, and governance in 129 countries.

CARICOM – Caribbean Community – a regional intergovernmental organization of fifteen Caribbean states that coordinates economic integration and political cooperation.

CEP – Conseil Électoral Provisoire (Provisional Electoral Council) – Haiti's provisional body responsible for organizing elections; the Permanent Electoral Council mandated by the 1987 Constitution has never been established.

CFW – Cash-for-Work – a short-term employment scheme providing income in exchange for labor on community projects, used as a stabilization tool in post-conflict settings.

CIN – Carte d'Identification Nationale – Haiti's national biometric identity card, incorporating fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, and photo data; required to vote.

CNDDR – Commission Nationale pour le Désarmement, le Démantèlement et la Réintégration – Haiti's national DDR body.

CSCCA – Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif – Haiti's Supreme Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes; the body that audited PetroCaribe funds and issued three reports (2019–2020) documenting \$1.74–2 billion in embezzlement.

CVR – Community Violence Reduction – a localized, community-based approach to reducing gang violence that complements or substitutes for formal DDR programs in settings where classic post-conflict templates do not apply.

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration – a structured process by which combatants lay down arms, leave armed groups, and are supported in returning to civilian life.

DPPA – Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs – the UN Secretariat department leading conflict prevention, peacemaking, and political mission work.

DPO – Department of Peace Operations – the UN Secretariat department responsible for planning, deploying, and managing UN peacekeeping operations.

DSRSG – Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General – a senior UN leadership position within a peacekeeping mission, typically responsible for a specific pillar such as political affairs, rule of law, or recovery and reconstruction.

GSF – Gang Suppression Force – the multinational force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 (2025) to replace the MSS mission, with a mandate to conduct offensive gang suppression operations and a personnel ceiling of 5,550.

HNP – Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti) – Haiti's national civilian police force, founded in 1995, responsible for day-to-day internal security.

HIPPO – High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations – a panel convened by the UN Secretary-General that produced the landmark 2015 report 'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace,' advocating for a more political, people-centered approach to UN peace operations.

IDDRS – Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards – the UN's comprehensive framework of standards and guidance for DDR programming.

IFIT – Institute for Integrated Transitions – an independent organization providing research and support on peace negotiations, including with criminal groups.

IJDH – Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti – a US-based non-profit documenting human rights abuses and electoral irregularities in Haiti.

IOM – International Organization for Migration – a UN-related organization responsible for tracking and assisting displaced persons; tracks internal displacement in Haiti.

ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance – the collection, processing, and exploitation of information in support of military and police operations.

JMAC – Joint Mission Analysis Cell – an analytical unit within UN peacekeeping missions producing intelligence-led assessments; pioneered within MINUSTAH 2006–07 and cited as a best practice for targeted operations.

LOE – Line of Effort – a framework used in military and peacekeeping planning to describe distinct but mutually reinforcing areas of operational focus that together achieve a mission's objectives.

MIF – Multinational Interim Force – a US-led force deployed to Haiti in February–June 2004 following President Aristide's departure, preceding MINUSTAH.

MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti – a smaller UN mission (2017–2019) that succeeded MINUSTAH, focused on rule of law, police reform, and human rights.

MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti) – a UN peacekeeping mission operating from 2004 to 2017, led by Brazil; controversial for introducing cholera and for documented sexual exploitation and abuse.

MONUPEH – Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Paix En Haïti – the proposed UN peacekeeping mission that is the subject of this report; a five-year Chapter VII multidimensional peacekeeping operation designed to succeed the GSF.

MSS – Multinational Security Support – the Kenya-led multinational security mission authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2699 (2023) and deployed to Haiti in June 2024; the predecessor to the GSF.

OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – the UN body responsible for coordinating humanitarian responses.

OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – the UN body responsible for monitoring, reporting on, and promoting human rights; publishes regular reports on Haiti's human rights situation.

ONI – Office National d'Identification – Haiti's national identity authority, responsible for issuing the CIN biometric identity card.

PHTK – Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale – a major Haitian political party associated with former Presidents Martelly and Moïse, linked in UN Panel of Experts and InSight Crime reporting to the G9 gang federation.

PKO – Peacekeeping Operation – a UN-mandated mission deploying military, police, and civilian personnel to support peace in conflict-affected states.

POC – Protection of Civilians – a core UN peacekeeping mandate authorizing missions to use force to protect civilians from physical violence.

RN-1 – Route Nationale 1 – Haiti's primary north–south highway connecting Port-au-Prince to the Artibonite and North departments; a key economic corridor targeted under MONUPEH's LOE 2.

RNDDH – Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains – Haiti's leading national human rights documentation network.

ROE – Rules of Engagement – the directives specifying the circumstances, conditions, and manner in which force may be applied by military and police personnel.

SEA – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse – UN terminology for misconduct by UN personnel involving sexual exploitation or abuse of host-community members; a major controversy associated with MINUSTAH.

SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary-General – the head of a UN peacekeeping or political mission.

SSC – Standing Surge Capacity – a reserve operational capability maintained within MONUPEH's structure to respond to contingencies without additional Security Council authorization.

SSR – Security Sector Reform – the transformation of security institutions (police, military, judiciary, corrections) to improve effectiveness, accountability, and respect for human rights; a core component of MONUPEH's LOE 1.

TPC – Transitional Presidential Council (Conseil Présidentiel de Transition) – the interim governing body established in Haiti in April 2024 following Prime Minister Henry's resignation.

UCREF – Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers – Haiti's financial intelligence unit, responsible for investigating money-laundering and financial crimes.

ULCC – Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption – Haiti's anti-corruption authority, responsible for investigating and referring corruption cases for prosecution.

UNCT – United Nations Country Team – the collective body of all UN agencies, funds, and programs operating in a given country.

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme – the UN's lead development agency, responsible for capacity-building, governance support, and long-term development programs.

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – the UN refugee agency, responsible for protection and assistance to displaced persons.

UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund – the UN agency responsible for children's welfare; documented a 70 percent increase in child recruitment by armed groups in Haiti between 2023 and 2024.

UNMIH – United Nations Mission in Haiti (1993–1996) – the first UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, mandated to modernize the military and create a new police force.

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – the UN body responsible for combating illicit drugs and international crime; has reported on arms trafficking and gang money-laundering infrastructure in Haiti.

UNPOL – United Nations Police – the civilian police component of UN peacekeeping missions, providing operational policing support and capacity-building for the host-nation police.

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution – a formal decision of the Security Council.

UNSOH – United Nations Support Office in Haiti – the logistical and administrative support structure established by Resolution 2793 (2025) to underpin the GSF.

USAID – United States Agency for International Development – formerly the primary US government agency for foreign assistance; the largest donor to the MSS mission and a key funder of humanitarian programs in Haiti.

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