Assessing AU-UN Partnerships in Peace Operations

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAPSTONE CONSULTING PROJECT

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Abbreviations

AFISMA - African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIS - African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
APF - African Peace Facility
AQIM - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU - African Union
AUPSC - AU Peace and Security Council
AUPSO - African Union (AU)-led peace support operations
AUHIP - AU High-Level Implementation Panel
ATMIS - African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD - Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DPA - Darfur Peace Agreement
DPO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPP - Darfur-based Political Process
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EEAS - European External Action Service
EU - European Union
FPUs - Formed Police Units
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPI - International Peace Institute
JAPS - Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan
JEM - Justice and Equality Movement
LJM - Liberation and Justice Movement
MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO - Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NSAGs - Non-State Armed Groups
RSF - Sudan Revolutionary Front
SLA - Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-MM - Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi
SNA - Somali National Army
SPLM - Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-N - Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
SRF - Sudanese Revolutionary Front
SSF - Somali Security Forces
T/PCCs - Troop and Police Contributing Countries
UN - United Nations
UNAMID - AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur)
UNCT - UN Country Team
UNOM - United Nations Office in Mali
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
UNOSOM I - United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II - United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSOM - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOS - United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UNITAF - Unified Task Force

Executive Summary

The United Nations has sought to strengthen its partnerships with regional organizations to promote international peace and security in recent years. This is particularly true in Africa, where violent extremism and threats to state sovereignty are a growing concern. In December 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2719, which created a framework through which UN-assessed contributions can be channeled to fund African Union peace support operations. This report examines past partnership models between the AU and UN – specifically, in Darfur, Mali, and Somalia – to draw lessons for future peacekeeping partnerships between the two organizations.

In the case of Darfur, the AU-UN hybrid mission (UNAMID) was mobilized to replace an AU-led mission, which faced severe financial and operational limitations. UNAMID created a model to leverage the AU and UN's strengths to enhance civilian protection efforts. However, the mission, especially in its early years, was marred by difficulties, including a lack of cooperation from the Sudanese government, the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and coordination struggles between the AU and the UN.

Despite these challenges, hybrid missions are still preferable over non-intervention in contexts where the host government will not consent to a solely UN-led mission. Several key measures should be taken to improve future hybrid missions and avoid repeating UNAMID's shortcomings. First, establishing a robust coordination mechanism similar to the Addis Ababa model would enhance understanding and collaboration between the AU and the UN or other regional partners. Second, separate special envoy positions should be unified into one role to improve clarity and strategic alignment. Finally, tensions among different bodies within the mission framework should be addressed to ensure effective operation and reduce susceptibility to manipulation by host governments.

In Mali, the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA illuminated the opportunities and pitfalls of a bridging mission, in which the AU quickly deploys a short-term peace support operation to be followed by a longer-term, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation. This approach leverages the comparative advantages of both organizations. The AU's proximity and relative risk tolerance allow for the rapid mobilization of troops to a crisis zone, while the UN is better equipped to sustain larger-scale peacekeeping operations.

However, challenges arose surrounding the re-hatting of troops and coordination between the AU and the UN. AFISMA troops varied in skill level and training, so transitioning to a new mandate proved challenging. Additionally, UNSC Resolution 2100 authorizing MINUSMA ignored the requests of the AU, creating tensions between the organizations and contributing to the AU losing influence after the transition. These lessons highlight how the capacity asymmetry between the AU and the UN hinders the realization of subsidiarity in practice.

Finally, in Somalia, the joint missions between the AU and the UN were designed to divide responsibilities based on complementary operational strengths. However, many challenges have hindered the efficiency of this model. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant security threat in the region, complicating political reform efforts and implementation of the peacekeeping operation. Supplies provided by the UN logistical mission did not meet the demands of the AU mission, reducing capabilities. Cooperation over financing also proved to be complicated.

These challenges arose due to the inability to synergize the two institutions' doctrines and the lack of a holistic approach to meet the Somali government's needs and interests. To improve coordination and support stabilization in Somalia, there must be a shared vision of national security, enhanced logistical capabilities to combat Al-Shabaab, increased financial transparency, and greater information sharing between the AU and the UN. A political settlement of the conflict is also essential to facilitate a holistic approach. Only with stable political conditions will it be possible to deprive Al-Shabaab of the support it receives from minor clans.

The report concludes by drawing lessons from across these three contexts to make recommendations for future joint operations between the AU and the UN.

1. Introduction

The partnership between the UN and regional organizations has become crucial to addressing the multifaceted international security threats faced by the global community. The need for partnership between the UN and AU is especially evident in the African continent, which is facing several security and humanitarian challenges. As a result, traditional approaches to peace operations and conflict resolution are facing unprecedented difficulties. The UN, with its global mandate for maintaining international peace and security, and the AU, with its deep understanding of local contexts and regional dynamics, possess complementary strengths that can be harnessed to address emerging security threats more effectively.

This research assesses previous AU and UN collaborations to draw lessons for future peace operations. The choice of Darfur, Mali, and Somalia as case studies for this research project is strategic, as each country has hosted peace operations involving the AU and the UN in varying capacities. These cases provide the opportunity to compare different approaches to the partnership between the AU and the UN.

The hybrid approach employed in Darfur, where AU and UN capabilities were blended, underscores the benefits and drawbacks of integrated operations. In Mali, where the AU provided an initial, rapid response force, which was later re-hatted under the banner of the UN, offers insights into the bridging mission model of transitioning from short-term interventions to long-term peacekeeping efforts. Finally, Somalia hosted separate but complementary missions, with the AU and the UN operating simultaneously but with distinct functions. This case highlights the complexities of coordination and the need for coherent cooperation between missions with different mandates and operational philosophies.

In December 2023, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution allowing for UN dues to be channeled to African Union-led peace operations. This report is a timely contribution to the AU and the UN's preparation for increased security cooperation. In addition to contributing to the literature on partnerships between the UN and regional peacekeeping actors, this report seeks to inform future policy formulation, institutional capacity building, and strategic planning. This is achieved by proposing recommendations for the design of effective partnership peace operations based on lessons learned from past collaborations.

The report comprises three case studies assessing the AU-UN partnerships in Darfur, Mali, and Somalia. Each case study describes the conflict context, considers the AU-UN partnership, and provides lessons learned and recommendations. The paper concludes by drawing findings from the case studies and suggesting best practices.

2. Methodology

This research employed a four-pronged methodology to unpack the intricacies of security cooperation between the AU and the UN. The methodology was designed to deconstruct existing partnership models within diverse mission settings and derive insightful recommendations for enhancing future collaborations between the two organizations.

1. Document-based research:
Our initial approach involved an extensive review of official documents, including AU and UN mandates, UNSC resolutions, AUPSC communiques, and budget reports relevant to each case study. The aim was to comprehensively understand the historical context, operational frameworks, and financial structures underpinning AU and UN partnerships in the three cases.

2. Interviews:
We conducted in-depth interviews with a diverse set of scholars and practitioners to gather informed insights. These included academics specializing in international security, international peace, and AU and UN experts, many of whom had worked in these case study contexts. These expert interviews gave us a nuanced understanding of our cases' strengths, challenges, and best practices.

3. Visual mapping:
We used visual mapping to portray the network of actors involved in the AU-UN partnerships in the three case study contexts. These visual representations of the various stakeholders, their roles, and their interconnections helped identify key collaboration points and potential areas for improvement.

4. Comparative case study analysis:
Finally, we conducted a comparative analysis of the AU-UN collaboration in Darfur, Mali, and Somalia. This allowed us to identify common patterns, success factors, and challenges across

diverse contexts. It also enabled us to distill lessons learned and extract actionable insights to inform our general recommendations for future AU-UN peacekeeping partnerships.
Integrating these four distinct methods enabled us to conduct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of security cooperation. This methodological approach aimed to generate valuable insights that can inform policymakers, practitioners, and scholars seeking to advance effective global peace and security partnerships.

3. Case study Analysis

3a. Darfur

Contextualization

Conflict Overview

Darfur, an underdeveloped and marginalized region in western Sudan, is home to a diverse array of approximately 80 tribes and ethnic groups, including both nomadic and settled communities.[1] The conflict in Darfur is intricately interwoven with the North-South Sudan war.[2] The Arab-dominated central government in Khartoum fought a protracted civil conflict against rebel factions, notably the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM) led by John Garang, from the country's primarily black and non-Muslim South from 1983 to 2005.[3] During this conflict, the central government bolstered its control in Darfur by arming Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to supplement its regular armed forces and undertake raids against the non-Arab population, seen as potential supporters of rebel factions.[4] The tensions came to a head when Khartoum restructured Darfur's administrative divisions, splitting major non-Arab ethnic communities and further diminishing their sway within regional governance structures.[5]

Mapping of actors

The conflict in Darfur broke out in early 2003 when non-Arab rebels from the region, notably the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), rose in armed opposition to the Sudanese government.[6] Angered by recurrent assaults on their territory and their marginalization in the ongoing peace negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM, they launched a guerrilla warfare campaign against government forces.[7] The government responded with a counterinsurgency operation against the SLM and the JEM in Darfur, using proxy

[1] See UN News, "Explainer: How Darfur became a 'humanitarian calamity and catastrophic human rights crisis," Africa Renewal, December 14, 2023, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2023/explainer-how-darfur-became-%E2%80%98humanitarian-calamity-and-catastrophic-human; and Adam Keith, *The African Union in Darfur: An African Solution to A Global Problem?* March 2007, p. 150.
[2] Alex De Waal, "The Wars of Sudan," The Nation, March 1, 2007, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/wars-sudan/.
[3] See Keith, *The African Union in Darfur*, p. 150, and De Waal, "The Wars of Sudan."
[4] Keith, *The African Union in Darfur,* p. 151.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See Keith, *The African Union in Darfur,* p. 151, and De Waal, "The Wars of Sudan."

Janjaweed militias to supplement its military capabilities. The Janjaweed was responsible for perpetrating numerous atrocities, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, in its campaign to kill and displace people from the same ethnic groups as the SLM and the JEM. When the conflict erupted in 2003, the SLM and the JEM were the only two major groups, however, both fragmented into splinter groups.

Table 3a.1. Government and major rebel groups and alliances in Darfur

Rebel Groups					**Government**
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	**The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)**	**Liberation and Justice Movement (LIM)**	**Sudan's People's Liberation Army-North (SPLM-N)**	**Sudan's Revolutionary Front**	**Sudanese Government and militia**
1) Justice and Equality Movement-Gibril 2) Justice and Equality Movement-Bashar	Rose against the government in early 2003 1) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) - Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur 2) SLA-Minni Minawi	LJM was formed in February 2010 after Ethiopia, Libya, United States Special Envoy Scott Gration, and other regional and international actors encouraged several smaller rebel groups to merge under the leadership of Tijani Sese	Malik Agar, an Ingessana from Blue Nile State, and Abdelaziz al-Hilu, a Masalit from the Nuba Mountains, lead the SPLM-N[8]	On August 7, 2011, the SLA-Minni Minawi, SLA-Abdul Wahid, and Sudan's People Kaoda, South Kordofan, established the Sudanese Revolutionary Front[9]	The Sudanese Government forces were supported by an allied militia known as the *Janjaweed*

The JEM was established by former followers of Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, who participated in President Omar al-Bashir's 1989 coup, which ousted Sadeq al-Mahdi's elected government.[10] Led by Khalil Ibrahim, the JEM emerged as the leading combatant force in Darfur by May 2008, when it carried out a widespread attack on the capital.[11] Khalil Ibrahim was killed by government forces in December 2011, leading to the election of his brother, Dr. Gibril Ibrahim, as the new leader in January 2012.[12] The JEM experienced a split in September 2012 (see Table 3a.1) after a group of eight second-tier members of the JEM Executive Council led by Mohammad Bashar formed a breakaway faction due to dissatisfaction with Gibril Ibrahim's

[8] Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 33, p. 10.
[9] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur,* Paragraph 18, October 12, 2011.
[10] BBC, "Who are Sudan's Darfur rebels?" February 23, 2020, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7039360.stm.
[11] Ibid.
[12] UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," (para. 12), April 17, 2012.

leadership style. In April 2013, JEM-Bashar signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in the presence of Vice President Ali Osman Taha.[13]

The SLA emerged as one of the original rebel factions in Darfur in early 2003, challenging the government.[14] Initially composed of members from the three largest non-Arab groups in Darfur, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes, the SLA protested against the political and economic marginalization of the region, advocating for the separation of religion and state.[15] The SLA split into two factions, mainly along tribal lines of Fur and Zaghawa: One faction led by Abdel Wahid primarily consisted of Fur members and held sway over part of Jebel Marra mountain, garnering support from extensive refugee camps in Darfur;[16] the second faction is led by Minni Minawi, who parted ways with SLA during the October-November 2005 Haskanite conference.[17] The SLA-MM, composed predominantly of Zaghawa members, signed the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), resulting in its territorial losses.[18]

The Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) was formed in February 2010 when various splinter groups merged under the leadership of Eltigani Seisi Mohamed Ateem, a member of the Fur ethnic group.[19] It was supported by the then US special envoy to broaden the support base for the Doha process and find an alternative Fur leader to Abdul Wahid.[20] On July 14, 2011, the LJM and the government signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), which had initially been negotiated with JEM, leading to Sisi's appointment as the head of the newly established Darfur Regional Authority.[21] However, Sisi swiftly expressed dissatisfaction with the insufficient allocation of funds required to fulfill his duties.[22]

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Malik Agar from the Ingessana community of Blue Nile State and Abdelaziz al-Hilu from the Masalit tribe in the Nuba Mountains, initially served as the northern branch of the SPLM under Garang but retained its activity following the secession of South Sudan in 2011.[23] In 2017, SPLM-N experienced a factional division: one faction, led by Malik Agar, endorsed the Juba Peace Agreement, while the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, declined to endorse the accord.[24]

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[13] Posalind Marsden, "Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process: The Role of International Actors," Chapter 13, p. 253 in "Making and Breaking Peace in Sudan and South Sudan: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Beyond," Sarah M.H. Nouwen (ed.) et al, December 2020.
[14] BBC, "Who are Sudan's Darfur rebels?" February 23, 2020.
[15] Ibid, and International Crisis Group, “Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis,” March 25, 2004.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 33, p. 10.
[18] BBC, "Who are Sudan's Darfur rebels?"
[19] Ralph Mamiya and Wibke Hansen, "Assessing the of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2020.
[20] Marsden,"Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process," Chapter 13, p. 2244.
[21] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)."
[22] Ibid.
[23] Andrew McCutchen, "The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its Formation and Development," Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 33.
[24] Ibid.

Box 1: The Impact of Conflict between Sudan and South Sudan on Darfur

The conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLM of South Sudan had a major impact on Darfur's political and security dynamics both before and after the South Sudan secession. When the transition from AMIS to a UN-led peace operation was being discussed, the SPLM, which had become a partner in the government after the signing of the CPA in 2005 (see Table 3a.2), unlike President al-Bashir and his National Congress Party, did not oppose the transition to a UN-only or hybrid mission.[25] This created internal pressure on President Bashir.

Following South Sudan's independence in July 2011 based on the CPA, SPLM-North became an independent rebel group in the two States of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. In November 2011, it joined rebel groups from Darfur to form the Sudanese Revolutionary Group (see Table 3a.1). The new alliance adopted a political platform in January 2013, which called for a national (instead of regional) approach to the conflicts within Sudan. Moreover, after becoming a sovereign country, South Sudan allowed the rebel groups from Darfur and the SPLM-N to operate safe havens on its side of the border and have a base of operations that was outside of Sudan.[26] Even if it did not actively support the rebel groups, it became a "very permissive environment" for them.[27]

Finally, South Sudan's successful achievement of self-determination set a precedent for rebel groups in Darfur as it became clear that if they were unable to gain autonomy inside Darfur, they would go for secession the same way the South Sudanese did.[28]

The SRF was established in August 2011 (see Table 3a.1).[29] In a joint political declaration, SRF announced the following objectives: the removal of the government led by the National Congress Party through all feasible means; the consolidation and fortification of Sudanese political entities; and the installation of a transitional government spanning six years.[30]

Analysis of AU-UN Partnership

Transition from AMIS to UNAMID

The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004 after the Sudanese government, the SLM/A, and the JEM signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement in Chad on April 8, 2004 (see Table 3a.2), in which the government agreed to allow an AU military presence in Darfur.[31] The AU's response to the Darfur conflict came in the context of two major developments within the organization: (1) the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) invested with powers to prevent

[25] I.D.F. and Munzoul Assal, "The National Congress Party and the Darfurian armed groups," (Chapter 1), in Black, David R & Paul Williams (edited), "The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur," Routledge, London, 2010, p. 35.
[26] Interview 1, April 4, 2024.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," (para. 16), December 30, 2011.
[30] Ibid.
[31] David R Black and Paul Williams (edited), "The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur," Routledge, London, 2010, p. 101.

conflicts, undertake peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, and authorize the deployment of peace support mission became fully operational in early 2004;[32] (2) the AU had pivoted from "non-interference" to "non-indifference."[33] However, AMIS's effectiveness in protecting civilians was hampered by limited resources and a dependence on voluntary funding.[34] Because the AU did not have the capacity to sustain AMIS, it began a discussion with the UN on the possibility of transitioning to a UN-led mission.[35] On March 10, 2006, the AUPSC announced that the AU would support the transition from AMIS into a UN operation if it had the Sudanese government's consent.[36]

When the AU deployed AMIS, it also pushed for a more comprehensive agreement and launched a discussion on how to achieve it. Starting in July 2004, the AU led seven rounds of Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, which were initially held in Addis Ababa, and then shifted to Abuja as Nigeria was the AU chair at the time.[37] At that time, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) provided limited assistance to the AU in its efforts to facilitate peace negotiations in Darfur through its African Mission in Sudan (AMIS).[38] The AU mediation concluded the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the government and the SLA-MM on May 5, 2006. The DPA, in turn, provided a basis for deploying a UN peacekeeping force as it created peace for the UN to keep.[39] This led to UNSC resolution 1706, adopted on August 31, 2006, which authorized the expansion of UNMIS into Darfur and invited the consent of the Sudanese government for the deployment of a UN peace mission in Darfur.[40] When US Ambassador John Bolton put the draft resolution 1706 to a vote, he did so, hoping that UNSC approval would pressure the Sudanese government to change course. However, the strategy did not work. Not only did the resolution fail to gain unanimous support – China, Russia, and Qatar abstained – but the Sudanese government also refused to consent to a UN-only peacekeeping force.[41] This marked the first time a UN peacekeeping force was rejected by a member state.[42] The ensuing stalemate was resolved only after the AU-UN hybrid mission was proposed. Finally, the UNSC (through resolution 1769, July 31, 2007) authorized the establishment of an AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for an initial duration of 12 months to support the timely and effective implementation of the DPA.[43] UNAMID was established after four years of civil conflict between rebel factions and the Sudanese government.[44] It assumed the authority from AMIS on

[32] African Union, "The Peace & Security Council," https://au.int/en/psc#:~:text=The%20Protocol%20Relating%20to%20the,fully%20operational%20in%20early%202004.
[33] Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, "The African Union," p.100.
[34] David Whineray, "Lessons for Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding from Darfur," IPI Global Observatory, February 5, 2020.
[35] Interview 2, February 15, 2024.
[36] Black and Williams, p.103.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Rachel Furlow, "The Legacy of UNAMID and the Future of Hybrid Peacekeeping Missions," Democracy in Africa (DiA); UNMIS was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005 to support the implementation of the CPA (see table 2); See UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (S/RES/1590 (2005).
[39] Whineray, "Lessons for Peacekeeping."
[40] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1706, (para 1), August 31, 2006, (S/RES/1706 (2006)).
[41] Whineray, "Lessons for Peacekeeping."
[42] Ibid.
[43] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1769, S/RES/1769, July 31, 2007.
[44] Rachel Furlow, "The Legacy of UNAMID and the Future of Hybrid Peacekeeping Missions."

December 31, 2007. After about 13 years, the UNSC (through resolution 2559, December 22, 2020) terminated UNAMID's mandate as of December 31, 2020.[45] UNAMID successfully completed the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian personnel by June 30, 2021, in accordance with the timeline outlined in Resolution 2559.[46]

Table 3a.2. Various ceasefire and peace agreements between 2004 and 2020

Date	Peace Agreements	Signatory Parties	Mediator/facilitator
April 8, 2004	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement	Government of Sudan, SLM-AW and JEM	Chad
January 9, 2005	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Government of Sudan and SPLM/A	IGAD, the United Kingdom, Norway, the United States, and Italy.
May 5, 2006	Darfur Peace Agreement	Government of Sudan and SLA-MM	AU
July 14, 2011	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur	Government of Sudan and LJM	Qatar
April 6, 2013	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur	Government of Sudan and JEM-Bashar	Qatar
October 3, 2020	Juba Agreement for Peace	Government of Sudan and SRF	South Sudan

As a result of this transition, UNAMID inherited a number of key challenges faced by AMIS. First, AMIS struggled to secure sufficient troop contributions from AU member states, which continued to affect UNAMID. Second, AMIS suffered from three major military capability

[45] The resolution instructed the Secretary-General to commence the drawdown of UNAMID personnel on January 1, 2021, and to finalize the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian personnel by June 30, 2021, except those required for the mission's liquidation. Additionally, the Secretary-General was tasked with providing the UNSC with an assessment of lessons learned from UNAMID's experience no later than October 31, 2021. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2559, December 22, 2020.

[46] United Nations, "Withdrawal of Hybrid Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur Completed by 30 June Deadline, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Outlining Plans to Liquidate Assets," July 27, 2021. https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14587.doc.htm?fbclid=IwAR1nkQR3zSTDb_V7wnKHTOBoMnpISjvzWMHtDu48eOCh5i3LdSDYQ7pwD3Q.

shortcomings: (1) it could not generate sufficient adequately trained and equipped personnel; (2) inadequate level of experience in strategic and operational military planning as well as command and control within the AU secretariat and AMIS headquarters for multidimensional peace operations; (3) AMIS lacked critical military specialties and technical capabilities, such as logistical planning and transport capability, intelligence and communications.[47] All these made AMIS, as the AU's second peace operation, very deadly, with a total of 59 soldiers killed while serving in AMIS, which in turn had a leftover effect on UNAMID.[48]

Mandates

Resolution 1769 approved UNAMID mandates proposed by the Secretary-General and the AU Commission Chairperson in their June 5, 2007 report. The report delineated eight overarching mandate goals for the hybrid operation in Darfur, categorized into four broader themes: (1) support for the peace process; (2) security; (3) the rule of law, governance, and human rights; and (4) humanitarian assistance.[49] This initial mandate was largely drawn from the DPA, reflecting the agreement's broad scope. As such, it included support for institution-building, which was part of the DPA to address the root causes of the conflict. However, the DPA's flaws and lack of buy-in from some of the key conflict actors hampered UNAMID's ability to implement its mandate effectively.[50]

A 2014 review found three major obstacles to the effective fulfillment of UNAMID's mandate: the uncooperative Sudanese government, major capability gaps in several of its troop and police contingents, and weak coordination and integration structures within UNAMID and with the UN Country Team.[51] As a result of the review, the UNSC revised UNAMID's strategic priorities (Resolution 2148), which focused on the protection of civilians, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, mediation between the government and non-signatory armed movements within the DDPD process, and support for the mediation of community conflict, including undertaking measures to address its root causes.[52] Two new dimensions stood out in this revised mandate: first, the support for mediation of community conflict, which coupled with UNAMID's efforts to "devise more effective and innovative tools helped to address" some of the conflict drivers more effectively; and second, the need for coordination between UNAMID and UNCT. The UNSC (through resolution 2363, 2017) mandated UNAMID to adopt a two-pronged approach focusing on peacekeeping in the Jebel Marra area and peacebuilding efforts in other parts of the region.

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[47] LCol James E. Allen, "Impediments to the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)," School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010, p.13.

[48] Arvid Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned," FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, August 2008, p.40 and 24.

[49] United Nations, Secretary General, "Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur," (para. 54), June 5, 2007.

[50] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),", p. 25.

[51] United Nations, Secretary General, "Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," (para 25), UN Security Council, February 25, 2014.

[52] See UN Security Council Resolution 2148, para 4, April 3, 2014, and "Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," February 25, 2014.

UNAMID's original mandate in 2007 was largely aimed at contributing to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, while the shift in priorities in 2014 was meant to support the Doha Declaration of Peace for Darfur.[53] However, the agreements were incomprehensive, significantly bearing on UNAMID's mandate. Between 2018 and late 2019, the UNSC urged UNAMID to devise an exit strategy for Darfur, necessitating preparations for the newly formed government in Sudan that assumed power in 2019. During this evolution, the mission's other focal points, including safeguarding civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid, and monitoring human rights, had to be harmonized with its political endeavors.[54]

Comparative Advantages of the AU and UN

As parent organizations for UNAMID and other joint missions, the UN and the AU have comparative advantages. For its part, the UN has greater financial resources than the AU and has more robust policies and procedures due to its dedicated Department of Peace Operations with more than 30 years of experience.[55] Unsurprisingly, UNAMID was designed to be financed through the UN peacekeeping budget and thus subject to the UN administrative rules and regulations.[56] This made UNAMID effectively a UN mission because its "structures, processes and procedures – military, police, and civilian – were all based on UN operations."[57] Regarding the AU's comparative advantage, it wielded greater political leverage over Sudan, which joined the Organization of African Union, the AU predecessor, on May 25, 1963.[58] Therefore, the AU acted as the primary "interlocutor" with the Sudanese government.[59] Even the AU elements of UNAMID reportedly played a role primarily "at the political-strategic level" by, for example, delivering messages to the Sudanese government that the UN would have found difficult to send.[60] The AU also used its political weight to address "various operational challenges" facing UNAMID.[61] This included pressing the Sudanese government to "issue visas and clear logistical blockages."[62] However, as discussed below in detail, the UNAMID's mandate was marred by a lack of cooperation by the Sudanese government. The hybrid mission was based on the assumption that the AU would employ its diplomatic capacity to make the host government consent easier or improve the relationship with it, which in practice proved "absolutely and fundamentally" to have not worked.[63]

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[53] Adam Day, "Peacekeeping Without a Partner: A Review of UNAMID's Political Strategy in Darfur," The Stimson Center, p. 45.
[54] Day, "Peacekeeping Without a Partner," p. 45.
[55] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[56] UN Security Council,"Summary report on lessons learned from the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," December 29, 2021, p. 12.
[57] Mamiya & Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[58] African Union,"Member States," https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2.
[59] UN Security Council, "Summary report on lessons learned from the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," December 29, 2021, p. 12.
[60] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[61] UN Security Council, "Summary report on lessons learned from the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," p. 12.
[62] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[63] Interview 1, April 4, 2024.

The AUPSC also influenced the UNSC, as evidenced by the response to the 2019 Sudanese uprising. When the protests broke out in December 2018 and escalated to calls for regime change by April 2019, the UNSC and AUPSC took different approaches.[64] However, following the Sudanese military's deadly crackdown on the protestors in June 2019, the AU stepped up in New York and shaped the calculation of the UNSC members, especially Russia and China, that were reluctant to do or say anything about the incident.[65] The AU also made a strong statement articulating a clear position on the need for a transition. This is "one of the stronger examples" of the AU's ability to use its comparative advantage, which also showed a two-way dynamic, not simply the UN dictating to the AU.[66]

Structure of the partnership

The UNSC and AUPSC mandated UNAMID. Its leadership included a UN-AU Joint Special Representative who was jointly appointed by the UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission Chairperson and reported to them.[67] In addition, the Force Commander, required to be of African descent, and a Police Commissioner were appointed by the AU Commission Chairperson in consultation with the UN Secretary-General. They led the military and police components of the mission and reported to the AU-UN joint special representative.[68] The chart below shows various AU and UN bodies and their missions in Khartoum and Darfur.

Figure 3a.1. AU-UN Partnership in Darfur

[64] Interview 2, February 15, 2024.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] See UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur," para 10 and 56, June 5, 2007.
[68] UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur," June 5, 2007.



As illustrated above, when UNAMID was deployed, the AU and UN had their separate, part-time special envoys specifically for Darfur, which they combined into a joint chief mediator in 2008 for easy coordination.[69] This brought about "a much greater degree of coherence in the mediation process" and also reduced the opportunity for conflict actors to engage in "forum shopping."[70] UNAMID had a limited supporting role in the high-level mediation efforts. In August 2011, the UN and AU decided to double-hat the post of AU-UN joint chief mediator with that of the head of UNAMID (refer to the chart above). However, this arrangement created a conflict of interest for the post-holder between the need to maintain impartiality as a mediator and cooperation with the Sudanese government as the head of mission.[71]

Box 2: Major decisions towards coordination and integration

[69] Posalind Marsden, "Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process," Chapter 13, p. 253.
[70] Interview 1, April 4, 2024.
[71] Marsden, "Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process," p. 253.

The decision by the UN and AU to appoint a joint chief mediator (replacing their separate envoys) was a significant step in the right direction in the early years of their partnership, which were marred by struggles for coordination. This joint role helped ensure a unified approach to the peace process in Darfur.

Establishing the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa was another important initiative in the AU and UN partnership. Serving as a central hub, the mechanism played an important role in bringing the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission closer in support of UNAMID. Beyond the coordinating role between the two organizations, the mechanism also played a significant role in helping secure continued commitment from African troop/police contributing countries by raising awareness about the situation in Darfur and UNAMID operations.

The authorized strength of the military and police, as well as the police units formed for UNAMID, changed throughout its mandate (see Table 3a.3). However, UNAMID's authorized strength was never fully achieved. For example, by the end of March 2012, it had reached only 92.4 percent of its military personnel (18,082 of the authorized strength of 19,555), 79.7% - (82% men and 18% women) - of its police personnel target (3,007 of 3,772), and only 16 of the authorized 19 formed police units were deployed.[72]

Table 3a.3. Authorized troop and police strength[73]

Resolution	Military	Police	Formed Police Units
Resolution 1769 (July 31, 2007)	19,555	3,772	19
Resolution 2063 (July 31, 2012)	16, 200	2,310	17
Resolution 2173 (August 27, 2014)	15,845	1,583	13
Resolution 2363 (June 29, 2017)- phase 1	11,395	2,888, including formed police units	
Phase 2: January 31-June 2018)	8,735	2,500, including formed police units	
Resolution 2429 (July 13, 2018)	4,050	2,500, including formed police units	

[72] UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," April 17, 2012.
[73] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur," p. 43.

UNAMID inherited the force generation problem from AMIS, which was further compounded by the Sudanese government's condition that UNAMID should be of "predominantly African character." In an op-ed on July 21, 2008, the first UNAMID force commander, Martin Luther Agawai, complained that the mission remained "desperately under-manned and poorly equipped" and suggested broadening the troop-contributing countries beyond Africa, arguing that UNSC Resolution 1769 did not stipulate that the force should be "exclusively African." This came less than two weeks after the mission lost seven personnel to an ambush when their convoy was returning from a patrol to investigate allegations by a rebel group that two of their soldiers had been killed.[74]

Challenges

A) Security dynamics

According to the AUDP, the crisis in Darfur consisted of "different levels of conflict, including local disputes over resources and administrative authority, a conflict between Darfur and the center of power in Khartoum, and an internationalized conflict between Sudan and Chad."[75] As such, the security situation was affected by the volatile relationship between Sudan and Chad. Chad viewed the Darfur conflict as a direct security threat.[76] Chadian President Idriss Deby, who belonged to the Zaghawa tribe (similar to some of the rebel groups from Darfur), was unable to prevent his country's soil from being used as a base or even some within his circles from supporting them.[77] This led to a retaliatory move by Khartoum, which began backing the opposition groups from Chad. This tit-for-tat support for rebel groups on both sides escalated into a proxy, the peak of which came with Chadian rebel attacks on N'Djamena (April 2006 and February 2008) and the JEM's attack on Omdurman (May 2008).[78]

UNAMID's methods in carrying out its protection mandate also affected the security situation. From the outset, UNAMID asked the Sudanese government for permission to dispatch troops to investigate incidents, which gave Khartoum leverage to deny or delay access to attack sites, while it had a Chapter VII mandate, which would have allowed it to simply notify the government instead of seeking permission for troop deployments.[79]

Moreover, the Sudanese government employed obstructive tactics, hampering UNAMID's quick response capability. These included imposing restrictions on the use of military helicopters, delaying or denying visas for the personnel, and holding up clearance of containers at Port Sudan.[80]

B) Strategic alignment

[74] General Martin Luther Agwai, "Op-Ed by UNAMID Force Commander," December 1, 2008, https://unamid.unmissions.org/op-ed-unamid-force-commander-general-martin-luther-agwai.
[75] African Union, "Report of the African Union High-level Panel On Darfur (AUPD)," October 29, 2009.
[76] Posalind Marsden, "Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process," p. 224.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.

The 2014 review of UNAMID highlighted a lack of coordination between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission on the provision of "joint strategic guidance" to the mission as one of the challenges it faced.[81] Since there was no precedent for UNAMID, this inherent challenge stemmed from the AU and UN's struggle to fuse their "strategic visions, objectives and distinct cultures and working methods."[82] Moreover, UNAMID's performance was affected by insufficient clarity regarding roles, disparate levels of experience and capacity, and an initial lack of trust between the organizations and their respective councils.[83]

However, the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, based in Addis Ababa, played an important role in providing coordination, support, and liaison for the mission as well as in raising awareness and fostering the engagement of the AUPSC and African troop/police contributing countries in the situation in Darfur and UNAMID operations.[84] The Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, according to one of the interviewees, was crucial to developing a deeper understanding of not just the procedures, rules, and regulations of the two organizations but also their unique cultures, business practices, and incentive structures.[85] Since it is already challenging to gain knowledge of how to navigate large bureaucracies like the AU and UN, the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism facilitated a two-way exchange: it not only helped understand the AU's inner workings but also informed the AU on how the UN functions.[86]

The early years of the UNAMID were also tarnished by a lack of coordination, even tension, in the mediation efforts. For example, while the appointment in June 2008 of Djibril Bassolé as the joint chief mediator for the peace process in Darfur, replacing their separate envoys as described in the previous section, was an important step towards reducing the official tracks for mediation efforts, Bassolé soon found himself competing with a new AU body.[87] In July 2008, one week after the ICC Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, the AUPSC established the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki.[88] Meanwhile, in September 2008, the League of Arab States mandated Qatar to host new Darfur peace talks, to which Sudanese President Bashir and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim responded positively after their initial refusal and reluctance.[89] In October 2009, after completing its report on Darfur, the AUPD was renamed the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), and President Mbeki received a mandate from the AUPSC to assist with the implementation of the AUPD's recommendations and implementation of the CPA. This led to three major issues: first, there was a substantial overlap between AUHIP's mandate and that of

[81] UN Security Council, "Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," para 28, February 25, 2014.
[82] UN Security Council, "Summary report on lessons learned from the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," December 29, 2021, p. 11.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid, para 38.
[85] Interview 3, March 18, 2024.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Interview 1, April 4, 2024, and Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur," p. 25.
[88] Mamiya, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[89] Ibid.

the Joint Chief Mediator, which was further compounded by previous personal friction between Mbeki and Bassolé; second, in 2010, Mbeki supported a political process in Darfur convened by the AUHIP and UNAMID, with the aim to also involve civil society. Finally, and as a consequence of these competing mediation processes, the Sudanese government tried to play these various actors off of one another and disrupt the initially significant political attention and pressure.[90]

The competition required the UNSC to weigh in by setting several conditions for an enabling environment for UNAMID's support for the Darfur process (through resolution 2003, 2011).[91] The Doha and Darfur processes were just two different forms of engagement that were incompatible. Although it was apparent that the Doha process was just a "sideshow" and thus not making a positive contribution to what was required for peace in Darfur, the joint chief mediator still had to engage with it since abandoning the process would have certain political repercussions.[92] However, regardless of what to call them, these incompatible or competing views seemed to persist until August 2014, when the AUHIP and Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator agreed that the AUHIP was best placed to leverage its broader mandate to urge and facilitate the Sudanese armed movements to join the national dialogue.[93] In fact, the AU and UN decided to give the AUHIP the lead role in advancing the political process in Darfur.[94]

In addition, the AU-UN partnership in Darfur, especially in its early years, also suffered from tensions associated with a notable absence of a common understanding of each other's operational approaches on the ground, a lack of synergy between merging compliance frameworks and human rights considerations, the absence of an agreed framework tailored to the African context, and limitations in deploying rapid peace enforcement measures restricted the UN and AU ability to respond effectively to escalating crisis. Consequently, the disjointed approach between the AU and the UN hindered their joint efforts in Darfur, adding to the challenges that prolonged the suffering of affected populations and impeding progress toward sustainable peace and stability.[95]

Transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS

In principle, peace operations should be drawn down when peace has been achieved, or a peace process seems "irreversible." However, the UNAMID departure was driven by two major factors: (1) a change in the geopolitical context in which member states didn't care about conditions-based withdrawal and (2) the al-Bashir government's pressure on UNAMID to

[90] Ibid.
[91] United Nations, Security Council Resolution, July 29, 2011, para 7.
[92] Interview 1, April 4, 2024.
[93] UN Security Council, "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," (para 7), March 6, 2015.
[94] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur."
[95] Interview 4, February 20, 2024.

withdraw.[96] In fact, discussions regarding an exit strategy for UNAMID started as early as 2014, when international support for UNAMID plummeted, and the host government started pressuring the mission to withdraw.[97] According to one account, Khartoum began to mount pressure on the mission after it tried to investigate an alleged mass rape by the Sudanese army in Tabit, North Darfur, in October 2014.[98] Then, a 2017 review of UNAMID recommended a two-pronged approach for UNAMID - peacekeeping in Jebel Marra and peacebuilding in the rest of Darfur - which the UNSC supported through resolution 2363 (2017).[99] It also coincided with a significant reduction in force based on Resolution 2363 (see Table 3a.3).

In 2018, a transition plan was approved, calling for a complete mission withdrawal by June 2020. The transition process was punctuated by a change in government in Sudan. On April 11, 2019, the Transitional Military Council removed President al-Bashir from power following protests that had started in Atbara over the removal of subsidies on essential commodities in December 2018 but had spread across the country.[100] In August 2019, there was an agreement on Sudan's constitutional declaration.[101] It became a de facto political settlement and signaled the transitional government's intent to normalize diplomatic relations.[102] The constitutional declaration announced comprehensive peace as an immediate priority, and the transitional government opened talks with the members of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (RSF) and other allied movements in October 2019 under the mediation of South Sudan.[103] On October 3, 2020, Sudan's Transitional Government and representatives of armed groups signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (JAPS) in Juba, South Sudan.[104] In its resolution, UNSC tasked the Secretary-General to ensure that the transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS "is phased, sequenced and efficient."[105] The transition in 2019 led to a political process but proved to be sustainable, as evidenced by the 2021 coup, which was not a coincidence and would not have been done under circumstances where UNAMID departure was reversible.[106]

In terms of the AU-UN partnership, the AU was "marginalized" from the process very quickly for a couple of reasons: first, the AU mediation had enabled the transitional government process in the summer of 2019, and AU leadership was not viewed favorably by all conflict parties. Second, after a decade and a half of a hybrid mission, the UN was keen to do the peacebuilding

[96] Daniel Forti, "Walking a Tightrope: The Transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS in Sudan," IPI, February 2021; and Interview 3l, March 18, 2024.
[97] Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur," and Forti, "Walking a Tightrope."
[98] Posalind,"Peacemaking in Darfur and the Doha Process," Chapter 13.
[99] See Mamiya and Hansen, "Assessing the of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur" and UN Security Council Resolution 2363, (S/RES/2363 (2017)), June 29, 2017, para. 2.
[100] UN Security Council, "Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," May 30, 2019.
[101] Forti, "Walking a Tightrope."
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Zaid Al-Ali, *The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan Summary and Analysis,* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, April 21, 2021, p. 5.
[105] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2559, December 22, 2020.
[106] Interview 3, March 18, 2024.

mission on its own.[107] As a result, the AU's role was reduced to a "tiny liaison office with very minimal levels of influence, infrastructural and financial support."[108] The negative experience with a hybrid structure with the AU, coupled with the absence of compelling evidence that a joint mission would add value, was the reasons why UNITAMS was not a joint mission with the AU, and there was not any other "doctrinal reason."[109]

Lessons Learned & Recommendations

The AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur was borne out of necessity and induced by the Sudanese government's refusal to consent to a UN-only mission. As such, there is no agreement on the effectiveness of the mission. However, the UNAMID experience suggests the following scenarios. First, in conflict situations where securing the host government's consent for a UN-only mission is possible, a hybrid mission might not be an effective approach. A UN-only mission or a regional organization initiating the initial response with a potential transition to a UN-only mission, which might be more successful. Second, where gaining the host government's consent for a UN mission is impossible, which is a fundamental pillar of peacekeeping, a well-designed hybrid mission remains preferable to no response as no intervention has allowed genocide in the past. However, proactive measures are crucial to avoid repeating UNAMID's early struggles. Below, we highlight some lessons that could be drawn from this hybrid mission and recommend improvements.

Lesson learned: the AU-UN partnership helped create a compromise to break the stalemate between the UNSC and Sudan and, more importantly, save lives in Darfur.

The hybrid mission helped secure the government's legal consent.[110] In this sense, the UNSC resolution 1769 (2007) was a big deal for both Darfur and the UN: UNAMID contributed to the protection of civilians and "limiting damage";[111] it allowed the UN to save its reputation that was at risk after the Sudanese government refused to implement the UN resolution.[112] Moreover, based on most of our interviews, the UN seems reluctant to apply the UNAMID model to future conflict settings.

Recommendations to UN: Remain open to difficult but innovative partnership models like the hybrid mission in Darfur when the option to deploy a traditional peacekeeping mission in response to a crisis is not immediately available.

In such scenarios, the UN should consider a clear reporting structure to improve the effectiveness and credibility of the mission. Designing the mission in a way in which the head of the mission reports solely to the UN while partner organization(s) are accommodated in other specific roles

[107] Interview 2, February 15, 2024.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Interview 1, April 4, 2024.
[110] Interview 5, February 19, 2024.
[111] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[112] Ibid.

within the mission framework might be more effective. In situations where a multi-organizational approach is required, the UN should build on relatively successful partnerships like the parallel deployments of AMISOM and UNSOM in Mali in complementary roles as discussed in this report, or UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo - which was deployed in 1999 and supported by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU in distinct roles within the overall mission framework.

Lesson learned: The hybrid mission was based on the assumption that it would allow the AU and UN to use their comparative strengths.

Specifically, the AU was expected to use its diplomatic capacity to lean on the host government to cooperate with the mission.[113] The AU could not have used its political leverage for a genuine political process due to two major factors: (1) the AU is a weak organization when it comes to conflict management because it does not have "strong sticks and tasty economic carrots" without which it is hard to do conflict management; (2) since Sudan is a powerful AU member state, with a huge army and a ruling military junta, the AU had to rely on the continent's biggest powers to pressure the Sudanese government to consent to and cooperate with the mission, which was not always available.[114]

Recommendation to AU: Consider employing the AU's normative framework about legitimacy, democracy, and human rights in Africa more rigorously when dealing with the host government for any future mission.

By using this comparative advantage, the AU will be able to contribute more significantly to the effectiveness of the mission and lead African solutions to crises on the continent.

Lesson learned: A peacekeeping mission can be effective only if it is based on a viable pathway to peace.

Military components can only help limit damage by reducing the number of civilian casualties and IDPs and refugees, but they cannot deliver sustainable peace.[115] Such a political pathway to a viable peace was absent in Darfur (and Somalia). While there was a semblance of a peace process in Darfur, it was not effective because the government's strategy was to buy off rebel groups.

Recommendation to UN and AU: Coordinate joint mediation efforts more closely.

This will allow the two organizations to use their comparative strengths to lean on the host government to participate in a peace process in good faith.

[113] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[114] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[115] Ibid.

Lesson learned: the hybrid mission suffered from an inherent problem: lack of strategic alignment.

This, in turn, stemmed from the UN and AU's struggles to fuse "the strategic visions, objectives, and distinct cultures and working methods of the two organizations," a lack of experience with this partnership model, which stymied the full realization of the benefits of the hybridity of the mission. Additionally, limited experience with certain components of the UNAMID mandate, including the meaning of the protection of civilians, the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and, more importantly, a lack of a cooperative host government also proved to be problematic.[116] The key challenge was that these organizations were quite different; they had different priorities, different procedures for designing their peace operations, and different philosophies for peace operations.[117]

Recommendation to the AU and UN: (1) Establish a robust support and coordination mechanism similar to the Addis Ababa model and streamline the political leadership.

In addition to coordinating between a mission's two parent organizations, it should raise awareness among the regional troop-contributing countries and combine the roles of separate special envoys into a single, joint position to create greater coherence in political support for peace agreements. It should also reduce tensions between parallel supporting bodies (ideally avoided or minimized from the outset) to enhance the mission's effectiveness, reduce its susceptibility to manipulation by the host government, and provide clear rules of engagement for the head of the mission.

3b. Mali

Contextualization

Conflict Overview

The conflict in Mali stems from a complex interplay of historical grievances, ethnic divisions, and political manipulation.[118] After Mali's independence from France in 1960, the country encountered challenges in consolidating authority over its vast territory. The northern regions, inhabited predominantly by Tuareg and Arab communities, became focal points of resistance due to longstanding distrust and the Malian state's repressive tactics.

A series of uprisings starting in 1960 and recurring in 1991, 2006, and 2012 highlighted the deep-seated resentment among northern populations toward the central government in Bamako.[119] Despite periodic peace agreements and demobilization efforts, tensions between the

[116] UN Security Council, "Summary report on lessons learned from the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," December 29, 2021, p. 5.
[117] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[118] Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, *The roots of Mali's conflict*, Clingendael, 2012.
[119] Chauzal, *The roots of Mali's conflict*.

North and South persisted. Bamako's strategy of exploiting interethnic tensions and favoring specific Tuareg tribes through electoral zoning further exacerbated the divide.[120] The situation boiled over in January 2012 when the MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group, initiated a rebellion seeking autonomy for the northern region of Azawad. Islamist militant groups took advantage of the power vacuum and seized control of territory in the north, further destabilizing the security situation. In March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis by members of the military. The extremist insurgency and the unconstitutional change of government resulted in a dual crisis that led the international community to intervene.

Mapping of Actors

A multitude of different national, regional, and international actors became involved in the Mali crisis following its eruption. The power vacuum created by the coup and the escalating security crisis led ECOWAS to make an initial response. The organization, as illustrated in Figure 3b.1, would impose immediate sanctions on the military junta and begin negotiations with the MNLA. Despite this, the MNLA, Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO moved towards Bamako and continued to acquire more territorial strongholds. With the security situation rapidly worsening, the interim Malian government later called upon ECOWAS, the AU, and its member states to help maintain the country's territorial integrity. However, ECOWAS' efforts to mobilize a stabilization mission failed to achieve sufficient resourcing to deploy. The AU subsequently took the reins and began efforts to provide a rapid response operation to the unconstitutional change in government and extremist insurgencies, which prompted the creation of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).

Figure 3b.1. Mali's Dual Crises

[120] Ibid.



In coordination with the European Union, which mobilized a training mission (EUTM-Mali), and other international partners, AFISMA was initially charged with recovering and stabilizing the northern territory and strengthening Mali's defense and security forces.[121] However, the adverse trajectory of the conflict and AU capacity constraints would shift the operational strategy with France later deploying an international counter-insurgency intervention, Operation Serval.[122] Chadian combat troops would also deploy alongside the French, under the authorization of the AU and "with command and control integrated with the French forces." [123] Together, Operational Serval and AFISMA impeded the entrenchment of the aforementioned armed groups and pushed the insurgents out of the main cities in the north. However, the growing demands of the dual crisis eventually drove the interim Malian government and France to push for a robust, multilateral UN operation. In July 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed.

Background and Politics of Mandate Creation

The principles guiding African peacekeeping were in flux as conflict broke out in Mali. The AU had pronounced a policy of non-indifference to conflicts on the continent but had yet to flesh out how the AU's claim to primacy in the realm of peace and security squared with the principle of subsidiarity afforded to regional economic communities (RECs). Subsidiarity initially took precedence when Mali's dual crises exploded, as ECOWAS initially sought to lead the

[121] World Peace Foundation, "Mali Mission Brief."
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.

peacekeeping response. However, the ECOWAS mission never came to fruition for two reasons: 1) ECOWAS simply did not have the capacity to mobilize a peacekeeping force, and 2) the conflict had spillover potential into Algeria and Chad, who were not members of ECOWAS but wanted a role in responding to the crisis.[124]

The UNSC authorized AFISMA's deployment with Resolution 2085, passed on December 20, 2012. The resolution mandated AFISMA to help strengthen the Malian armed forces, protect civilians, and ensure humanitarian access in the north. AFISMA was also mandated to conduct stabilization operations "following the recovery of national territory" and called for further planning on an offensive military strategy toward this end.[125]

While coordination between the UN, AU, and ECOWAS was effective in devising the strategic concept for AFISMA, a key point of contention was the UN's denial of the AU's request for a funding and logistics support package, as had been the case in Somalia.[126] The UNSC was hesitant to provide such overt support for an offensive military operation (despite having recently done so in the case of MONUSCO). There was concern that the UN wouldn't be able to act on humanitarian and peacekeeping imperatives while also funding offensive force. This created a divide between the AU and the UN and led to a prolonged timeline for the deployment of AFISMA – which initially was not scheduled to deploy until eighteen months after the coup.[127]

Soon after, rebels began closing in on Mali's capital, leading France to launch Operation Serval to slow their advance. AFISMA's deployment was expedited to February 2013, and the mission took on a backup role to Serval, creating tandem operations in which France would recover territory from rebels, and then AFISMA would step in to secure and protect France's gains. However, AFISMA troops were not uniformly equipped to provide requisite security. While the capacity of troops varied based on the troop-contributing country, AFISMA troops were better equipped to train Malian forces rather than engage in operations themselves.[128]

In light of AFISMA's weaknesses, which also included a lack of consistent funding, the UN Secretary-General proposed two options for the future of the mission: 1) to bolster AFISMA's operational capacity and establish a political component of the mission or 2) to replace AFISMA with a UN peacekeeping mission.[129] Malian, French, and ECOWAS stakeholders preferred the latter, as did the French. Their support was based on the assumption that with a UN mission would come additional UN resources, and the French felt they would more likely be able to withdraw Operation Serval and transition some of its responsibilities over to a UN mission.[130]

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[124] Arthur Boutellis and Paul Williams, "Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship," *African Affairs*, Volume 113, Issue 451, April 2014, p. 254–278.
[125] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2085 (S/RES/2085), December 20, 2012.
[126] World Peace Foundation, "Mali Mission Brief."
[127] Boutellis and Williams, "Partnership peacekeeping."
[128] World Peace Foundation, "Mali Mission Brief."
[129] Aditi Gorur, "The Political Strategy of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali," United Nations University Centre for Policy Research & Stimson Center, 2020.
[130] World Peace Foundation, "Mali Mission Brief."

However, AU support for the transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA came with certain preconditions laid out in a March 7, 2013 communique of the Peace and Security Council[131]:

1) The mission has a robust peace enforcement mandate
2) The Secretary-General appoints the head of AFISMA, Pierre Buyoya, as his special representative of the new mission
3) The mandate provides for the central political role of the AU and ECOWAS

These conditions were not met by UN Security Council Resolution 2100, which authorized MINUSMA on April 25, 2013. The mandate reflected a more integrated political and peacekeeping approach than that of AFISMA, and the mission was to absorb the UN's pre-existing political mission, the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM). MINUSMA was authorized to conduct stabilization operations and extend state authority throughout Mali while also supporting the implementation of the transitional roadmap by which Mali was to return to democratic, civilian governance.[132] The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who later would be announced to be Albert Koenders, not Pierre Buyoya, was assigned primary responsibility for mediating future peace efforts, denying the AU its desired central role.[133]

In response, the AU issued a statement expressing discontent that Africa had not been adequately consulted in the development of MINUSMA's mandate, going against "the spirit of partnership that the AU and United Nations [had] been striving to promote for many years."[134] This hurt the already precarious partnership of the UN and AU in Mali. The heart of the issue lay in the AU's perceived exclusion from decision-making processes and the feeling that the UN had not acknowledged the significant contributions of the AU to Mali's peace and security.[135] The AU wanted to play a central role in supporting Mali's political transition by shepherding governance reforms to address the root causes of the crisis.[136] These aspirations were not realized, as the AU found itself sidelined from the core deliberations, effectively diminishing its influence.

Analysis of AU-UN Partnership

Comparative Advantages of the AU and UN

The UN and the AU present comparative advantages in terms of their respective supply capabilities. The AU, leveraging its regional presence and partnerships, typically demonstrates a capacity for swift and cost-effective deployment of troops to address crises. However, in the case of Mali, this rapid mobilization advantage was not fully utilized. Instead, France had to deploy

[131] AU Peace and Security Council, 358th Ministerial Meeting, "Communiqué," PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLVIII), March 7, 2013.
[132] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2100 (S/RES/2100), 25 April 2013.
[133] Arthur Boutellis and Paul Williams, "Disagreements Over Mali Could Sour More Than Upcoming African Union Celebration," IPI, May 15, 2013.
[134] AU Peace and Security Council, 371st Ministerial Meeting, "Communiqué," PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLXXI), April 25, 2013.
[135] Boutellis and Williams, "Partnership peacekeeping."
[136] Thomas G. Weiss, "The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond."

Operation Serval due to the AU's lag in its response.[137] The absence of a stable peace accord necessitated swift action, which the AU could not provide effectively. Therefore, its comparative advantage in rapid mobilization was not effectively leveraged in the Mali crisis, resulting in France's intervention to contain the escalating conflict.

Another comparative advantage of the AU is its greater understanding of the local context and its perceived legitimacy by local actors. For example, human rights observers deployed under the banner of AFISMA were seen as having greater access to the population due to their shared identity and values.[138] This is critical for effective human rights monitoring and an important counterpoint to arguments discounting the AU's human rights capacity.

The UN possessed broader financial and logistical support mechanisms, enabling sustained and comprehensive peace operations. Through its assessed peacekeeping budget and innovative funding mechanisms, the UN provided crucial technical assistance and financial backing to MINUSMA, ensuring the long-term viability of peacekeeping efforts. Furthermore, the transition to MINUSMA underscored the UN's capacity to provide sustainable support, leveraging its institutional experience and resources to facilitate a smooth handover from AFISMA. While the AU demonstrated agility and regional legitimacy in its initial response, the UN's broader financial and logistical capabilities were pivotal in ensuring the longevity of the peace operations, marking a collaborative effort between the two organizations.

Transition and Re-hatting of the Mission

To operationalize the transition, it was decided that AFISMA troops would be re-hatted under the banner of the UN. The UNSC requested "the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS, AFISMA military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations standards."[139] As a result, nearly 6,600 military and police personnel were absorbed into MINSUMA, including all AFISMA forces from eleven African TCCs, as mentioned below in Table 3b.1.[140]

Table 3b.1. The Number of Troops and FPU Personnel Re-hatted by Country in MINUSMA

[137] Thomas. G. Weiss and Martin Welz, "The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?" *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, *90*(4), 889–905. 2012.
[138] Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, "The future of African peace operations," The Nordic Africa Institute, Zed Books, 2016.
[139] UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), *Inspection and Evaluation Division | Evaluation Report of Re-hatting in MINUSMA and MINUSCA*, February 12, 2018, p. 7-38.
[140] Ibid.

T/PCCs	Troops	Police	Total
Benin	305		305
Burkina Faso	667		667
Chad	1,246		1,246
Côte D'Ivoire	126		126
Guinea	850		850
Ghana	128		128
Liberia	46		46
Nigeria	687	140	827
Niger	657		657
Senegal	510	140	650
Togo	939	146	1,085
Total Re-Hatted	**6,161**	**426**	**6,587**
Total Authorized Strength	11,200	1,440	12,640
Re-Hatted Forces As % Of Total	55%	30%	52%

A) Benefits

The re-hatting of the mission provided considerable political and human security advantages from which the UN and AU benefitted. Re-hatting enabled the rapid deployment of forces and demonstrated that the UN was responsive to the crisis and human suffering the country was undergoing. The immediate force presence helped to avoid security gaps and provide needed stabilization and civilian protection while

facilitating a political transition. Additionally, since AFISMA already had a presence in Mali, AU troops came with the area knowledge and expertise that MINUSMA needed to operate on the ground. It helped circumvent some logistical issues and speed up the planning process of getting troops onto the field as they were already deployed, could rely on neighboring states for logistics, and came with operational experience and self-sustainment services.[141] In doing so, it also helped avoid additional financial costs for the UN. As encapsulated within our interviews, to get people and equipment out and then back into a specific context is costly. It's also operationally challenging as it makes getting institutional resources in and out of a complex setting logistically, administratively, and bureaucratically complicated.[142] As such, the more individuals retained within a particular context–in this case, Mali, the better it was for the UN to circumvent the aforementioned challenges once MINUSMA was deployed. Lastly, re-hatting demonstrated regional solidarity among AU member states with the Malian government and joint efforts to maintain regional peace and security. As such, the full participation of all AFISMA forces in MINUSMA thus showed the AU's commitment to the principle of African-led solutions to African problems, even under the banner of a UN mission.[143]

B) Challenges

However, AFISMA's re-hatting later proved to hinder MINUSMA's operational effectiveness in meeting the demands of the conflict. AFISMA employed counterterrorism and counter-insurgency tactics, so their training and experience were not applicable to MINUSMA's mandate. Many AU member states likewise felt the transition process was too opaque and expedited with little consultation, as the UN only had nine weeks to complete re-hatting. "Although AFISMA FPUs were inspected, no formal training of its military units had been undertaken."[144] The AU furthermore differed on the necessity of re-hatting as they found the decision was largely based on political rather than technical considerations. The organization pointed out the "technical benchmarking that was previously conducted to determine if the context was ripe for a peacekeeping mission," which had established the security situation was not ready for such an operation.[145] As such, the AU questioned whether a UN mission would be well-suited for the high intensity of the dual crisis at hand. For that reason, some AU member states felt that AFISMA had made considerable successes in improving northern Mali's security situation and cultivating an environment in which transition to a UN mission was possible—a feat they believed was ignored by the UN.

The rapid re-hatting also caused several operational challenges. As conveyed in our interviews, it takes sufficient time for contingents to adapt to the different procedures, operations, and standards of a new mission once it is re-hatted—as this was the case over time with

[141] Katharina Coleman and Paul Williams, "Logistics Partnerships in Peace Operations," IPI, p. 20-21, June 2017.
[142] Interview 3, March 18, 2024.
[143] Interview 7, April 5, 2024.
[144] UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Inspection and Evaluation Division.*
[145] Ibid.

MINUSMA.[146] AU forces had previously been under a very different command-and-control structure under a different kind of Force Commander. In becoming a UN mission, most of MINUSMA's force planning and command-and-control arrangements changed over time, becoming different from AFISMA. [147] This also meant that previous actions and conduct that had been permissible under the AFISMA mandate were no longer admissible once the mission was re-hatted under the UN banner. As such, if certain acts were conducted, they became highly problematic. This, in turn, affected the mission's legitimacy and began to erode the host government's confidence and expectations as compared to the previous arrangements under AFISMA.

A series of pre-deployment processes were furthermore skipped once AFISMA's re-hatting took place. Prior to a mission's actual deployment, pre-deployment training is done to prepare all peacekeeping personnel–military, police, or civilian–to effectively function in a UN peacekeeping operation.[148] It is also done to ensure that all personnel are brought up to UN standards, policies, and procedures. Since the re-hatted troops were already on the ground, some steps had been skipped.[149] Limited due consideration was given to properly vetting and training these contingents. This largely stemmed from the re-hatting process being largely ad hoc, numbers-driven, and incognizant of past re-hatting experiences. Following AFISMA's transfer of responsibility, the primary concern was to deploy as many troops as possible to respond to the context's security situation. For that reason, AFISMA's military units did not receive sufficient formal training and were ill-equipped for most of the mission's handover, causing the AU to feel sentiments of the transition process being too expedited with little consultation. The relationship between the AU and the UN became strained as the UN did not fulfill the former's request for a UN-funded logistical support package for AFISMA. Although the UN helped to prepare AU contingents for re-hatting through their provisions of mission-support services and their efforts to upgrade troop capabilities, AFISMA nevertheless encountered critical shortfalls in training and logistics.[150] The equipment and self-sustainment capabilities of several TCCs remained below UN standards by the time of transition and troop handover.[151] Consequently, it created many more challenges in the mission that the UN had to deal with later in MINUSMA. The various shortcomings prior to and leading up to re-hatting would, in turn, all challenge the partnership and coordination of the UN and AU and, by doing so, hinder the full realization of each mission's mandate.

Limited efforts to properly vet and train AU forces later had a damaging effect once the transition to MINUSMA started, given the negative consequences of re-hatting. Different human rights and reputational risks arose prior to AFISMA's handover. Many of these risks involved questionable human rights records of some of the AU forces under the mission. They also

[146] Interview 8, March 27, 2024.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Interview 3, March 18, 2024.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Coleman and Williams, "Logistics Partnerships in Peace Operations."; Interview 9, April 24, 2024.
[151] Ibid.

notably included 64 accusations of human rights violations against re-hatted contingents.[152] Allegations of physical assault against civilians, excessive use of force, arbitrary detention, and SEA were manifest at the time of AFISMA's re-hatting. Despite this, limited action was taken to mitigate these concerns. "AU interlocutors reported gaps and unmet training needs for integrating human rights, and the AU lacked systems for recording and managing information on human rights records of its forces." [153] Because of this, the UN could not obtain sufficient and reliable information on the AFISMA troops' human rights track records.

There was, similarly, scant implementation of the Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN personnel, which is relevant for re-hatting. This largely stemmed from the policy being heavily reliant on self-certification by T/PCCs for deploying formed units. Furthermore, the UN did not fully comply with its Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) while supporting AFISMA troops. Prior to re-hatting, the Security Council initially requested the UN to support the contingents in line with the HRDDP to ensure the troops' compliance with UN human rights norms. "Following such orders, the UN would later conduct risk assessments for all AFISMA forces and, in doing so, consider the records of these contingents as "relevant for possible future behavior." [154] It would go so far as to even identify several mitigating measures to ensure AU forces' compliance. However, due to time pressures, capacity constraints, and the brevity of AFISMA's deployment, most of the assessments remained as drafts and were not adequately acted upon.[155] UN support thus commenced before the risk assessments and mitigation measures could be implemented. It is a core principle of the UN to ensure compliance with accountability, international norms and standards, and human rights values. Limited action to address and mitigate these concerns during AFISMA's handover affected local perception, the mission's legitimacy, and how each mission could engage on the ground—negatively impacting mandate implementation.

Overall, AFISMA's re-hatting and eventual handover had notable benefits for the UN and the AU. Considering the shifting peace and security challenges Mali was undergoing, the mission's handover presented itself as the most appropriate recourse to halting the prospect of a greater security vacuum in the region. At the same time, scant consideration was given to its consultation and planning. Such limitations created relevant challenges and risks that affected the full implementation of each mission's mandate. Under the framework of future partnerships between the UN and the AU, substantial planning, risk assessment, and consultation must be involved in the early stages of re-hatting–especially in the event of future AU-led peace operations.

Impacts of the capacity asymmetry between the UN and AU

[152] UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Inspection and Evaluation Division*.
[153] Ibid.; Interview 9, April 24, 2024.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid; Interview 9, April 24, 2024.

The AU-UN partnership in Mali was challenged by the capacity asymmetry between the two organizations. The UN benefitted from sixty years of peacekeeping experience and a seven-billion-dollar annual peacekeeping budget, while the AU was only 10 years old and had no dedicated budget for peace support operations.[156] So, while the UN may have wanted to embrace subsidiarity, the reality that any successful peacekeeping operation in Mali would rely on UN funding meant that there was an inevitable power imbalance between the two organizations.

This dynamic hindered AFISMA from its inception. While trying to generate forces for the AU-led mission, certain potential TCCs refrained from pledging troops, foreseeing that compensation would be greater if they waited to contribute troops until the mission was replaced by a UN PKO.[157]

The power imbalance was even clearer during the process of developing MINUSMA's mandate. As described above, the AU's preferences for the mission's mandate and leadership were not respected. Preferences of the UNSC took precedence inherently because they oversaw the body that would allocate funding to the mission. UNSC members Argentina, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Russia advocated against a robust peace enforcement mandate for MINUSMA.[158] France leveraged its influence to encourage a speedy transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA, in part because it saw the UN mission as providing an exit strategy for its own Operation Serval.[159] Political preferences of the UNSC, rather than an articulated strategy reflective of needs on the ground, guided the development of MINUSMA's mandate.

Coordination during the transition period

The plurality of actors presents in Mali from the outset of the crisis made the development of a coherent strategy, linking political and peacekeeping imperatives, difficult. The European Union had deployed a training mission to build the capacity of Malian forces, France had mobilized Operation Serval, which was to be reconstituted as a small rapid reaction force once MINUSMA was deployed, and the UN already had a Special Envoy for the Sahel and a Special Representative for West Africa. Meanwhile, the AU had a Special Representative in Mali, and the UK and France had also designated special envoys for the Sahel.[160]

Figure 3b.2. The Timeline and Plurality of Actors in Mali

[156] Boutellis and Williams, "Partnership peacekeeping."
[157] Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, "The future of African peace operations," The Nordic Africa Institute, Zed Books, 2016.
[158] Jaïr van der Lijn, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019.
[159] Arthur Boutellis, "Mali's Peacekeeping Mission: Full-Fledged Behemoth, or Have Lessons Been Learned?", International Peace Institute Global Observatory, March 12, 2023.
[160] Ibid.



There was no single body to coordinate these actors. Instead, several mechanisms existed, with differing mandates and membership.[161] Interviewees were largely unfamiliar with these mechanisms, however, and one said that coordination between international actors in Mali was mostly ad hoc.[162] As a result, parallel efforts developed with the same objectives but no coordination. For example, the EU Training Mission was established at France's encouragement, duplicating AFIMSA's efforts to strengthen the Malian Army. This was an intentional choice on France's part, opting to create a new mechanism over which it would have greater control.[163] This approach sacrifices efficiency through the division of labor based on the comparative advantages of the various actors on the ground in Mali.

Perceptions of the Missions

Understanding the perceptions of peacekeeping missions, whether they are joint efforts by the UN and AU or regional initiatives, is crucial for assessing their impact and legitimacy among the host country's citizens. In Mali, the reception of the French operation, AFISMA, and MINUSMA missions varied significantly depending on the perceived effectiveness and tangible outcomes of

[161] These mechanisms include the Mali Integrated Task Force, the Joint Coordination Mechanism, and the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali.
[162] Interview 10, February 21, 2024.
[163] Thomas Weiss and Martin Welz, "The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?" *International Affairs*, Vol 90., No. 4, July 2014.

an intervention (pragmatic legitimacy) and the alignment of the mission with the values and beliefs of the local population (ideological legitimacy). Analyzing these perceptions provides valuable insights into how peace interventions are received and the factors influencing their legitimacy.

In the case of the French operation, its pragmatic legitimacy stemmed from its ability to swiftly respond to the crisis and combat rebel forces, earning praise for its decisive military action. However, it faced ideological criticism due to perceptions of ulterior motives and a lack of cultural resonance with the Malian population. AFISMA, being a regional force comprising troops from neighboring African countries, enjoyed strong ideological legitimacy. It was seen as a manifestation of solidarity and shared identity among regional states, fostering a sense of fraternity and collective responsibility. However, AFISMA struggled to gain pragmatic legitimacy, as its operational inefficiencies and limited capabilities raised doubts about its effectiveness in addressing the conflict on the ground.[164]

MINUSMA, as a UN-led mission, faced challenges on both fronts. While it received pragmatic appreciation for certain military achievements, such as pushing back rebel forces, it encountered widespread ideological disapproval. Many Malians viewed MINUSMA as an external force lacking cultural and political resonance, leading to suspicions about its motives and capabilities.[165]

Lastly, the composition of re-hatted troops affected MINUSMA's perception. Nearly 45% of re-hatted contingents came from neighboring countries.[166] While the involvement of these countries as T/PCCs provided notable benefits for the mission's deployment, it presents reputational and political risks for the UN. As encapsulated within our interviews, the selection of TCCs plays a significant role in mission start-up—specifically, within the force generation process. It has been the norm in UN peacekeeping operations not to deploy troops from countries that are contiguous with the mission area.[167] This largely stems from the concern of these T/PCC's motivations for participating in the operation as well as the impact their national interests can have in affecting what is going on the other side of the border.[168] It is a core principle of the UN for its peacekeeping operations to avoid scrupulous activities that compromise its image of impartiality and undermine its legitimacy. However, given the exacerbating nature of the security situation in Mali, more priority was placed on the requisite for rapid troop generation to quickly respond to the crisis at hand and work towards creating a stable environment. As such, five of the re-hatted T/PCCs in MINUSMA were from countries that had close regional proximity to the mission. Furthermore, questions arose about whether re-hatted troops from post-conflict countries that hosted peacekeeping operations and had been parties to

[164] Sophia Sabrow, "Local perceptions of the legitimacy of peace operations by the UN, regional organizations and individual states – a case study of the Mali conflict," International Peacekeeping, Volume 24, issue 1, November 2016, p 159-186.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Interview 7, April 5, 2024; Interview 8, March 27, 2024.
[168] Ibid.

such conflicts were appropriate to be T/PCCs. Two of the re-hatted contingents, Chad, and Côte d'Ivoire, had undergone crises and were undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. "A representative of a permanent member of the Security Council expressed concern as to how the UN could entrust peacekeeping duties to forces from countries that had failed to provide security to their own citizens, had problematic human rights records, and had Security Council sanctions against them."[169] Despite this, scant due consideration was given to the relevant risks involved and how they would affect perceptions of MINUSMA's impartiality and credibility. It is thus imperative that greater consultation is given to not only the benefits but also the different risks involved in troop selection.

Lessons Learned & Recommendations

The transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA highlighted several challenges faced by peacekeeping missions in Africa related to sequencing, capacity, strategic vision, coordination, and alignment with host government needs. However, several interviews confirmed that the Mali "bridging" model - through which an AU mission quickly deployed to conduct peace enforcement operations in the short-term, followed by a longer-term UN multidimensional PKO, is a replicable model for the future. As such, the following lessons learned, and recommendations should be considered while planning and implementing future bridging missions.

Lesson learned: Lack of capacity and funding prevented AFISMA from leveraging the AU's comparative advantage in mobilizing quick response peacekeeping forces.

The initial coalescence behind ECOWAS playing a leading role in the peacekeeping response to the Mali crisis, only to realize that the REC had insufficient capacity, delayed the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Even once the AU took on a leading role, deployment was delayed due to capacity and funding constraints. Once deployed, the inconsistent capabilities of troops at times rendered AFISMA operationally ineffective.

Recommendation for the AU and UN: Before authorizing a mission, consider long-term funding requirements.

While anticipating funding challenges will be less acute in the future, given the AUPSO financing resolution (2719), AU missions will still be responsible for 25% of mission costs. This should be accounted for in mission planning ahead of authorization, with due consideration to long-term funding needs, which goes hand in hand with an effective exit strategy.

Recommendation for the AU: Proactively build peacekeeping capacity.

[169] UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Inspection and Evaluation Division.*

As the UNSC begins to authorize and financially support AU-led missions under Resolution 2719, African troops will likely be called upon in greater numbers to serve in peacekeeping operations. To avoid the pitfalls faced by AFISMA, the AU should provide funding for joint training among member states to proactively prepare for peacekeeping operations. This could happen through existing mechanisms, such as the African Standby Force. Attention should be paid to equalizing capacity across likely troop-contributing countries. Training of troops should focus not only on the military dimensions of peacekeeping but also on protecting civilians and human rights responsibilities.

Lesson Learned: Refusing the AU's requests during the formulation of MINUSMA's initial mandate created tension in the AU-UN relationship, impeding future cooperation in Mali.

Although coordination between the UN, AU, and ECOWAS was imperfect when devising AFISMA's mandate, all parties were on the same page by the time the mission was authorized. The same cannot be said of MINUSMA's authorization, as described above. As a result, the AU felt sidelined from both the peacekeeping and political response to the crisis in Mali following the transition. Even if it was politically impossible for the UN to meet the AU's demands for MINUSMA's mandate, greater attention should have been paid to bringing the AU along during the negotiation process, with the goal of presenting a united, supportive front once the Mission was authorized. Instead, the fracturing was made public, and tensions at the headquarters level trickled down to the field.

Recommendation to the UN: While negotiating UN follow-on PKOs to AU bridging missions, pursue agreement on the UN mission's mandate and provide for the AU's continued leadership role.

It is important to prioritize partnership throughout the transition to ensure the AU's sense of joint ownership over the crisis response. This requires consistent consultation with AU member states, particularly the host country. Before authorizing a mission, it should be confirmed that the AU will profess public support.

Lesson Learned: The plurality of actors in Mali, some with overlapping mandates, led to parallel initiatives that did not maximize efficiency through the division of labor.

The transition to MINUSMA occurred without a clear strategic vision for a division of labor among the multitude of international actors in Mali.[170] The lack of coordination led to parallel initiatives, sometimes with overlapping objectives, that failed to leverage comparative advantage to maximize effectiveness.

[170] Lisa Sharland, *MINUSMA and protection of civilians: Implications for future peacekeeping missions - Mali*, ReliefWeb, July 14, 2023.

Recommendation to the AU and UN: In settings where many international actors are present, use the organization's convening power to ensure a coherent strategy guides all international initiatives.

One interviewee identified that the added value of the AU and UN in crowded settings is the ability to convene stakeholders.[171] Both organizations should leverage this role to build consensus around a sole crisis response strategy, encouraging a coherent division of labor to maximize effectiveness.

Lessons Learned: It is essential to establish a long-term vision and theory of change when planning and implementing bridging missions, particularly for the re-hatting and transition process.

Due to the intensity of the conflict in Mali in 2012, the international community's primary aim was to deploy troops, minimize hostilities, and mitigate spillover potential quickly. Hence, there is a rapid deployment of MINUSMA and re-hatting of AFISMA. However, due consideration must be given to a mission's long-term strategic objectives. Interviewees highlighted that the absence of a long-term strategic vision hurt operational effectiveness.[172] Key decisions regarding the mandate, decision-making timetables, and operational planning - including troop strength and capabilities - were not made before the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA.

Recommendation to the AU and UN: Jointly plan the mandate and objectives of a UN follow-on mission before an initial AU bridging mission is deployed, including plans for the transition and re-hatting process.

In future peace operations using the AU-UN bridging model, it is imperative for the UN and the AU to coordinate on a mutually agreeable plan for how responsibility will be transferred from the UN to the AU and what the mandate and objectives of the eventual UN mission will be. This planning process should include a coherent political strategy that carries over from the AU to the UN mission. This should help minimize tensions during and after the transition process.

Recommendation to the UN: It is imperative to ensure the implementation of human rights screening procedures and due diligence policies during the earliest stages of the re-hatting process and transition planning.

Under the framework of future partnerships between the AU and the UN, the UN must ensure adequate implementation of its human rights screening and due diligence policies when re-hatting AU forces. Limited action and implementation of such procedures had an unfavorable effect once the transition to MINUSMA started, as it affected the mission's legitimacy and its

[171] Interview 2, February 15, 2024.
[172] Interview 11, February 12, 2024.

ability to engage on the ground. Timely coordination on the implementation of these policies at the earliest stage of transition planning should help ensure contingent forces' compliance with human rights standards and ensure their on-the-ground engagement is in alignment with the mandate.

3c. Somalia

Contextualization

Conflict Overview

The long-term conflict in Somalia dates back to the 1960s, when the country, having gained independence, experienced years of dictatorial rule, civil war, and military coups. Since the fall of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991, the country has remained fragmented and torn apart by rival groups and clans to this day. Attempts to unify the country in the early 2000s led to another stage of escalation with the invasion of Ethiopia and the emergence of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, which still controls a significant part of the Central and Southern parts of the country. In 2007, the African Union deployed the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on a peace operation to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in the fight against Al-Shabaab and provide an exit strategy for the Ethiopian forces. In 2009, the UN deployed its logistics mission, the UN Support Office (UNSOA), in response to the growing logistical requirements of the mission.

Despite the long-term AU-UN peace operation, challenges still persist. Al-Shabaab still poses a significant threat, controlling territory and engaging in guerrilla warfare. Efforts to establish a stable government and resolve the conflict continue, but Somalia remains plagued by political instability, humanitarian crises, and security challenges. However, in 2017, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) decided to assume responsibility for the country's security and launch the AMISOM drawdown process. Hence, in 2022, AMISOM transitioned to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which aimed to hand over the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to Somalia Security Forces (SSF, a part of the National Security Architecture). The transition is still at risk because of the low fight capabilities of the SSF, which should take over the full security responsibilities from ATMIS by the end of 2024 and defend the liberated territories from Al-Shabaab on its own. [173]

[173] United Nations, "As African Union Mission in Somalia Draws Down, Al-Shabaab Remains Threat to Country, Region, Special Representative Tells Security Council," October 19, 2023.

Map 1. Somalia map of control, January 2023



Source: Khmer Times,
https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501224123/somali-military-liberates-strategic-town-from-terrorists/#google_vignette

Mapping of Actors of the Conflict in Somalia

The current escalation in Somalia began in 2006, when Ethiopia invaded the country to liberate the neighboring regions of Somalia and the capital city, Mogadishu, from the Union of Islamic Courts (USC). That led to the radicalization of Al-Shabaab *(currently 7000-12000 troops)*,[174] which used to be a "military wing" of USC. As shown in Figure 3c.1 the main confrontation is between non-state armed groups and the FGS, supported by international actors. The main force of non-state armed groups is the Al-Shabaab group, supported by various clans and warlords, mostly in southern and central Somalia. Despite years of attempts to destroy Al-Shabaab, the group remains resilient and continues to confidently oppose the Somali army and AU-UN peacekeeping mission. Al-Shabaab still controls large areas of southern and central Somalia, where the group has established its own government, judicial, and tax systems. In addition, the group controls key supply routes, engages in extortion in other territories, conducts operations against ATMIS troops and the SSF, and undertakes high-profile operations in the Somali capital on a regular basis. Al-Shabaab skillfully exploits political controversies between regions and the

[174] Patricia Zenn, *"Al-Shabaab Versus the Islamic State in Somalia Province,"* Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, March 2023.

central government and confrontations between Somali clans to advance its goals. Al-Shabaab remains committed to overthrowing the FGS and refuses to get into any negotiations with it.

Among the non-state armed groups, there is also the Islamic State in Somali Province. However, this group operates mainly in the Puntland region and is unrelated to Al-Shabaab. ATMIS-UNSOS and SSF regularly conduct joint operations, while Turkey, the UK, and the USA operate more independently, periodically supporting the Somalia National Army (SNA) and conducting various training for military personnel. Also, apart from contributing troops to ATMIS, Ethiopia has deployed its armed forces in Somalia.

Figure 3c.1. Main actors in Somalia Conflict



Analysis of AU-UN Partnership

Sequencing of the Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions in Somalia

The following sequence shows the evolution of international intervention in Somalia, transitioning from immediate humanitarian responses to long-term peacekeeping, security, and state-building operations under the AU and UN partnerships.

Table 3c.1. Sequencing of the Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions in Somalia 1992-2024

UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia I)[175] Deployed in April 1992	UNOSOM I was the first mission by the UN to facilitate humanitarian relief in Somalia following the outbreak of civil war and famine. This operation struggled due to limited mandate and resources.
UNITAF (Unified Task Force)[176] Deployed in December 1992	Led by the United States under the UN banner, known as Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF's mission was to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Although not an AU mission, it was a significant international intervention in Somalia.
UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia II)[177] Deployed in March 1993	Following UNITAF, with a stronger mandate to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations and to assist in rebuilding Somalia's economy and political institutions. The mission faced significant challenges, including the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.
AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia)[178] Deployed in March 2007	AMISOM's primary mission has been to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Over the years, AMISOM has been a key player in combating the insurgent group Al-Shabaab and has been instrumental in recovering territories.
UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia)[179] Established in June 2013	UNSOM was created to provide UN support for the Somali government's peacebuilding and state-building activities. It focuses on governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, disengagement of combatants, human rights protection, and coordination of international assistance.
Transition Plan and Reconfiguration of AMISOM	From 2018 onwards, there has been a gradual transition plan aiming to hand over security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. The transition includes the reconfiguration of AMISOM's operations to support the Somali government more effectively in securing the country against Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups.

[175] United Nations, “UNOSOM I Background,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html.
[176] United Nations, “Use of Force Authorized - UNOSOM I,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html#five.
[177] United Nations, “UNOSOM II Background,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2backgr1.html.
[178] AMISOM, "AMISOM Background," https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.
[179] United Nations, “UNSOM Mandate,” https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate.

ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia)[180] **Replaced AMISOM in April 2022**	The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia is an active African Union transition and drawdown mission from peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Formerly the African Union Mission to Somalia, ATMIS's mandate will end in 2024, with a full transition of security operations to the Somali National Armed Forces.

Mandates

AMISOM was the first mission to be deployed in Somalia, mandated to address the threat of Al-Shabaab, including through offensive operations, collaborate with the Somali security forces, assist in the provisioning of humanitarian assistance, and aid in stabilization, reconciliation, and peace-building efforts.[181] As AMISOM reached over 22,000 uniformed personnel, UNSOA was established as the logistical field support operation[182] for AMISOM to increase its operational effectiveness.[183] UNSOA provided food, water, fuel, medical supplies, transportation, engineering, infrastructure, strategic communications, and defense support. In 2022, the Somali government expressed the desire to take over security responsibilities from AMISOM, so the Somali Transition Plan was created. AMISOM was then transformed into ATMIS, which was mandated to implement the transition plan and scale the drawdown of AU troops through condition-based phases.[184] ATMIS is in the midst of this drawdown, operating as a smaller, more agile mission, transferring security responsibilities to the SSF, with the mission's termination date being December 2024. UNSOA was reconfigured to UNSOS, and despite this change in the acronym, the mission mandate was unchanged. UNSOS continues to provide logistical support to ATMIS in support of the AU mission military drawdown.[185]

The AU-UN peacekeeping partnership dynamic in Somalia has allowed each mission to display its advantages, bringing a useful division of labor.[186] The AU is weak in conducting multidimensional missions; rather, it is better at conducting the military dimension. As the UN has no military force, the AU mission provides troops and conducts peace enforcement operations, while the UN missions provide logistical, strategic, political, and financial support.[187] In this way, the UN and AU missions have been able to complement each other by "having different tools in their toolbox."[188] The AU forces work to create stabilization while the UN assists in creating a political pathway to peace.

[180] ATMIS, "ATMIS Background," https://atmis-au.org/atmis-background/.
[181] AMISON, "AMISOM Mandate," amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/.
[182] UNSOA, "UNSOA Mandate," July 6, 2015, unsoa.unmissions.org/unsoa-mandate.
[183] Annie Schmidt, "UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: Lessons from UNSOA," IPI, May 9, 2020.
[184] ATMIS, "ATMIS Mandate," November 20, 2023, atmis-au.org/atmis-mandate/.
[185] UNSOS, "UNSOS Mandate," September 5, 2022, unsos.unmissions.org/unsos-mandate.
[186] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[187] Paul Williams, *Lessons for "Partnership Peacekeeping" from the African Union Mission in Somalia*, IPI, October 2019.
[188] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.

Troop Contributing Countries

The troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to ATMIS include Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The troops are deployed throughout Southern-Central Somalia in five sectors. Two of the TCCs, Ethiopia and Kenya, share a common border with Somalia and, apart from ATMIS, bilaterally deployed their forces in Somalia at least once. The ENDF is still being deployed in Somalia through bilateral agreements between two countries. Both countries have bilateral interests in Somalia that at times outweigh their loyalty to the mission. For example, Ethiopia, which has the longest common border with Somalia, is interested in ensuring the security of border areas. The initial goal of the first AMISOM deployment, inter alia, was to ensure the exit of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, which were deployed from 2006 to 2009. Ethiopia's participation in the peacekeeping operation is explained by the need to ensure the security of the bordering Ogaden region, which is called the "Somali region of Ethiopia," with a population of about 4 million ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia has often influenced Somali domestic politics and the Ethiopian forces that are deployed in Somalia supported pro-Ethiopian political groups. Additionally, tensions have escalated recently between Ethiopia and Somalia due to an agreement signed by Addis Ababa with Somaliland regarding access to the port of Berbera. This led to increased anti-Ethiopian sentiments in Somalia, which may affect the activities of the ENDF troops within ATMIS.[189]

Kenya, which borders Somalia's Jubaland region, has similar interests in preventing Al-Shabaab from encroaching on the Kenyan border. Kenya has been the target of attacks from Al-Shabaab on more than one occasion, so security in Somalia is important to Nairobi. Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia in 2011 during the operation "Linda Nchi," which was completed in 2012. The main goal of the operation was to create a buffer zone to prevent Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil, however the Kenyans may have desired to be seen as a reliable partner in the U.S.-led 'global war on terrorism,' with certain political elites possibly advancing their personal political and economic agendas.[190]

Relations between Somalia and Kenya deteriorated after Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta hosted the political leadership from Somaliland in December 2020. Mogadishu cut off diplomatic ties and accused Nairobi of meddling in its internal affairs.[191] However, the relationship was restored in 2021. In 2022, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Mogadishu for the inauguration of Somalia's newly elected president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, marking an easing of relations between the two countries.[192]

These bilateral deployments created additional confusion and placed the mission in the difficult position of denying involvement in activities conducted by a TCC. There were also other

[189] International Crisis Group, *The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal,* March 2024.
[190] International Crisis Group, *The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,* February 2012.
[191] Victoria Amunga, "Somalia President Visits Kenya Amid Recent Tensions," Voice of America, July 15, 2022.
[192] Africanews.com, "Kenya, Somalia in fresh diplomatic row," June 15, 2022, https://www.africanews.com/2022/06/15/kenya-somalia-in-fresh-diplomatic-row/.

international actors that provided counterterrorism support, equipment, and training to Somali forces, including the U.S., the UK, the EU, and Turkey. [193]

Funding Overview

The effectiveness of the AU and UN partnership in Somalia has been significantly shaped by the funding structures of the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. While the international community's support has been crucial for the missions' operations, the associated restraints and conditions have historically posed challenges.[194] Balancing donor expectations with mission requirements and ensuring that funding aligns with the strategic objectives of peace and security in Somalia remain ongoing challenges for the AU-UN partnership. The missions within the AU-UN partnership have been primarily financed through a mix of contributions from AU member states, the AU Peace Fund, the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM and Somali National Army, bilateral and multilateral partners, including the European Union (EU), the United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as logistical support from the UN Support Office. This diverse funding landscape arose due to the AU member states' inability to fully finance the missions as originally planned, leading to a heavy reliance on non-AU sources. The initial financial model proposed by the AU, where member states would bear the costs for the first three months and then be reimbursed, proved impractical. Consequently, AMISOM's substantial operational costs, which escalated from approximately $350 million in 2009 to $900 million by 2016, were covered through this complex array of external funding sources, with considerable support from bilateral donors for TCCs and substantial logistical backing from the UN.[195]

One of the underlying factors that drove the transition from AMISOM to ATMIS was financial constraints and complex challenges. AMISOM, heavily reliant on external funding from the UN, EU, and other partners, faced sustainability issues due to its complex funding mechanisms and the high operational costs that increased significantly over the years. The EU, as one of the major financiers, had its funding mechanisms characterized by bureaucratic delays and, at one point, reduced peacekeeper allowances by 20%, highlighting the financial strains and operational constraints faced by the mission.[196] This situation necessitated a more sustainable model that could ensure continued support and effectiveness in addressing Somalia's security challenges. ATMIS was envisioned to provide a more streamlined and efficient framework for international support, focusing on transitioning security responsibilities to Somali forces and securing the gains made by AMISOM against Al-Shabaab and other violent groups within a framework that could better manage the operational and financial complexities of peacekeeping in Somalia. The AU and UN emphasize the importance of a gradual drawdown of ATMIS, which is aligned with Somalia's strategic needs and security situation.[197] The international community, including China,

[193] International Crisis Group, "Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia," November 2021, p. 4-5.
[194] International Peace Institute, *AMISOM: African Union Peacekeeping and Financing*, January 2017.
[195] Effective Peace Operations Network, *EPON AMISOM Report*, January 2018.
[196] African Union Mission in Somalia, *EU Reiterates Its Continued Support for AMISOM*, April 2016.
[197] European External Action Service, EU Statement – UN High-Level Meeting on ATMIS Financing and Resourcing for the Somali Security Transition, March 23, 2023.

Russia, and other Security Council members, has debated the timeline and conditions for ATMIS' drawdown, highlighting the need for flexible, security-driven planning.[198]

In terms of humanitarian efforts, for 2024, humanitarian partners, including the UN, have outlined a funding requirement of US$1.6 billion to assist 5.2 million people out of 6.9 million who need life-saving humanitarian and protection assistance in Somalia. This plan reflects a strategic shift towards a more targeted response, addressing the most severe needs amidst challenges like climatic shocks, conflict, poverty, and disease outbreaks. The 2024 funding requirement represents a 37% reduction from the previous year's $2.6 billion, aimed at meeting the needs of 7.6 million people.[199]

Comparative Advantages of the AU and UN

The AU-UN partnership brings several comparative advantages in terms of supply and capabilities. The AU mission brings regional knowledge and expertise of local contexts and regional dynamics, which is invaluable in addressing the conflict situation effectively. By partnering with the UN, which has a global reach, the peacekeeping operations benefit from the AU's local expertise and the UN's global experience. With the AU's regional knowledge, these missions have better access to local resources, networks, and personnel, while the UN brings financial and logistical support. By pooling their resources together and aligning their strategies, they can achieve more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to complex issues while avoiding the duplication of efforts and maximizing their impact.

How Did It Meet the Host Country's Demands?

The AU-UN partnership leverages the AU's strengths in military operations and regional expertise against the UN's capacity for logistical, political, and financial support, theoretically crafting a holistic approach to peacekeeping that should align closely with the needs on the ground. However, there is a critical gap in this synergy when it comes to addressing the comprehensive needs of the host country, which often extend beyond the immediate military stabilization to include humanitarian aid, governance, infrastructure, and socio-economic development. Moreover, for Somalia, the demand for security is intertwined with the need for political stability, economic development, and social cohesion. Although crucial, the AU's focus on military dimensions does not fully address the complex tapestry of needs that contribute to lasting peace. The UN's support roles in logistics, strategy, and politics are essential but can be hampered by the lack of a direct military component and sometimes by bureaucratic delays and the challenge of aligning international support with immediate local needs.

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[198] Security Council Report, *Somalia: Votes on the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and on the Renewal of the Sanctions Regime*, November 2023.

[199] United Nations in Somalia, *Humanitarian partners seek US$1.6 billion to assist 5.2 million people in Somalia in 2024,* January 30, 2024, https://somalia.un.org/en/259189-humanitarian-partners-seek-us16-billion-assist-52-million-people-somalia-2024.

This persisting mismatch between supply (the capabilities and focus of the AU-UN partnership) and demand (the comprehensive needs of the host country) suggests that while this partnership is beneficial, it is not fully optimized for the multifaceted challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Evidence of this can be seen in the persistent instability and recurring challenges in regions where these partnerships have been deployed. Despite their efforts, the lack of a unified command structure and the sometimes-divergent priorities of the AU-UN can lead to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for creating lasting peace.

Challenges for the AMISOM and UN Logistical Support Partnership (2007-2021)

To analyze the challenges faced by the AU and UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, it is necessary to understand the difference in the conceptual approach of the two organizations to peacekeeping operations. The UN's peacekeeping doctrine is based on three main principles: (1) consent of the host country and main conflict parties; (2) impartiality; (3) non-use of force, except for self-defense and defense of the mandate.[200] Whereas the AU does not have an official doctrine for its peace and support operations, according to the practice, it sees peace operations as an opportunity to enforce peace and is more willing to engage in combat against particular armed groups.[201] These discrepancies are reflected in all areas of AMISOM and UNSOA activities, starting from restrictions on the use of lethal weapons and ending with safety assessment criteria for peacekeeping missions. For a more detailed analysis, we divided the cooperation between the two missions into the following areas:

Logistical Supply Challenges

UNSOA was an unprecedented mission deployed by the UN in response to the AU's request. Initially, UNSOA had to prepare the groundwork for the transition to a UN peacekeeping mission, but this did not occur. Increasing volatility in Somalia made it unfeasible to transform AMISOM into a UN mission.[202]

At the initial stage, the main logistics support problems were related to the rapidly growing tasks of AMISOM, to which UNSOA did not have time to adapt. For instance, according to Paul Williams, between 2009 and 2015, the AMISOM's mandate expanded eight times, and the number of personnel went from 8,000 to 33,500, so geographically, UNSOA's area of operation had to increase by 4000 times. However, UNSOA staff increased only from 249 to 450 people, whereas the budget grew only 2.8 times.[203] Under such conditions, AMISOM troops did not receive sufficient supplies, which affected the units' combat capabilities. Later, the number of structures that UNSOA had to support also increased. While UNSOA's original mandate was to provide logistics support for AMISOM, by 2015, there was a need to support the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the SNA. As a result, the UN decided to expand the mandate of UNSOA and transition to UNSOS.

[200] Paul Williams, "Fighting for Peace in Somalia," Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 219.
[201] Williams, "Fighting for Peace in Somalia," p. 219.
[202] Adebayo Kareem, "From AMISOM to ATMIS." April 2023, p. 5.
[203] Williams, "Fighting for Peace in Somalia," p. 219.

The main challenges to logistics cooperation between AMISOM and UNSOA stem from the two organizations' different approaches to peacekeeping operations. The UN considers that to carry out a peacekeeping operation, it is necessary to first achieve peace or a ceasefire, while the African Union views a peacekeeping operation as an opportunity to "enforce and establish peace." The difference in conceptual approaches is reflected in bureaucratic procedures, reporting documentation, methods, and rules of logistics support. Consequently, UNSOA was based on UN procedures and mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping operations rather than a war-fighting mission.

There is a saying, “Logistics is all or almost all of the field of military activities except combat,” by Baron de Jomini (1838), which describes the importance of logistics at war. [204] Logistics is an integral part of an army and should ideally be controlled by the commander. However, in the case of AMISOM, this system was changed, and military commanders depended on the UN's logistical mission, affecting combat efficiency. Moreover, sometimes, the UN logistical mission was under-resourced and incapable of fulfilling the AMISOM’s demand. [205]

In addition, AMISOM and UNSOA did not share many rules and regulations for accountability and disciplinary sanctions, which created many problems with accountability for fuel, food, water, etc.[206] For these reasons, it was difficult to hold accountable some AMISOM soldiers, causing environmental damage, wasting water, etc. Also, the AU was not good at preventing soldiers from using indiscriminate force against civilians and engaging in sexual exploitation, which could have negatively affected the UN's prestige since the peace-keeping mission was perceived by the Somali society as a “joint mission.” [207]

Another challenge was that the UN logistics missions provided supplies to five of the AMISOM six sector headquarters, and AMISOM sector commands were expected to transport the supplies from the headquarters to various FOBs by road.[208] Oftentimes, it was dangerous to deliver the supplies by road because of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) installed by Al-Shabaab. Moreover, the AMISOM forces were not trained to conduct such operations, which created additional risks.

Restoration of the Security System

When the operation was conducted in the capital city of Mogadishu, AMISOM played a leading role in the fight against Al-Shabaab, but as it expanded beyond the capital city, AMISOM often relied on the SNA. Therefore, one of the main challenges for AMISOM was to assist TFG in creating an efficient SNA from scratch. Completely destroyed state institutions, corruption, and

[204] Peter Williams, “Flexible logistics in a fluid, modern security environment,” NATO Review, 2018.
[205] Interview 12, March 29, 2024.
[206] Williams, “Fighting for Peace in Somalia,” p. 223-224.
[207] Human Rights Watch, Statement regarding the Recent Report on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by AMISOM Peacekeepers, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/25/statement-regarding-recent-report-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-amisom-peacekeepers.
[208] Adebayo Kareem, “From AMISOM to ATMIS.”

fragmentation between different clans made it difficult to unify various small military formations and coordinate international partners. In parallel with this, AMISOM had to wage an armed confrontation with Al-Shabaab, so the army reforms had to be implemented in military conditions.

Due to the absence of a central government in the country from 1991 to 2004 and the functioning of a transitional government from 2004 to 2012, the central state institutions were completely destroyed. The population was accustomed to the fact that their security was ensured by regional authorities or clans. When the central government began to create a new security system, it was complicated by regional authorities who doubted the ability of the Somali government to provide security for the country effectively. For example, the first state institutions functioned so ineffectively that it was problematic to forge a sustainable revenue for SNA.[209]

An important obstacle to creating a cohesive army was clan division. The roots of the SNA clan division go back to the reign of Siad Barre when representatives of the Darood clan were appointed to key positions in the army. Even now, some military personnel prioritize the interests of their clans more than federal. Some SNA units are more loyal to their own clans and use their positions in SNA to oppress rival clans.[210] Later, the SNA was taken over by the Hawiye clan, and many regional governments within Somalia saw the Hawiye-dominated federal forces as rivals.[211] Often, these forces were perceived as illegitimate by the locals on the periphery.

A significant problem in creating an effective army was corruption. According to the Corruption Perception Index, Somalia has been one of the most corrupt countries in the world for many years, so corruption among the SNA command was also common.[212] As a Somali Parliamentarian mentioned, "corruption and poor management within the SNA have been identified as the primary factors contributing to low morale among troops, resulting in their retreat from the frontline." [213] Most of the allocated money was misused or did not reach the military personnel; they often did not receive wages and had to sell their ammunition and weapons and work second jobs. In 2009, the AMISOM force commander told the UN technical assessment mission that Al-Shabaab was offering the SNA fighters $50/month to swap sides, and this was a severe proposal given how many of them lacked food and equipment.[214]

A significant challenge for AMISOM was the constant resilience of Al-Shabaab. For sustainable peace, the peace operation in Somalia should have been accompanied by an active political settlement. It is known that Al-Shabaab rejects the possibility of negotiations with the FGS

[209] Williams, "Fighting for Peace in Somalia," p. 247.
[210] Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The problem with militias in Somalia: Almost everyone wants them despite their dangers," The Brookings Institute, April 14, 2020.
[211] Katharine Houreld, "Exclusive - U.S. suspends aid to Somalia's battered military over graft," Reuters, December 17, 2017.
[212] Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/somalia.
[213] Horn of Africa, "Somali army weapons, ammunition sold in open markets as corruption and poor management fuel Al-Shabaab's advances," April 9, 2024.
[214] Williams, "Fighting for Peace in Somalia," p. 252.

because it considers the current government to be pro-Ethiopian and treasonous. However, according to experts, without a political settlement, it is highly likely that once ATMIS is out of Somalia, the conflict will escalate again.[215] The political settlement is also necessary to provide a safe exit of ATMIS from Somalia.

The above-mentioned problems challenged the SNA and AMISOM and affected the implementation of the peacekeeping operation. It became especially difficult as AMISOM's territory of control grew. AMISOM and SNA faced a problem of "distributed battlefield"; when it is necessary to control large areas with a small number of armed forces, which requires high military skills. [216]

The SNA's low defense capability and weak state institutions created problems not only in terms of military counteraction to Al-Shabaab but also in establishing sustainable peace in the country. Weak armed forces will not be able to ensure the country's security after the withdrawal of the AU-UN peacekeeping mission from Somalia, so the UN and the African Union need to pay more attention to the SNA's capacity-building.

Civilian Safety

A major difficulty in the humanitarian dimension of the AMISOM-UNSOA partnership stemmed from the lack of implementing measures for civilian protection in the AU mission. As a result, harm to civilians has largely gone untracked, and international actors have had a hard time monitoring if the AU military mission has acted according to international humanitarian law. As a result of not explicitly protecting civilians from harm, civilian support of the mission has been negatively impacted, reducing the mission's legitimacy and effectiveness.[217] Although the Protection of Civilians is an AU and UN priority, the doctrine principles in each organization do not match, leading to a lack of efficient implementation of civilian protections in peacekeeping operations in Somalia.[218]

The largely untracked harm has been reported to be upwards of 4,000 peacekeeper deaths, making AMISOM/ATMIS the deadliest peacekeeping operation over the last 80 years.[219] The real number of casualties, including civilian casualties, is expected to be much higher, but a lack of AU and troop-contributing country transparency on fatality figures has led to incomplete data.

The violence resulting from the offensive operations against Al-Shabaab is estimated to have killed hundreds of civilians and displaced over 650,000.[220] Throughout the conflict period, the UN has reported spiked rates of gender-based violence, sexual violence, and violence against

[215] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[216] Robin J. Stauffer, "Battlefield Distribution: A Systems Approach?" December 14, 1995.
[217] Paul Williams, *Lessons for "Partnership Peacekeeping" from the African Union Mission in Somalia*, IPI, October 2019.
[218] ReliefWeb, *Transferring Policy: The African Union's Protection of Civilians Policy in Peacekeeping Missions in Somalia and South Sudan,* August 1, 2023.
[219] Harun Maruf, *Exclusive: At Least 3,500 AU Soldiers Killed in Somalia Since 2007,* VOA, April 2023.
[220] Tirana Hassan, "World Report 2024: Rights trends in Somalia," Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2024.

children, especially among the displaced population. Somalia is in a state of severe drought, and ongoing violence has blocked routes and disrupted the provision of humanitarian aid, leaving over 4.3 million individuals facing an urgent need for food assistance.[221]

Challenges in Funding

The AU and UN partnership in Somalia faces significant funding challenges, which are further complicated by governance and transparency issues within the AU. These challenges impact the effectiveness of missions like ATMIS, leading to operational and financial strains. A key challenge has been the costly stalemate in the fight against Al-Shabaab, with ATMIS forces spread thinly across a large area, making logistic support more expensive and reducing the mission's ability to sustain offensive operations. This situation has led to a reliance on aviation assets for logistical and combat support, given the insecurity of supply routes.[222]

Additionally, the strained cooperation between the AU and the UN is also exacerbated by uncertainties in the budgetary environment and the ad-hoc nature of counterterrorism operations. Sustainable political alignment between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council remains difficult, affecting the comprehensive response to crises. The deadlock on peacekeeping financing, highlighted by the failed negotiations over a UNSC resolution in 2018 and 2019, underscores the financial tensions in the partnership. The slow capitalization of the AU Peace Fund and challenges in establishing a systematic and institutionalized global arrangement for harnessing the AU's potential are other key issues.[223]

Lastly, the lack of governance and transparency within the African Union has historically undermined donor confidence, as uncertainties about how funds and resources are managed can deter continued financial support. Consequently, the ambiguity surrounding the AU's operations and decision-making processes raises questions about its missions' efficacy and integrity, potentially jeopardizing current and future support and partnerships essential for the region's stability.

Challenges to Information Sharing

Intelligence sharing has always been essential to the success of a peacekeeping operation on the battleground. Poorly managed information sharing can adversely affect the coordination and execution of a peacekeeping mission. The problem with the TCCs is that each country has its own rules, interests, and regulations for intelligence sharing. In situations when quick decision-making was required, the lack of information often forced the peacekeepers to remain at their bases or to not react appropriately.

[221] Hassan, "World Report 2024."
[222] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, *Peacekeepers and Political Stability in Somalia*, February 12, 2024.
[223] International Peace Institute, *Can the UN and AU Navigate the Shifting Landscape of Multilateral Peace Operations?* July 2021.

The issue of information sharing among TCCs leads to mistrust and mutual accusations. For instance, the Kenyan Defense Forces have been accused of working separately and independently from the central commandment of ATMIS and not sharing their information with other TCCs. The Uganda troops in ATMIS have also been accused of not sharing their intelligence with other TCCs.[224] Hence, insufficient information sharing affects the ability of ATMIS to analyze the situation on the battlefield, provide adequate intelligence, and strategic planning etc.

To ensure more trust among TCCs, it is necessary to take some measures aimed at creating an atmosphere of trust and reliability in information sharing. Firstly, TCCs, under the auspices of ATMIS, should develop some common requirements and rules for intelligence information sharing that would meet the core requirements of each TCC's laws. Also, training and education courses on information sharing should be conducted to ensure that both intelligence providers and consumers can protect the information. Secondly, to maximize the use of open-source intelligence to enable increased sharing among TCCs without risking sources and methods.[225] Thirdly, given the upcoming withdrawal of ATMIS and the need to transfer security responsibilities to the SSF, it is necessary to create a synergy between ATMIS and the SNA on information sharing and intelligence gathering.

Efficiency of the Mission's Transition

This section analyzes the effectiveness of the transition from AMISOM to ATMIS and the further drawdown of the ATMIS contingent. The idea of transitioning to ATMIS was first announced in 2017 when the Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as "Farmajo") decided that SNA should assume responsibility for the security of the country. According to some experts, Farmajo may have believed that eliminating AMISOM could attract more funding to the Somali army and that by eliminating AMISOM, Mogadishu would be able to curb Nairobi's influence in Somali politics.[226]

As a result, the Somali Transition Plan was signed, a document first released in 2018 and updated in 2021. This plan provides for the gradual security transition while strengthening the role of the SSF in the fight against Al-Shabaab and transferring key military and government facilities to protect the SSF. The Somalia Transition Plan's implementation includes four phases: reconfiguration, shaping and clearing operations; decisive operations; and consolidation, drawdown, and exit.[227] However, this plan's shortcoming is that the security responsibility transfer to the SSF does not correspond to its capabilities. In addition to problems with

[224] Musoma Albert Lusiola, Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, https://ajernet.net/ojs/index.php/ajernet/article/view/6, 2021.
[225] Transatlantic Security Initiative. In brief: A ten-step guide to transforming intelligence sharing with US allies. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/in-brief-a-ten-step-guide-to-transforming-intelligence-sharing-with-us-allies/. November 3, 2022.
[226] International Crisis Group, *"Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia,"* Africa Briefing N°176, November 15, 2021, p. 11.
[227] Letter from the UNSG addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2022/716, September 26, 2022, p 6.

equipment, supplies, and uniforms, the SNA has always had an acute problem of recruiting new military personnel, which should replace withdrawing ATMIS soldiers.

The distinctive feature of ATMIS's tactic is that the SSF has started playing a leading role in combat operations against Al-Shabaab. This trains and strengthens the SSF's fighting capacity, enabling it to take full responsibility for the country's security. Also, new tactics of collaboration with local clans in the fight against Al-Shabaab and drawing them to FGS's side are helping to strengthen Somali authority on the ground.

Table 3c.2. ATMIS drawdown phases (Source: AmaniAfrica website[228])

	Phase 1	**Phase 2**	**Phase 3**	**Phase 4**
Main activities	Reconfiguration	Joint operations and the transferring of FOB (Forward Operating Bases) to SSF	Decisive Operations and completion of the FOB transferring process	Complete withdrawal of ATMIS
AU Force Strength	18,586 *(2,000 troops drawdown at the end of Phase 1)*	16,586 *(3,000 troops drawdown at the end of Phase 2)*	13,586 *(4,000 troops drawdown at the end of Phase 3)*	9,586
Police	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Civilian Component	70	85	85	85

Another reason for AMISOM's transition is the fatigue of donors. International donors, especially the EU, were frustrated by the lack of progress of AMISOM, which initially was supposed to be deployed for six months. Therefore, reformatting AMISOM into ATMIS was one of the opportunities to outline the ultimate goal of the peacekeeping mission with the gradual transfer of FOBs and main facilities of Mogadishu under the protection of the SSF and the simultaneous withdrawal of peacekeepers.

Therefore, the AU Peace and Security Council Communique for the 1068th Meeting and the UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022) authorized ATMIS as a multidimensional mission

[228] AmaniAfrica, "Insights on the Peace and Security Council," September 13, 2023, https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-situation-in-somalia-and-activities-of-atmis/.

(military, police, and civilian), which replaced AMISOM with a clear mandate to implement the Somali Transition Plan fully. Thus, ATMIS became operational on April 1, 2022.

By the end of January 2024, ATMIS had completed its second military drawdown phase and handed over nine military bases to the SSF. In the framework of the drawdown, 3,000 ATMIS troops withdrew from Somalia. Due to the drawdown's first two phases, 5,000 troops left Somalia, and 13 military bases were turned over to Somali forces.[229]

However, the second phase of the drawdown was not very smooth. In September 2023, the FGS requested a 3-month pause of the drawdown due to the inability of SSF to hold the liberated territories. The main concern of many experts is the premature withdrawal of ATMIS, which is once again challenged by the poor combat training of the SSF. The main disadvantage of this phased withdrawal of troops is that it will not provide logistical support for the SSF when ATMIS is entirely out of Somalia. Although the Government of Somalia hopes that the UN will continue providing logistical supply to SNA after the withdrawal of ATMIS, such a decision has not yet been officially announced.[230] The UN leadership has already conveyed to the Somali Government that the withdrawal of ATMIS will be followed by the withdrawal of UNSOS, and logistical supply to the SNA will not be provided afterward.[231]

The success of the mission's drawdown depends on the extent to which ATMIS, the FGS, and other international actors succeed in the following: defeating Al-Shabaab, recovering the liberated territories, and consolidating federal authority in the country. As for now, none of these factors have been fully achieved, so the withdrawal of the ATMIS peacekeeping force may be premature. No matter the circumstances, Somalia's stability and state-building efforts need to be supported by significant advancement in political settlement and national reconciliation, which might involve considering the integration of Al-Shabaab into the process. Otherwise, there is a risk of repeating the mistakes of the past.

Lessons Learned & Recommendations

Lesson Learned: The UN's logistical mission's low adaptation capability could not meet the military component's growing requirements.

Recommendation to the UN: Proactively enhance logistical mission's support capabilities to enable its adaptation to AU's peacekeeping mission enlargement.

[229] Africa Defense Forum, *"ATMIS Completes Second Phase of Drawdown Amid al-Shabaab Attacks,"* February 27, 2024.
[230] Interview 6, February 16, 2024.
[231] Interview 12, March 29, 2024.

Future UN logistics missions should deploy their logistics bases closer to operating bases so that TCCs will have less risk in delivering supplies. Logistical support to the national army of host countries must also be predictable and adequate.[232]

Lesson Learned: Contradictions between Somalia's central and regional authorities hampered the establishment of efficient national armed forces.

Recommendation to the AU and UN: Encourage local political elites to reach a consensus on security issues as soon as possible and create a conducive national politics.

The conduciveness of national politics is fundamental for creating an effective army. For a long time, there was no consensus in Somalia about the power-sharing between the central and regional authorities, which complicated the establishment of the SNA.[233]

Lesson Learned: The lack of mandated protection of civilians reduced the AU mission's credibility and led to increased harm to the population.

Recommendation to the AU: Missions must have equivalent mandated civilian protections.

Future AU missions should adopt the UN's rules to prevent civilian harm and implement tracking mechanisms to ensure compliance and uphold the UN's values, therefore increasing mission integrity and success.

Lesson Learned: The ambiguity surrounding the AU's use of funds and financial decision-making processes raises questions about the efficacy, accountability, and integrity of the AU-UN partnership, potentially jeopardizing not only current but also future support and partnerships essential for Somalia's stability.

Recommendation to the UN and AU: Introduce independent assessments to evaluate the true cost of war or regional conflicts in Somalia, alongside verifying financial reports.

It represents a crucial step towards enhancing the transparency and financial partnership between the AU and the UN. Independent assessments ensure transparency and objectivity, providing a solid foundation for understanding conflicts' economic and humanitarian impacts. This approach aids in aligning resources with the areas of greatest need, thereby maximizing the efficacy of interventions. Furthermore, verifying AU reports through independent means enhances credibility and trust between the AU and UN, fostering a more collaborative and effective partnership.

[232] Adebayo Kareem, "From AMISOM to ATMIS. Critical Lessons for Optimizing the Transition Mission," April 2023.
[233] Paul Williams, "Lessons for "Partnership Peacekeeping from the African Union Mission in Somalia," IPI, p. 7.

Lesson Learned: The AU and the UN's different conceptual approaches to peacekeeping operations created problems with the reports of AMISOM peacekeepers regarding the material support received, disciplinary responsibility, etc.

Recommendation to the UN and AU: Harmonize the rules, norms, and requirements for peacekeeping operations, which are conducted in complementary ways.

Namely, create common standards for accountability and the use of consumable materials (fuel, weapons, water, etc.) provided by a UN logistics mission to a non-UN mission.

4. Conclusions and Overall Recommendations

Our team conducted expert interviews with scholars, practitioners, and mission officers for this report to build a comprehensive and balanced understanding of the partnership challenges and opportunities. We aim to inform future support of African-led solutions to crises on the continent. Our report contributes to the literature on the growing partnerships between the UN and regional actors in peacekeeping operations at a time when traditional missions face new challenges.

In December 2023, the UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution allowing for UN dues to be channeled to African Union-led peace operations. Our research comes at a timely moment when the UN and the AU can increase security cooperation.

This report concludes by proposing the following strategies, based on lessons from all three case studies, for designing effective partnerships, which are crucial to ensuring the efficient allocation of resources to efforts to save lives and establish peace:

Recommendations for the AU: Proactively build peacekeeping capacity.

As the UNSC begins to authorize and financially support AU-led missions under Resolution 2719, African troops will likely be called upon in greater numbers to serve in peacekeeping operations. To avoid the pitfalls faced by AFISMA and AMIS, the AU should provide funding for joint training among member states to proactively prepare for peacekeeping operations. This could happen through existing mechanisms, such as the African Standby Force. Attention should be paid to equalizing capacity across likely troop-contributing countries. Training of troops should focus not only on the military dimensions of peacekeeping but also on protecting civilians and human rights responsibilities.

Recommendations for the AU and UN: Undertake measures to synergize their doctrines on peace operations to improve strategic guidance, coordination, accountability, and shared norms.

Drawing from the partnership between the AU and the UN in Somalia, the peacekeeping missions must adopt a holistic approach. Apart from the military aspect, this approach should prioritize the restoration of governmental authority, the development of security forces' capabilities, and the significant consideration of humanitarian and human rights issues. At the inception of a peacekeeping operation, the mandate must incorporate measures for civilian protection and minimizing harm to the local population. This inclusion will foster accountability and increase public support.

Recommendation for the AU and UN: Before authorizing a mission, consider long-term funding requirements.

In the future, while the funding challenges hopefully will be less acute given the AUPSO financing resolution (2719), AU missions will still be responsible for 25% of mission costs. This should be accounted for in mission planning ahead of authorization, with due consideration to long-term funding needs, which goes hand in hand with an effective exit strategy.

Recommendations for the AU and UN: Implement independent assessments to determine the true costs of conflicts and other relevant risks in the region to enhance transparency in the AU-UN partnership.

This strategy improves transparency, strengthens the partnership, and ensures objectivity in understanding conflicts' economic and humanitarian impacts. Aligning resources with critical needs increases the effectiveness of interventions, and independent verification of the missions' reports boosts credibility and trust, leading to a more synergized and integrated partnership.

Before the withdrawal of the peacekeeping missions, the AU or UN must begin the recovery process proactively to safeguard its mission's legacy and preserve critical contributions. Such a political mission should be adequately resourced to implement some of the key goals of the African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy, including Political Governance and Transition, Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development, and Gender and Women, amongst others.

Recommendations for the AU and UN: Consider rigid candidate vetting for the mission's leadership to ensure its efficacy.

Based on these case studies, especially UNAMID, rigid candidate vetting for the mission's leadership is essential to ensure its efficacy, as leaders driven by personal ambitions rather than the mission's strategic objectives can undermine the mission's leadership and endanger its success. A comprehensive vetting process, conducted through collaboration between the UN and partner organizations, will help identify individuals who prioritize the mission's strategic aims in their interactions with the host government, parent organizations, and member states. This approach will prevent candidates from considering the assignment as merely a means to advance

their personal agendas in their home countries, ensuring their dedication to the mission's accountability.

Recommendations for the UN: Remain open to difficult but innovative partnership models like the Darfur hybrid mission when it does not have the option to deploy a traditional peacekeeping mission in response to a crisis.

The UN should consider a clear reporting structure. Designing the mission so that the head of the mission reports solely to the UN while partner organization(s) are accommodated in other specific roles within the mission framework might be more effective. The parallel deployments of AMISOM and UNSOM in Somalia or UNMIK in Kosovo in complementary and distinct roles, as discussed in this report, provide relatively more successful models.

In summary, this approach will help to boost accountability and dedication among mission personnel, ultimately enhancing the overall success of peacekeeping endeavors. Additionally, the UN should remain open to innovative partnership models and clear reporting structures to optimize mission efficiency, drawing from the valuable experiences of past successful collaborations in various conflict zones.